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ABSTRACT
THE ABSENT EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN
REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM
Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. Francis Adams

The United States often acted in Latin America as an empire. Nevertheless, there
has been an obvious dissimilarity between US actions in South America and US actions
in the rest of Latin America, which is illustrated by the fact that the United States never
sent troops to invade a South American country. While geographic distance and strategic
considerations may have played a role, they provide at best incomplete explanations for
US relative absence south of Panama. The fact that the United States has had a distinct
pattern of interactions with South America is thus not captured by the typical concept of
Latin America. By recuperating the virtually neglected literature on regional subsystems,
this dissertation maintains that researchers of inter-American relations would greatly
benefit from a characterization that reflected more regional realities than entrenched
preconceptions. Such a characterization would mean subdividing the Western
Hemisphere in two regional subsystems: North and South America. This subdivision
allows for uncovering regional dynamics that can help explain US relative absence from
South America when contrasted to the remainder of Latin America. This dissertation
argues that the role of Brazil as a status quo regional power in South America is the key
to understanding this phenomenon. Through a historical analysis focusing on specific
cases spanning three centuries, this research demonstrates that Brazil has deliberately
affected the calculations of costs and benefits of a more significant US involvement in

South America. While in the past Brazil has taken actions that resulted in increasing the
benefits of US limited involvement in South American affairs, in more recent times it has
sought to increase the costs of a more significant US presence. The concluding session
considers some of the theoretical and political implications of the framework laid out by
this research.
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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The first factor that students of US foreign policy toward Latin America
immediately have to take into consideration is the obvious disparity of power between the
United States and its southern neighbors. Faced with this reality, the second factor should
be to avoid the temptation of translating this indisputable fact into monocausal
explanations for the international relations of Latin America. While the first aspect has
been diligently observed by virtually all studies of the subject, the second has met more
resistance. Indeed, every important event in the history of Latin America, from peace to
war, from stability to instability, for good or for bad, can be attributed to actions planned
in offices in Washington under the usual framework of US-Latin American relations. As
one US Ambassador once observed: "We Americans tend to be societally ethnocentric almost narcissistic - exaggerating the influence of both our positive and our negative
actions in the world." ! This perspective is greatly helped by the fact that the customary
frameworks for the study of international relations are focused on the great powers.
But reality seems to indicate that if there is a region in which it would apparently
be difficult to exaggerate US influence, this would be Latin America. After all, history
shows an impressive array of military interventions, both overt and covert, territory
annexations, and other actions that indeed decisively changed the course of events in
Latin American countries. Hence, even before the United States was described as a global
This dissertation follows the format requirements of the Chicago Manual of Style 15th Edition. The
translations from foreign language sources are those of the author
1
Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), x.
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empire after the end of the Second World War, it could already be characterized as a
regional empire in the Western Hemisphere. For an extended period of their historical
relationship, whenever a country in Latin America was perceived as contradicting US
interests, Washington would repeatedly dispatch the Marines or find someone else to do
the job. Nevertheless, any brief examination of these actions reveals an obvious
geographic pattern concentrated north of the Panama Canal, with the vast South
American region basically spared the US imperial urge. This abundance of involvement
in one half of Latin America in contrast to a relative absence in the other half has been
translated in an abundance of studies focusing on the former in parallel to a relative
absence of studies focusing on the latter. The general result is that analyses of US policies
toward "Latin America" are mostly analyses of US policies toward Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean, with occasional references to South American countries to
give an impression of homogeneity or, when the researcher chooses to focus on South
American countries, the framework used is basically the same as ones used to analyze US
relations with the rest of Latin America. In this latter view, the distinctiveness of South
American international relations is occasionally acknowledged, but it is studied as a
special case within the broader Latin American framework. In other words, these
analyses interpret the different level of US involvement in South America as a mere
quantitative issue.
This dissertation aims to address this issue by first laying out a theoretical
framework for understanding and investigating South America that captures and explains
the distinct dynamics that have characterized the US relationship with that region in
contrast to the rest of Latin America. The most evident aspect illustrating these different

3

dynamics is the fact that, compared to its historical over involvement in Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean, the United States has been a relatively absent empire in
South America. This relative absence must be explained not just by looking into domestic
factors in the United States, but also by detecting how particular regional dynamics help
to shape the outcome of US foreign policies. Thus, the second aim of this research is to
demonstrate that there is a distinct pattern of interactions within Latin America that
justify treating South America as a distinct regional subsystem. In other words, South
America must be distinguished from the rest of Latin America not only because of the
different patterns of relations in respect to the United States, but also because there is
clearly a distinctive pattern of relations within South America that is not captured by the
customary concept of Latin America. The practical significance of this is that Latin
America as a concept has limited applicability in the field of international relations, and
its theoretical predominance often leads to error of analysis, judgment and, ultimately,
policies. In fact, this research implies that dropping the concept of Latin America
altogether in favor of the notion of a South and a North American regional subsystem
would lead to a significant refinement of the understanding of the international relations
in the Western Hemisphere.

THE ARGUMENT

In labeling the United States as an "absent empire" in South America, this
dissertation makes a relatively bold claim. After all, the references to Latin America as
the US "backyard" are abundant and the United States indeed frequently acted in the

4

region as a true empire. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the very notion of Latin
America when used to study phenomena related to the discipline of international relations
is inaccurate. A central assumption of this dissertation is that analysts of inter-American
relations would greatly benefit from a change in perspective that substitutes the culturally
defined notion of Latin America for the concept of a North and a South American
regional subsystem. The use of Latin America as a theoretical concept in US scholarship
tends to generate two main fallacies in the study of international relations in the Western
Hemisphere. Firstly, it assumes that there is somehow a level of integration - or at least a
very important integrating variable - that gives the region identified as Latin America a
degree of homogeneity. Secondly, and as a corollary of the first, it implicitly accepts that
there is a pattern of US foreign policy towards the region that justifies treating it as a
coherent unit.
This dissertation disputes both claims. First, it demonstrates that the variables
generally used to give homogeneity to Latin America, such as culture and level of
development, are not evenly used to define other regions in the world, and in any case
they are largely irrelevant for the purposes of international relations research.
Accordingly, when only the relevant variables are used, the notion of Latin America loses
its usefulness. Based on the literature on regional subsystems, it is argued that the
relevant variables should be based on geography and patterns of interactions, and that
these criteria tend to lead to the identification of a North and a South American regional
subsystem. Second, and following this characterization, this research argues that a
fundamental distinction should be made regarding the outcomes of US foreign policies in
each of the two regional subsystems in the Western Hemisphere. This fundamental

5

difference is captured by this dissertation's depiction of the United States as an absent
empire in South America, as opposed to being historically a very present empire in the
remainder of Latin America.
Thus, the central question of this research is what factors explain US relative
absence from South America? Although the literature has obviously noted the fact that
US foreign policies toward South America have displayed distinct characteristics in
relation to the rest of Latin America, the explanations given for this phenomenon have
been unsatisfactory at best, especially since the central factor typically mentioned has
been simply that South America is too far away, while Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean are too close to the United States. In addition, at the same time it
acknowledges this distinction, this literature also assumes that there is no reason to see
South America as a different region. In other words, the argument goes that the United
States has had the same policies towards the whole of Latin America, but because the
region south of the Panama Canal is deemed as having little strategic significance, it has
paid relatively little attention to South America. This is indeed a compelling argument,
but although it may explain a certain lack of interest, it fails to provide explanations for
the instances when the United States did pay attention to South America and yet the
outcome was the same relative absence of imperial policies. Moreover, as this
explanation holds that the United States has paid little attention to South America,
researchers have followed suit and the result is that US relative absence from South
America has been translated in a relative absence of South America in US studies on
Latin America.

This dissertation inverts the traditional argument indicated above and claims that
US relative absence from South America, even in the instances when the United States
demonstrated a clear interest in the region, must be understood not only in terms of South
America's distance from the United States, but also in terms of its "proximity" to Brazil.
The hypothesis put forward by this dissertation is that Brazil is a status quo regional
power that has affected the calculations of costs and benefits of a more significant US
involvement in South America. It is shown that while Brazil historically played a role
that resulted in increasing the benefits of relatively limited US involvement in the region,
in more recent times it has sought to increase the costs of a more substantial US presence.
As this research intends to demonstrate, this change can be understood not as a result of
particular domestic circumstances in Brazil, but because of changes in the international
and regional environments, with Brazilian regional strategic goal of preserving its
position in the South American subsystem remaining by and large invariable throughout
time. Hence, the fact that South America has been considered as a region of little
strategic relevance for the United States is but part of the explanation, in which it allowed
Brazil to play this role with fewer resources than it would have been case had South
America been located in a more strategically important region.

THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA

The concept of Latin America is fairly recent in its origins and it is usually
attributed as originally a French concept - where the idea of a Latin "race" was common used since at least the late 1830s, but particularly in the 1860s to give an ideological
justification for French imperialism in Mexico and to create the impression of cultural

affinity in the region, of which France would be the natural "protectress" against the
Anglo-Saxons in the north. In a pioneering study, John Leady Phelan maintains that the
first use of the expression VAmerique latine was in article entitled "Situation de la
latinite''' by L. M. Tisserand, published in Januray 1861. Nevertheless, more recent
studies demonstrate that "a number of Spanish American writers and intellectuals - many
of them, it is true, resident in Paris - had used the expression 'America Latina' several
years earlier." Joao Feres Jr. claims that the first usage of the term was made by the
Colombian poet Jose Maria Torres de Caicedo, who spent most of his life in France, in a
poem called Las Dos Americas (The Two Americas), in 1856. As the title of Caicedos's
poem makes clear, not much differently from the French, these Spanish American writers
employed the concept of America Latina to reinforce a common identity in the Americas
in opposition to the "other" America in the North. In fact, Caicedo proposed a union of
the "Latin American" republics against the threat of "North American" aggression, which
became a particularly relevant issue after the Mexican-American War in the 1840s.
Therefore, before there was Latin America, there was Amerique Latine and
America Latina. For these writers though, Latin America was synonymous with the
Spanish American republics, and hence Brazil - which was not only Portuguese-speaking
but was also a monarchy - was not included. Likewise, Brazilians also did not consider
themselves as Latin American, not least because Brazil on one hand emphasized its

2

Michel Chevalier, Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States, Reprints of Economic Classics
(New York,: A. M. Kelley, 1966).
3
John Leddy Phelan, "Pan-Latinism, French Intervention in Mexico (1861-7) and the Genesis of the Idea
of Latin America," In Concienciay Autenticidad Historicas; Escritos en Homenaje a Edmundo O'Gorman,
Emerito, Aetatis Anno LXDicata, ed. Juan Antonio Ortega y Medina (Mexico: UNAM, 1968).
4
Leslie Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'," Journal of Latin American Studies 42, no. 03 (2010): 458.
5
Joao Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and
Social Scientific Discourse" (Phd Diss., City University Of New York, 2003), 68.
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American identity, and on the other it had a certain feeling of foreignness in relation to its
Spanish-speaking neighbors; therefore it was not interested in creating a sense of
separation in regards to the United States. But with the popularization of the term in US
academic circles, the idea that the nations south of the United States could be considered
as part of a region called Latin America gained ground and with that Brazil was also
included. As Leslie Bethell argues, it was only when "America Latina became Latin
America" in the 1920s and 1930s, but most particularly after the Second World War, that
Brazil became to be regarded as part of a region called Latin America.6 Yet, only much
later on, during the Cold War, would some Brazilian writers begin to identify themselves
as Latin Americans, which was particularly evident among the Left seeking to reinforce
the ties with the Cuban Revolution as well as the distance from the United States.
In the United States, the expression "Latin America" can be found in official
documentation by the late 1890s, and before that the term used was "Spanish America"
or "Hispanic America." But it was only after the First World War that "Latin America"
became widely used in English. A research in the Library of Congress and the New York
Public Library revealed that before 1900 there was not a single publication containing the
term "Latin America" in its title, while between 1900 and 1910 only two publications
were found, between 1911 and 1920 twenty-three, between 1921 and 1930 twenty-five,
with steady growth after that and burgeoning after 1960, when "Latin American
studies" became somewhat fashionable in the United States, owing specially to the Cuban
Revolution. An interesting illustration of the problems associated with the concept of

6

Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'," 474.
Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social
Scientific Discourse," 363.

7

9
Latin America, and its struggle to be accepted as an adequate referent during its initial
stages of existence, can be seen on the occasion of the foundation of the Hispanic
American Historical Review, in 1918, which was the first journal in the United States
dedicated to the study of Latin America. The editors considered naming the journal as
"Latin American Historical Review," but they eventually concluded that the term was
Q

"ambiguous, misleading, and unscientific." They argued that the original notion of
"Hispania" included both Spain and Portugal.
As it was the case when the term was employed both by French and Spanish
intellectuals, in the United States the concept of Latin America was also used on one
hand to create the impression of cultural affinity among the countries south of the United
States, and on the other hand to create a sense of separation between the United States
and its less developed "Latin" neighbors. Feres Jr. argues that the notion of Latin
America, far from being a value-free geographic concept, has been used in the United
States to perpetuate and justify an asymmetry between the perceptions of the American
"self in opposition to the Latin American "other." For Feres Jr., "Latin America" can
be understood as an "asymmetric concept, i.e., a concept defined in opposition to a
collective self-image and used to name a generalized other." 10
In any case, since its inception, it seems clear that the relatively recent concept of
Latin America, in its Spanish, French, and English versions, has been employed not on a
geographical basis but on perceived cultural similarities and in order to establish a clear

8

Charles E. Chapman, "The Founding of the Review," The Hispanic American Historical Review 1, no. 1
(1918): 17.
9
Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social
Scientific Discourse."
10
Ibid., 61.

10
contrast in relation to the United States. Given the definitional problems associated with
the concept, the fact that it is a unique case of widespread use of a term to identify a
region based on cultural referents, as well as its racialist implications, it is remarkable
that "Latin America" has been uncritically accepted as a scientific concept used to study
the international relations of the Western Hemisphere.

THE QUESTION OF EMPIRE

This dissertation makes reference to the United States as an "empire" or as
occasionally pursuing "imperial policies." Although the United States has been referred
to as an empire innumerable times,11 the definition of what this term effectively means in
this context is far from a settled issue. In fact, empire is one of those terms in the social
sciences that have acquired significant emotional undertones, and as such it has
inevitably lost some of its scientific usefulness. This issue is especially controversial in
the US context since it was a country born in reaction to an overseas empire and is

11

The examples are virtually endless, but some include, in chronological order: Robert Rutherford
McCormick, The American Empire (Chicago: Chicago Tribune, 1952); Amaury De Riencourt, The
American Empire (New York,: Dial Press, 1968); Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire
(New York,: Crowell, 1971); Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of Empire : the United States and Latin
American Militarism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The
United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986); Robert W.
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's
Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know:
Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1997);
Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, 35th anniversary
ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Michael Ignatieff,
"The American Empire," New York Times Magazine, May 1, 2003; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of
America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Chalmers A. Johnson, Blowback: The costs and
Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop:
Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, The American Empire Project.
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: the American
Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009).
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therefore imbued with a strong anti-imperialistic rhetoric. While it is not the purpose of
this dissertation to offer a final answer to this definitional problem, it is important to
make some observations regarding the broad sense in which the term is employed here,
even if the term is admittedly used in a loose way.
First of all, a clear conceptual distinction must be made between empire and the
notion of imperialism. Indeed, considering the way the concepts have evolved, it seems
pretty reasonable to treat empire and imperialism as two distinct sets of literature. A
common factor present in the studies of imperialism is an economic interpretation of
history, which is insufficient to understand instances when motivations other than
economic are present.1 As Norman Etherington, who wrote one of the best accounts on
the subject, remarks, "an enormous amount of confusion has been generated by using
empire, colonialism, and imperialism as synonyms. Theories of imperialism were not
theories of empire."13 Some may argue that, as the concept of imperialism has historically
been appropriated by the left to denounce alleged evils of capitalism, an effort to separate
it from the broader concept of empire is an attempt to avoid an ideological contamination.
This is not entirely wrong and even William Appleman Williams, who could hardly be
considered a right wing writer, acknowledges the problems of putting empire and
imperialism in the same basket. Williams observed that "the semantic trouble began with
the causal appropriation of the world imperial, originally associated with empire, to
12

Classical studies on imperialism as used in the modern sense include the pioneering work of John
Hobson and the influential piece by Vladimir Lenin: J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York,: J.
Pott & Company, 1902); Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York,:
International publishers, 1933).
13
Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest, and Capital (London; Totowa, N.J.:
Croom Helm; Barnes & Noble Books, 1984), 267. For other good accounts on theories of imperialism see:
Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism; The Story and Significance of a Political Word,
1840-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 1964); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism (New
York: Random House, 1980); Earle Micajah Winslow, The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study in the Theories
of Power (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1948).
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describe an evolving set of different relationships between advanced industrial societies
and the rest of the world." 14 Likewise, George Liska observes that an "imperial function'
is distinctive from "its deformative 'ism', aggressively expansionist imperialism." Thus,
it is not merely a matter of avoiding an ideological corruption, but of elucidating the fact
that empire and the conventional notion of imperialism refer in fact to two different sets
of relationships. This research is about empire, not imperialism.
The second important characteristic that must be emphasized regarding the use of
the term empire in the present dissertation is that it does not refer to a political entity but
to a system of relationships that may or may not be pursued as a strategy by powerful
states. In this sense, the question is not whether the United States is or is not an empire,
but whether or not it has pursued imperial solutions for specific problems. In other words,
power is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of imperial
policies, and so the question becomes whether the reality of US power was or was not
translated in imperial ways in order to pursue specific policy objectives. This perspective
is similar to the one adopted by modern students of empire, such as George Liska, Geir
Lundestad, Michael Doyle, Alexander Motyl, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim.16

14

William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of
America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980), 7.
15
George Liska, Twilight of a Hegemon : The Late Career of Imperial America (Dallas: University Press
of America, 2003), 55.
16
, Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press,
1967);
, Twilight of a Hegemony: The Late Career of Imperial America; Geir Lundestad, The
United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford
; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003);
, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and
Western Europe, 1945-1952.";
, The American Empire and other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a
Comparative Perspective (Oslo; Oxford: Norwegian University Press; Oxford University Press
[distributor], 1990); Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Cornell studies in comparative history. (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1986); Alexander J. Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and
Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1999);
, "Is
Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?," Comparative Politics 38, no. 2 (2006); Alexander Wendt and

13
All these authors define empire not as a political entity but first and foremost as a
"system" or "structure" of relationships, which allows the researcher to identify which
relationships between individual states display imperial characteristics and which do not.
Basically, the kind of relationship that characterizes an imperial system described by
these authors is one in which the anarchical aspect of the international system is
challenged and elements of hierarchy come into the fore. For Doyle, who wrote one of
the most relevant works that attempts to give a scientific definition to the concept, an
empire is a "system of interaction" characterized by "control of both foreign and
17

domestic policy" whereas hegemony is characterized only by the control of the first.
Thus, imperial control is understood as "one form of the exercise of asymmetrical
1 R

influence and power" among others. This distinction has also been made by Adam
Watson, who distinguished between hegemony, "where a powerful state controls the
external relations of its client states," and what the author calls dominion, "where it also
intervenes in their domestic affairs."19
One useful way to differentiate an imperial relationship from other kinds of
relationships, such as hegemony for example, is by relating it to the concepts of
autonomy and sovereignty. While the latter relates to the classical Westphalian
conception and means that the state "is subject to no other state and has full and exclusive
powers within its jurisdiction,"20 the first can be broadly understood from the perspective
of international relations as the notion of freedom of action, or the opposite of
Daniel Friedheim, "Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State," International
Organization 49, no. 4 (1995).
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dependence. Doyle remarks that while a dependent state is "a state subject to limited
constraints on its economic, social, and (indirectly) political autonomy," an imperialized
state is one whose "effective sovereignty" is controlled by the imperial state.

Similarly,

a recent study on the subject of empire has defined an "imperial rule" as "a relationship in
which a state assumes some degree of sovereign political control over a subordinate
polity."22 A sovereign state may enjoy more or less autonomy in the pursuit of its
objectives on the international arena without necessarily affecting its condition of
sovereignty. As Kenneth Waltz commented, "to say that a state is sovereign means that
it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems,
including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its
freedom by making commitments to them." This limitation in freedom that Waltz
refers to can be interpreted as the autonomy aspect, which claims that the more limits are
placed on its freedom, the less autonomy a state has. Because the condition of
sovereignty requires a hierarchical structure in which there is no higher authority within a
given territory above that of the state that controls it, whenever an imperial relationship is
established, a new hierarchy is in place and the result is loss of sovereignty. For Roberto
Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, who studied the question of autonomy and
sovereignty specifically within the context of Latin America, the first
was more a South American issue than a Latin American one. In northern Latin
America (of which Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean form a part), the
accent was more on the question of sovereignty, given that this region has
historically been the object of diverse uses of force by the United States-conquest
and annexation of territories, invasion and military intervention, covert
Doyle, Empires: 12-13.
Paul K. MacDonald, "Those Who Forget Historiography are Doomed to Republish it: Empire,
Imperialism and Contemporary Debates about American Power," Review of International Studies 35, no. 1
(2009): 81.
23
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operations, and so on. South America, from Colombia to Argentina, on the other
hand, had a relatively greater margin for diplomatic, commercial, and cultural
maneuvering with respect to Washington. It is thus not surprising that most of the
literature on the subject of autonomy has been produced in South America and,
more specifically, in the Southern Cone.
Therefore, when this dissertation refers to the United States as an "absent empire"
in South America, it does not imply that this country has been absent in that particular
regional subsystem, which would be nonsense, but that a system of relationships between
the United States and South America that could be accurately characterized as being
imperial in nature has not been established. This observation is even more pertinent when
one considers the kind of policies that the United States repeatedly pursued in Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean, policies that have historically demonstrated obvious
imperial characteristics, the clearest evidence for which being the fact that the US sent
troops to decisively affect domestic politics in these regions a number of times during the
nineteenth and twentieth century in order to enforce its interests.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

This introductory chapter has made reference to the notion of "regional
subsystems." This concept is not nearly as popular in international relations literature as
the notion of an "international system." While the latter is the focus of much of the
research in the field, the former is sparsely studied, and the result has generally been
much conceptual confusion and little scientific validity. In order to examine the trajectory
of studies focusing on regional subsystems, chapter 2 offers a review of the literature
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produced on this subject. This chapter seeks to accomplish three main goals. First, it aims
to rediscover this literature, which was born around the late fifties but had died down by
the late seventies, swallowed first by the neorealist approach during the Cold War, which
tended to neglect regional dynamics, and later by the regionalist approach after the Cold
War, which tended to neglect systemic factors. Second, by organizing and clearly
locating the literature on regional subsystem within the broader international relations
literature, I am able to offer a definition of a regional subsystem by arguing that there are
only two necessary and sufficient criteria for its establishment: geography and patterns of
interaction. Finally, with this conceptualization in mind, I examine how the literature on
regional subsystems has been applied to the study of Latin American international
relations before and after the Cold War. I show that while earlier works did not make any
analytical differentiation between South America and the rest of Latin America, some of
the more recent works have discovered the advantages of doing so.
Chapter 3 addresses the advantages of the regional subsystemic approach and sets
the methodological basis of the dissertation. I present the regional subsystemic approach
as a useful theoretical tool to the study of international relations in terms of overcoming
the traditional international-domestic dualism that has prevailed in the field, and argue
that the regional level can be seen as a third level of analysis, between the domestic and
the international. I define a regional subsystem as a subset of the international system
reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum
between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic
proximity. Then I indicate what the regional subsystemic approach can accomplish and
explore in more detail the definitional aspect by showing what a regional subsystem is
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and what it is not, and by stressing the main aspects of the definition. In addition, I make
the case for a constructivist approach to the study of regional subsystems as social
systems and for the importance of a historical approach based on the notion that agents
and structures are not independent variables but are co-determined. The main implication
of this constructivist approach is the fact that regional subsystems should be studied by
taking into consideration both the spatial dimension and the time dimension.
While chapter 3 makes the methodological case for a regional subsystemic
approach to the study of South America, chapter 4 makes the specific case for the
existence of a South American regional subsystem. I show that the existence of a South
American regional subsystem is a corollary of the methodology and the definition
developed on the previous chapter which considers the necessary and sufficient criteria of
geographic proximity and patterns of interaction and logically leads to the conclusion that
South America should be treated as a separate regional subsystem in the Americas. After
some quick geographical considerations, I define what I mean by patterns of interactions
and indicate a way to operationalize these patterns in order to include a broad range of
interactions, both conflictive and cooperative in nature. Then I apply this to the case of
Latin America in order to demonstrate the existence of a South American subsystem, and
to emphasize the importance of Brazil within this subsystem. In addition, I draw from
Robert Gilpin's work on international system change and adapt these theories to the
regional subsystemic approach in order to understand what factors can potentially lead to
regional subsystemic change. With this framework in mind, I am then adequately
equipped to address the central claim of this dissertation, which is that the United States
has been an "absent empire" in South America. I examine the usual explanations
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provided by the literature for this relative absence, showing that there is a latent discourse
of US absence from South America that is not clearly articulated. After presenting a
critique of these explanations, I offer my own point of view based on the role of Brazil
affecting the structures of costs and benefits of subsystemic change for the United States.
This basic explanation forms the framework for the subsequent case studies.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are composed of case studies selected following three main
criteria. First, if a pattern of interaction was to be demonstrated, they should encompass a
lengthy period of time. Indeed the chapters cover a period spanning three centuries, going
from the time of the independence of Latin American states until recent years. Second,
because the focus is on the regional subsystem, it would be useful if the case studies
comprised different configurations of the international system in order to demonstrate
that regional subsystemic dynamics remained relatively constant regardless of variations
in the international system. Thus, each case study corresponds to a distinct configuration
of the international system and of the corresponding US position in it: multipolar, with
the United States as a regional power; bipolar, with the United States as a global power;
and unipolar, with the United States as the remaining superpower. Third, the cases
selected should consider periods when the United States clearly demonstrated an interest
in South America in order to detect how its policies interacted with the South American
subsystem. Otherwise, just demonstrating US absence in terms of neglect would be
repeating the existing argument in the literature. Although they cover lengthy periods of
time, each chapter focuses on a specific US policy in which South America was an
important component. Therefore, chapter 5 focuses on the Monroe Doctrine in the
nineteenth century, chapter 6 on the US actions in Chile during the Cold War, and
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chapter 7 on the US proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the post-Cold War
period. The case studies show that for each period there is a corresponding Brazilian
strategy affecting the structure of costs and benefits of US presence or absence. While for
the first two periods Brazil sought to raise the benefits of US absence from the South
American subsystem, in the latter period Brazil attempted to raise the costs of a more
significant US presence. Lastly, chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research,
including some theoretical and policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Virtually as soon as the system's approach took hold in the field of international
relations with Morton Kaplan's "System and Process in International Politics", first
published in 1957,25 a number of international relations' scholars reacted against the
notion that international politics should be assumed as being "total and global," and that
it was imperative to consider how the fact that international politics often has a "non•

Oft

global character" would impact the application of systems theory. Most of those
scholars were area specialists and were concerned particularly with the connection
between area studies and the emerging systems approach to international relations. What
derived from this incorporation of systems theory into area studies was a subsystemic
approach based on regional criteria.
The literature on regional subsystems (or "subordinate systems" , or "partial
international systems"28 as they have been called) gained momentum in the sixties and

Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957).
Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics 10, no. 3
(1958): 409.
27
For example: ibid; Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International
Studies Quarterly 12, no. 3 (1968); Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The
Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics 15, no. 2 (1963); I. William Zartman, "Africa
as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization 21, no. 3 (1967).
Additionally, Peter Berton used the term "submacro" to refer to regional subsystems, while Michael
Wallace talked about "cluster of nations". Peter Berton, "International Subsystems-A Submacro Approach
to International Studies," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1969); Michael D. Wallace, "Clusters
of Nations in the Global System, 1865-1964: Some Preliminary Evidence," International Studies Quarterly
19, no. 1(1975).
28
For example: Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial
International System," International Organization 17, no. 3 (1963); Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction Regional
26

21
seventies, but the success of the neorealist approach in the late seventies and its focus on
the global level and the constraints imposed by the international system - which was a
useful fit for the Cold War environment - eclipsed the regional approach. After the end
of the bipolar configuration, however, a new wave of studies taking the region as a
referent for analysis appeared. The reasons for this resurgence are commonly attributed to
the fact that great powers had less incentive to intervene after the end of the Cold War,
which tended to give regions more autonomy to develop with a lower degree of outside
influence. Nonetheless, this literature was generally more concerned with processes of
regionalization based on cooperation and the establishment of institutions and thus little
room was left for the regional subsystemic approach that had been developed up until the
seventies.

THE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMIC APPROACH

The regional subsystemic approach to studying regions, as contrasted to other
possible approaches, takes into consideration two main factors in order to establish the
existence of a regional subsystem: geographical proximity and patterns of interaction. In
fact, an approach that takes only the first criterion is not necessarily systemic, while
approaches considering only the second are not necessarily regional. The importance of
these two aspects will be considered later on, as now the goal is to present an overview of
this literature. Although not all authors presented here refer specifically to the term
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regional subsystem, they advance a concept of region that is systemic, and this justifies
their inclusion in this literature.
Even though other criteria have been offered for the identification of a regional
subsystem, geographic proximity and regular interactions can be considered as providing
both necessary and sufficient conditions. Indeed, in a widely cited article analyzing the
literature produced on regional systems up until the early seventies, William Thompson
concluded that there were a "lack of uniformity" in the concept of regional subsystem and
identified a total of twenty-one attributes mentioned in the literature, which he reduced to
the two that were the "most consistently cited" and that were after all "already implied by
the regional subsystem term": proximity and regular interaction.

The other nineteen

characteristics attributed to regional subsystems, such as common developmental status,
degree of integration, or shared ethnic, cultural, and historical bonds were deemed neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions.
A corollary of the concept of a regional subsystem is the notion that states in a
regional subsystem have a degree of interdependence in the sense that "the activities of
other members of the region (be they cooperative or antagonistic) are significant
-5 1

determinants of its foreign policy."

The caveat that the interactions can be "cooperative

or antagonistic" is crucial, as the very notion of system is neutral vis-a-vis the nature of
the relationship. Karl Kaiser defines a subsystem in terms of pattern of interaction and
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adds an "awareness of interdependence among participating units" as a characteristic.33
Similarly, Joseph Nye talks about a region as being characterized by "a limited number of
states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual
interdependence."

Again, it is important to remember that interdependence may

involve both conflictive and cooperative aspects, friends and enemies alike. In this sense,
states are considered to be interdependent "when the outcome of an interaction for each
depends on the choices of the others." As Wendt remarks, interdependence should be
distinguished from "common fate", such as a common threat. The difference between
them is that common fate does not imply interaction. The interdependence aspect that
characterizes the regional level is important because it determines one key assumption of
the regional subsystemic approach: the notion that for a number of countries with a
number of issues, the regional setting, as "a relatively self-contained network of political
interactions,"

is more relevant than the global setting in foreign policy actions.

Since Thompson's article was published, there have been no noteworthy
challenges to the notion that proximity and patterns of interactions are the key variables
to define a regional subsystem. The most significant challenge comes perhaps from
David Lake and Patrick Morgan, who concentrate on the security aspect and dropped
both geography and interactions as factors in order to define a "regional security
complex" is terms of shared "security externalities" among its members - with all other
33
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criteria being secondary.

However, the more recent scholarship has generally confirmed

the conceptualization of geographic proximity combined with patterns of interaction as
necessary conditions. Douglas Lemke, based on Haas' earlier conception, defined a
regional subsystem in terms of states' "ability to interact militarily," which he claims to
combine both proximity and interaction.39 For Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, who
developed the notion of regional security complexes, the chief criteria for defining a
region must be "the actual patterns of security practices."40 Michael Schulz et al also
stress that a regional subsystem is characterized "by the patterns of interaction," and add
that they can be manifested in a variety of fields such as economic, cultural, and
security.41 Similarly, Arie Kacowicz maintains that regional subsystems "are
characterized by cluster of states coexisting in geographical propinquity as interrelated
units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations."42
Nevertheless, as Thompson had detected, besides geography and interactions,
several other criteria have been used by a number scholars in order to identify a regional
subsystem. Perhaps the most mentioned alternative, and the one that even presently
seems to bring more problems to the clarity of the concept, has been the need for a
collective identity and culture. Even for those authors who concentrate on the two main
conditions presented hitherto, the temptation to include factors related to identity and
J
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culture has been strong. For instance, after making the case that a regional subsystem is
characterized by the interrelatedness among states in a given geographic area, Louis
Cantori and Steven Spiegel defined a regional subsystem as consisting of "one state, or
two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic,
cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased
by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."43 Likewise, Kacowicz, after
insisting on the geographical and patterns of interactions criteria, feels it necessary to add
that an important factor is a "subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive
community and having a collective identity." Hans Holm and Georg Sorensen maintain
that the concept of region is "multidimensional" and used Latin America as an example
of "regions of identity."45 In none of these cases is it clear how the cultural criterion is
helpful for the analysis of regional subsystems, except perhaps to justify the culturallydefined referent "Latin" in Latin America.

INITIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Often-cited works of the initial wave of the literature on regional subsystems
include Leonard Binder on the Middle East, which is considered one of the first works
referring to the region as an analytical level between the global and the local, Michael
Brecher on Southern Asia, Larry Bowman on Southern Africa, and George Modelski on
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South-East Asia.46 Because of their important early efforts to elaborate the notion of
regional subsystems, a brief exploration of these four works is necessary.
Binder's pioneering work is especially relevant as he was perhaps the first author
to acknowledge that approaching the study of international relations uniquely through the
lenses of the international system - that is, the assumption that "international politics is
total and global" - led to "a lack of refinement" when dealing with issues that did not
necessarily fall under the bipolar logic. These issues were particularly germane when
moving from a great-power view to the study of lesser powers. International politics
should then be viewed, Binder argued, not "as a single global international system" but
instead as several systems "with a variety of relationships". The author recognized that
the bipolar system of the Cold War was in fact the dominant system, thus the label
"subordinate systems" to define what we call regional subsystems. Therefore, Binder
maintained, the need for describing and analyzing these several systems would have to be
an important task for area specialists and political scientists. Although he attempts to
present some general guidelines, Binder does not offer specific criteria for the
delimitation of such subordinate systems, but hints that they "must be referred to
substantive problems which cannot be solved without the concept of area." He then
goes on to analyze the Middle East as a subordinate system, noticing the "inapplicability
of the theory of bipolarity to Middle Eastern international politics"49 both to describe
"relations within the Middle East or between the major bipolar system itself and this
46
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subordinate system."50 Binder argues that, notwithstanding a history of US and Soviet
intervention, the Middle East region operated with rules that were "relatively independent
of the 'rules' regulating the dominant bipolar system." 51 The consequence of these
relatively independent rules would be that when external power was projected into a
subordinate system it would be "refracted" by the particular dynamics of that system.5
Binder's evident interest in the application of the concept of subordinate systems to
analyze both the relationships within those systems as well as how those relationships
related to the global system and affected the projection of power by the great powers is an
important factor that often reappeared in subsequent studies.
Brecher also challenges the assumption of a single international system in the
study of international politics. Like Binder, Brecher considers the international system to
be the dominant system but not the only one, and while the international system approach
was valid to explain certain features of international politics, there was "an array of interstate problems, conflicts, and relationships among actors outside the blocs that have
nothing or little to do with the bloc system", and thus the notion of subordinate systems
was pertinent.5 In examining the "Southern Asian" subordinate system, Brecher notes
that for all states composing that system, except China and India, the subordinate system
"is the primary, if not exclusive, framework for foreign policy."54 Although Brecher
focuses on Southern Asia, his article is fundamentally an attempt to build a systematic
approach to the study of subordinate systems and in this sense it is a further step in
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relation to Binder's work. Brecher identifies five "definable subordinate systems":
Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, West European, and West African.55 He does
not explain how to categorize the other regions in the world left out of the five
subordinate systems he presents nor the specific composition of the other four systems he
does not examine in detail, but offers six conditions for the conception of a subordinate
system: delimited geographical scope, at least three actors, external recognition by other
actors, internal recognition by the members, relative inferiority of power in relation to the
powers composing the dominant system, and the fact that changes in the dominant system
have a greater effect in the subordinate system than the reverse. Brecher also identifies
three "structural features" for classification of subordinate systems: the configuration
(distribution and level) of power, organizational integration, and "character and
frequency of interaction among the members."57 In the case of the American system the
structural features would be respectively: "unqualified domination" of the United States ;
"impressive" organizational integration, but only "on paper;" and "continuous bilateral
ties with the hegemonial power, but variation of intensity among Latin America - high in
Central America and the "deep south", and lower among the other members.58 Similarly
to Binder's concern with the relationship between outside powers and subordinate
systems, Brecher draws attention for the question of examining the links between the
dominant and the subordinate systems, especially "the nature and degree of penetration"
of one system into the other. In the case of the "American system," Brecher argues that
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thanks to American hegemony, and unlike Southern Asia, there was no power vacuum
and hence Soviet penetration was prevented until the Cuban Revolution in 1959. .59
In a similar effort to systematize the study of regional subsystems, Modelski, who
actually prefers the term "regional subsystem" over "subordinate system," identifies
some characteristics of such systems. The main innovation introduced by Modelski and not generally followed by the subsequent literature - was the consideration of only
small powers as constituting a regional subsystem. Thus, for Modelski, a regional
subsystem is defined as "a less than universal pattern of relationships created by a cluster
of small powers in a condition of proximity."61 Therefore three conditions for the
establishment of a regional subsystem are presented. The first of these conditions is the
existence of "a number" of countries, which the author estimates in "around a dozen," in
order to "create favorable conditions for the emergence of certain system properties." The
second condition established by Modelski is the exclusion of great powers since they
"tend to have world-wide and small powers only sub-system centered interests" and that
"the great power's impact upon a sub-system is the key to the understanding of its
functioning." Finally, a regional subsystem is geographically determined but
"functionally diffuse" and should therefore be "distinguished from regional alliances
which are functionally specific arrangements concluded by some or all members of a subsystem, usually with one or more great powers, for certain determinate political and
military purposes." Modelski also adds that a crucial factor to be taken into
consideration is the level of influence that great powers have upon the regional
59
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subsystems. Hence, subsystems should be distinguished by the number of great powers
that exert influence over them: if there is one dominant power, if there are two or more,
or if the subsystem is relatively free from great power influence.63
Although not identified by Brecher as one of his five subordinate systems,
Bowman draws from Brecher's framework to argue for the existence of a subordinate
system in Southern Africa, emphasizing that it is even more justified than the existence of
a West African system mentioned by Brecher. According to Bowman, one central factor
that would give unity to this subordinate system is the regional economic dominance of
South Africa.64 Besides arguing for the existence of a separate Southern African system,
the main innovation Bowman introduced to the analysis of subordinate systems is related
to the exploration of factors determining the reasons for the stability of the Southern
African system in terms of its power to prevent outside intervention. This supposed
power to prevent intervention has two sources, one defined negatively and other
positively. The first relates to the "unpredictability of the direction of coerced change" in
a "troubled" region of the world. This would have as a consequence a "lack of great
power interest in a Southern Africa military adventure" which would constitute a "central
pillar of support for the system." The second positive source of stability is identified as
the "South African defense establishment," the existence of which would mean that "any
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invasion would meet strong resistance."65 Bowman can thus explain the stability of the
South African system exclusively through references to subsystemic properties.
A common theme that appears in all early works mentioned above is the role of
outside powers when they interact with the regional subsystem. This theme is taken up by
Karl Kaiser in an article specifically addressed to examine how external factors,
particularly the role of superpowers and the interactions with other subsystems, affect the
evolution of regional subsystems.66 Kaiser seems eager to demonstrate that a regional
subsystem is not necessarily based on states. He develops a typology of regional
subsystems based on "the location of the elites who make decisions on matters relevant to
relations between the members of the regional subsystem." The three ideal types
described by Kaiser are: the Transnational Society Subsystem (nongovernmental elites
acting independent of states), Intergovernmental Regional System (decisions taken by
governmental elites), and Comprehensive Regional Subsystem (a hybrid of the other
two). But possibly more important than this typology developed by Kaiser are his
considerations regarding the interaction between different regional subsystems. Two
forms of interaction deserve particular consideration: the "demonstration effect" and the
"threat effect." For instance, Kaiser remarks that the process of European integration
would have worked both as a model and as a threat (because the potential exclusion from
/TO

the European system) to similar processes in Central and South America.

Regarding the

role of superpowers, Kaiser points out "the desire to gain autonomy vis-a-vis the
superpower" as a driving force for the consolidation of regional subsystems and again
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mentions the examples of Central and South America, with the United States acting as an
incentive for processes of regionalization.

Although Kaiser claims not to be interested

in the study of regionalism and processes of integration, his analysis is focused on
institutions such as the EEC and NATO, and he seems heavily influenced by the
regionalist literature.70
This first wave of literature in the fifties and sixties was followed by a renewed
attempt to theorize the notion of regional subsystems in the seventies. Two major efforts
during this period are Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel's "The International Politics of
71

Regions", and Bruce Russet's "International Regions and the International System".
What distinguished these works from the early wave is their greater effort to define what
exactly a regional subsystem consists of and how to delimit their borders. Russet's book
is a particularly good example of this preoccupation. Faced with a number of criteria to
demarcate regional subsystems, Russet selected five different criteria in order to come up
with five different ways of categorizing regional subsystems: social-cultural homogeneity
(economic development, religion, size, etc); political attitudes/external behavior (based
on pattern of United Nations voting); political interdependence and institutions (measured
by membership in international organizations); economic interdependence (measured by
trade); and geographical proximity. For each of the five criteria, Russet presented a
distinct possibility of demarcating a region. For example, according to the criterion of
geographic proximity, there would be a region called Africa and another called Asia, but
69
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using the criterion of socio-cultural homogeneity or external behavior, a new "AfroAsian" region is conceived. Russet's book is especially important in the sense that it
makes clear the different ways one can conceive a region depending on the criteria that
are being used. However, beyond this effort of categorization, Russet does not offer
79

much theoretical insight.
In comparison to Russet's, Cantori and Spiegel's book is more theoretically
oriented. In contrast to Brecher, who a few years earlier had identified only five, Cantori
and Spiegel identified a total of fifteen regional subsystems (Middle East, West Europe,
East Europe, USSR, North America, Latin America, East Asia, Southwest Pacific,
Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa,
East Africa), but concentrated only on five of them for the purposes of their study (West
Europe, Middle East, West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America). It is interesting to
note that the subsystems on which they chose to focus are very similar to the five
subsystems identified by Brecher, but where Brecher identified an American system,
Cantori and Spiegel see Latin America as separated from North America. Like some of
the earlier works mentioned, Cantori and Spiegel offer some variables to compare and
construct a typology of different regional subsystems: nature and level of cohesion
(social, economic, political, organizational); nature of communications (high or low
degree); level of power; and structure of relations (conflictual or cooperative). Likewise,
mirroring the concerns presented in the first wave of literature on regional subsystems,
the authors remark on the important role played by outside powers in defining those
systems in their concept of "intrusive" systems. Here, two types of "externally based
72
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regional participation" are offered: politically insignificant and politically significant
involvement. The first "comprises material aid, trade, economic investment, and cultural
and educational efforts which do not usually produce participation in the balance of
power in the region", while the latter
is expressed by the possession of a colony; economic or military aid producing an
alteration in the balance of power in the region; formal alliance, troop
commitment, or any agreement which causes the external power to act in ways
which resemble the types of actions that would ordinarily be taken by a country
indigenous to the region.

LATIN AMERICA IN THE EARLIER LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

With these theoretical efforts that accompanied the development of the literature
on regional subsystems, the problem of how to treat Latin America became evident. As
shown above, while some authors spoke of an American subsystem, others referred to a
Latin American subsystem. With few exceptions, none of these works came to the
conclusion that it would be analytically useful to treat South America as a separate
subsystem,7 and little was produced on Latin America. One of the few works applying
the concept of regional subsystem and the theoretical insights of the earlier works in
order to analyze specifically the case of an "emerging" Latin American subsystem did not
bother to notice any distinctions between South America and the rest of the region. This
is even more remarkable considering the authors began their essay by mentioning Robert
Burr, who talked explicitly about a South American system in contrast to the rest of the
J
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region7 . But since the authors used the terms South America and Latin America
interchangeably, this difference seems to have escaped their analysis. Another study on
"Latin American International Politics," treats Latin America as a coherent subsystem
and at some point refers to the existence of "a balance of military power, particularly
77

among the South American countries."

•

The addition of the adverb particularly leads

the reader to assume that there is a balance of military power among other parts of Latin
America, but the author is silent about this possibility.
A common feature of the works making the case for treating Latin America as a
coherent regional subsystem is their lack of compelling evidence for doing so. For
example, in their study, Cantori and Spiegel acknowledge in a footnote that there may
exist in fact some problems in considering Latin America as a single system, but they
present evidence to justify their choice of doing so. It is worth noticing that, akin to other
works, while all fifteen subsystems proposed by Cantori and Spiegel are geographically
referenced, the only one that is culturally referenced is Latin America. Whereas the
authors consider Latin America as a single system, they divide the African continent in
North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa. Their
explanation for this profusion of African subsystems is that "the African continent is
fragmented by a variety of local interactions, while in Latin America, despite great
differences, the area is more interrelated."

To demonstrate the supposed interrelatedness

of the Latin American subsystem they mention the fact that the region has organizational
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cohesiveness, high degree of communication, and a low level of conflict - predictably,
thanks to American hegemony. The evidence they offer, however, fails to make the case
for either variable. To show "organizational cohesiveness" the authors mention the
creation of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association, today known as ALADI)
and CACM (Central American Common Market) and conclude that "a high degree of
cooperation of the alliance variety" exists in Latin America.

A closer look on the

membership of these organizations, however, would only serve to reinforce the notion
that there are actually two different systems at work in Latin America - while LAFTA
included only South American countries (with the exception of Mexico), CACM included
only Central American countries. To demonstrate the high degree of communication in
Latin America, the authors footnote a work that focused specifically on South America.80
Finally, arguing that the structure of relations in the region was characterized by low
levels of conflicts, they except the Chaco War, and "a variety of disputes which include
Peru vs. Ecuador, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, Argentina vs. Chile, and Argentina vs.
Brazil," which are all examples taken exclusively from South America.81
In his study on the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin
America and Eastern Europe respectively, Edy Kauffman adopted Cantori and Spiegel's
framework but went even further in his defense of the existence of a single Latin
American subsystem. The author uses the usual criteria of geography and patterns of
interaction and concludes that given the "high intensity of interaction between the twenty
Latin American countries," Latin America could be treated as "a unified entity, while
79
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Africa, Asia and Europe can be divided into two or more subsystems."

One major

problem of Kauffman's analysis is that he is not consistent with his own adopted criteria
of geography plus patterns of interactions. For example, he justifies the exclusion of
some countries from Latin America, like Jamaica and Guyana, on the basis of "different
historical tradition and experience, and the linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural
differences of these countries."

The rest of Latin America would be unified in terms of

"common historical links, religion, race and culture, not only inside the component states
QA

but crosscutting them."

Therefore, argues Kauffman, given this remarkable degree of

"cohesiveness," it would be "impossible to divide the subsystem into smaller regions." 85
At some point, the author also considers particular governments such as Castro's Cuba
and Allende's Chile as "exceptions." They would not be part of the Latin American
subsystem, the author affirms, because "they maintain policies different from the
majority of countries in their respective subsystems" and thus they would constitute
"exceptions to the rule of superpower domination in Latin America." 8 This means that
Kauffman implicitly includes the convergence of policies among its members as another
variable for the constitution of a regional subsystem, which means that participating in
the subsystem becomes a matter of domestic decision. It is interesting to note that in
contrast, Eastern Europe is seen as a complex region with important cultural, historical,
and economic differences, and it is considered single a subsystem basically because of
penetration by the Soviet Union. Why Kauffman abandoned the cultural and historical
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criteria he used for Latin America when he switched to Eastern Europe is never explained
to the reader.
There were, of course, some exceptions to the rule of lumping together Latin
America as a regional subsystem in this earlier literature. Jorge Dominguez, for example,
differentiates between a Middle American and a South American subsystem based on
different patterns of territorial disputes and economic links. He adds that they are not
only distinct but they "compete against each other" for the "economic favors" of the
United States.

Russet had forewarned that although he used the concept of Latin

America as a single subsystem, it seemed apparent to him that "not all Latin America is
equally involved in this potential subsystem" but that a core group existed in Central
America and the Caribbean, "with the nations in the lower half of South America, and of
course the United States and Canada, very much more marginal." In fact, with more
careful scrutiny, the author detected discrepancies on trade, "where the hemisphere was
split into two components, a North and Central American aggregate, and one for South
America", as well as in political behavior and international organizations.8 Even so, in
the few instances where Latin America was studied under the regional subsystemic
perspective during this period, the general rule was that it was commonly treated as a
single coherent unity, and that included Russet in spite of his caveats. Typically, this
interpretation led to generalizations about international politics in the region - particularly
*

concerning the relationship with the United States - that were often based on empirical
data taken from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.
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REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS AND THE END OF COLD WAR

Although a good amount of theoretical insights were produced by the literature on
regional subsystems from the fifties to the seventies, the consolidation of neorealism as
the main theoretical paradigm in international relations, especially after the publication of
Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" in 1979, eclipsed the subsystemic
approach. The main argument of neorealism was that the most important features of
international politics could only be explained by references to systemic pressures which
emanated from the anarchical environment of the international system. Any reference to
interacting units should therefore be seen as "reductionist," as opposed to a "systemic"
approach. Likewise, neoliberal reactions to neorealism also generally took the point of
view of the global international system.90 Consequently, the regional subsystems became
a mere footnote when explaining international politics and little interest was directed to
this literature. The resilience, and in a certain way the neatness, provided by the bipolar
environment certainly contributed for the success of the neorealist approach. With two
global superpowers struggling for supremacy, references to balance of power concerns
seemed, in effect, to explain a great deal of international politics. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union, however, changed the international landscape and removed an important
incentive for intervention by the remaining superpower. This in turn gave more relative
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autonomy to regional subsystems which translated into new impulse to the literature
focused on regional processes.
Despite this renewed interest, when scholars turned their attention to regional
dynamics with the end of the Cold War, the majority of the literature produced dealt with
processes of regionalization, i.e., when statesmen deliberately design strategies of
regionalization through political-economic integration and formalize it in regional
organizations. However, as Oran Young points out, it is analytically important to make a
clear differentiation between institutions and organizations.91 While the first refers to
social practices, the latter is translated into formal structures, or "material entities
09

possessing physical location (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budget."

The

notion of a trade regime would be an example of the former, while the World Trade
Organization would be an example of the latter. Likewise, regional subsystems can be
understood as institutions, while regional trade agreements are organizations, and the first
may or may not coincide with the latter. This commonly overlooked distinction is
important because, as Young remarks, it allows the analyst to explore the relationships
between institutions and organizations. Therefore, it can be argued that empirical
observable processes that characterize a given region are based on actual patterns of
interactions that may or may not be eventually formalized in formal organizations. In
other words, the formalization of a regional subsystem in the form of a regional
organization is not an independent phenomenon, but the two generally follow previous
patterns of relationships that were socially constructed. The reality of interactions
Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the
Environment, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 31.
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precedes the building of formal organizations, which does not mean to negate the fact
that the establishment of formal organizations may affect the pattern of interactions in a
93

region.
As a matter of fact, one could hypothesize that a regional subsystemic perspective
based on actual patterns of interactions can help to predict the relevance and effectiveness
of formal regionalist schemes. As David Lake observes, rather than including the
establishment of institutions in the definition of regional subsystem, "it is preferable to
treat the degree of institutionalization as a dimension of possible variation for further
analysis." Cooperation is just one extreme aspect of a spectrum of interactions in which
the other end may be characterized as conflict. Hence, this dissertation will not focus on
processes of regional cooperation among governments leading to policies of
regionalization, but rather on the consolidation of regional subsystems as subset of the
international system reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions — including
the whole spectrum between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of
geographic proximity. It is not the concern of the present study to analyze states'
integration strategies or to raise normative concerns, but to make the case that the
existence of regional subsystems as a social reality and as an analytical tool is an
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important factor to consider in the study of foreign policy. Therefore, this dissertation
assumes that, while there may be some overlapping between the literature on regionalism
and the literature on regional subsystems, the two can and should be clearly
distinguished.9
When this distinction is made, it becomes clear that while the "regionalist"
literature burgeoned after the end of the Cold War, the literature on regional subsystems
reappeared quietly and sparsely. Probably the most significant theoretical insight among
the works taking the regional subsystemic perspective to study contemporary
international politics is the development of the concept of "regional security complexes"
by Barry Buzan and the so called "Copenhagen School." Buzan adapted much of the
early literature on regional subsystems in order to apply it specifically to the context of
security. He criticized, for instance, Cantori and Spiegel for attempting "to tackle regions
across the whole agenda of international relations" which would be "too complex and
cumbersome to establish a generally followed understanding of region." Thus, by
focusing on security, Buzan seeks to "provide a narrower and more manageable
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approach." The problem with this argument is that, while claiming to offer a "narrower"
approach, the concept of security itself employed by Buzan and the Copenhagen School
in general, is considerably broad, covering military, political, economic, societal, and
go

t

t

environmental security. Buzan characterizes a regional security complex, or RSC, as
being "defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal,
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence"99 and that has a "mediating
effect [...] on relations between the great powers and the local states."1

Consequently,

even though geographical proximity is considered to be an important factor, the author
remarks that RSCs "are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the
security practice of the actors."

The fact that RSCs are "socially constructed"

evidences its "constructivists roots," given the fact that regional subsystems are
"dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of
1 09

the distribution of power."

Hence, as regions are then defined both by geographic

factors as well as "by the actual patterns of security practices,"

it becomes clear that

the regional subsystemic perspective used by Buzan is similar to the one that was
developed by the early literature as seen above. Moreover, reminiscent of the earlier
literature on regional subsystems, Buzan acknowledges the effects of regional subsystems
in the relations between great powers and states in a given subsystem.
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At the same time that this double focus on geography and patterns of interactions
places the notion of regional security complexes side by side with the literature on
regional subsystems, it also distinguishes it from the notion of "security communities," a
concept initially developed by Karl Deutsch104 in which boundaries are "determined by
shared understanding rather than geography."

Somewhere between these two

literatures lies the notion of regional security complex as developed by David Lake and
Patrick Morgan. Contrary to Buzan, Lake and Morgan do not define a regional security
complex in terms of geography plus patterns of interactions, but on the idea of "security
externalities". A regional security complex is thus defined as "a set of states continually
affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic
area."106 While Buzan sees geography as a necessary condition for a RSC, Lake and
*

Morgan do not. Whereas Buzan stresses that "the actual patterns of security practices" are
the key to define a RSC, Lake and Morgan maintain that since externalities are what
define a RSC, they "may be created even when there is no manifest or measurable
1 07

'interaction' between states, such as the exchange of goods and services."

The problem

with this argument is that the authors seem to equal interactions with the "exchange of
products or material,"108 or only with practices of cooperation, which is evidently a
mistakenly narrow definition of interaction.
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Other examples of the application of the insights generated by the literature on
regional subsystems after the Cold War are Arie Kacowicz's "Zones of Peace in the
Third World" and, more recently, Markus Kaim's "Great Powers and Regional
Orders."109 Kaim's edited book is dedicated to the analysis of the role of external powers
in regional subsystems with a focus on the United States in the Persian Gulf. Kaim
develops an analytical framework based on four variables that would determine an
external actor's influence in regional subsystems: the level of domestic consensus such as
"the influence of societal forces, predominantly manifested in the existence of specific
interest or lobby groups;" intra-regional dynamics, or "the quality of a given regional
order," which includes "intra-regional patterns of power and influence and the way the
regional parties cooperate with, or confront, each other;" domestic politics of regional
players; and the structure of the international system.110 These variables, Kaim maintains,
"determine whether the United States can be influential in a regional order, when, and
under what circumstances."111
Kacowicz focuses on South America since the 1880s and West Africa since the
sixties in order to explain "the maintenance of periods of extensive peace" in these two
regions in spite of the fact that they have not been democracies for most of the goven
time frame.112 Because Kacowicz is interested in explaining the "preservation of
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international peace at the regional level,"

the framework of regional subsystems is

uniquely well-suited for his purposes as it allows him to focus on a level between the
dyadic and the international system and "to define several zones of peace instead of just
one democratic zone."114 Although Kacowicz presents several possible explanations for
this phenomenon, he emphasizes the satisfaction with the territorial status quo by states
within the region as the strongest factor. By focusing on regional subsystems, Kacowicz
is able to produce some interesting insights, one of the most relevant of which is the idea
to highlight the role of Brazil in the South American subsystem and at the same time
situate the commonly overemphasized role of the United States in that region within
perspective. Brazil, Kacowicz points out, has been the most territorially satisfied country
in the subsystem and is the country that would have most to lose from a change in status
quo, which "might affect the existing structure of prestige."115 Therefore, as a
"quintessential status quo power," Brazil would play an important role in maintaining
South America peace.' ] 6 Thus, the Brazilian interest in keeping the status quo in the
region is presented by Kacowicz as being an important part of the explanation for the
establishment of a zone of peace in South America since 1883, in contrast to Central
America which is characterized as a zone of conflict. As Kacowicz argues, "in regional
rather than systemic terms it can be argued that Brazil has played a more preponderant
role as a potential hegemonic power than the United States." m Likewise, Buzan and
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Waever argue that the role of Brazil as a "hegemonic stabilizer" is "more important than
the often-made reference to the United States as a regional hegemon."118

LATIN AMERICA IN THE RECENT LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

In relation to Latin America, a common trait of Buzan's and Kacowicz's approach
is their insistence in making a clear differentiation between South America and the rest of
Latin America, which allows them to provide interesting insights that would be lost if
they did not make this distinction. In his study, Kacowicz found it necessary to "clearly
distinguish between two regions or subsystems: Middle America [...] and South
America."119 The reason for this is that only in South America could Kacowicz identify a
zone of peace, as Middle America was a zone of conflict until at least the end of the Cold
War. Similarly, in their study on regional security complexes, Buzan and Waever also
found it useful to take apart South America as a distinct region from the point of view of
security, while incorporating Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean into the North
American complex. The authors justify that "despite recurrent hemispheric projects [...]
North and South America have different security dynamics and connections are highly
asymmetrical."120 In fact, Buzan and Waever argue that the North American and the
South American complex are not only dissimilar, but they also consist of different types
of RSCs - while the South American RSC is characterized as a "standard" RSC, the
North American would be a "centered" RSC. The difference is that a centered RSC is
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dominated by a great power, while in the standard RSC the polarity is determined by
regional powers.

It is interesting to notice that this preoccupation in clearly

distinguishing South America from the rest of Latin America was present only in an
embryonic way in Buzan's earlier work. In "People, States, and Fear" Buzan found the
Americas "somewhat harder to characterize" and made mention to a "Latin American
complex" that was congruent with South America, but only by exclusion, since the fact
that Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were included as a "hegemonic
complex" part of the North American complex, because they "have been so penetrated by
the United States" that "any independent security dynamics" was "virtually impossible to
discern."122 The direction of his subsequent work demonstrated how Buzan later refined
this idea. Nevertheless, for some unexplained reason, Buzan and Waever felt it necessary
at a certain point to justify treating South America as a distinct regional subsystem would
be relevant only from the point of view of security. In fact, they claim that the South
American subsystem "is a useful example of where the pattern of regional security does
not line up with other patterns of regionality." However, aside from a general mention of
the "southward ties" of Central America and the Caribbean, the authors do not explain
what other "patterns of regionality" would make Latin America a coherent regional
subsystem.123
Like the works just mentioned, other works in the post Cold War era also tend to
consider South America as a separate regional subsystem, yet they generally either view
this as a new phenomenon or as restricted to some issue-areas. David Myers, for
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example, argued that the view of South America "as an autonomous international arena in
its own right" was an "emerging" trend and while in the past "the United States once
crafted policies for all of Latin America (the Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor
Policy, and the Alliance for Progress) more recent initiatives have centered on the
Caribbean Basin."124 In Schulz et al there is a separate chapter dedicated to South
America, but because of their focus on cooperation, the authors see this detachment of
1 9S

South America as a trend that begun only with the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps the most important work applying the concept of regional subsystem
exclusively to the case of Latin America is G. Pope Atkins' "Latin America and the
Caribbean in the International System."126 Contrary to Buzan/Waever and Kacowicz,
Atkins chose to make the case that Latin America as a whole should be treated as a
regional subsystem. Like the earlier works previously mentioned, the problem with this
view is that Atkins is unable to make a convincing case why it is relevant to do so. The
author claims that the criteria for the identification of boundaries of a subsystem are not
only geographic proximity and "regularity of interactions among the units," but also a
"degree of mutual identity" based on "regional self-perception and the views of the
external actors about the region."

As it is the case with other authors who overlook the

centrality of patterns of interaction in order to emphasize the notion of a supposed
"mutual identity" in Latin America as a justification for treating it as a coherent system,
Atkins also encounters some difficulties. The author argues that the reason some
124
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specialists prefer not to treat Latin America as a system would be because of "great
differences and heterogeneity among the states within the region," and that this view of
Latin America as "so internally different" that "it cannot be treated as a whole" would be
"exaggerated and misleading." 128 However, the fact that internal differentiation is not a
part of his own definition of a regional subsystem seems to have escaped his
examination. In fact, states in a regional subsystem can be very different internally and
still be part of the same regional subsystem. Therefore, Atkins is left with supposed
notions of a shared identity and recognition by external actors - which would be proven
by their "Latin American policies" - to make the case for treating Latin America as a
regional subsystem.129 When Atkins attempts to show patterns of interactions, he briefly
mentions some regional organizations, with many of them, such as the Latin American
Parliament, having little or no actual significance. Other important aspects of interaction,
such as trade and conflicts, are not mentioned. Although claiming to be "appropriate" to
treat Latin America as a single coherent unit, Atkins concedes that it is "incomplete"
because it is necessary "to highlight those subsystems with different conditions," and he
mentions Mexico, Circum Caribbean, South America and Brazil as subsystems within the
1 ^0

subsystem.

By considering individual countries, the author confuses a subsystem with

a regional subsystem and does not make clear why this is analytically useful from the
point of view of international relations. Atkins acknowledges that "much of the Mexican
international subsystem has been and is largely divorced from the broader inter-American
arena," that "the United States has engaged in unilateral military intervention only in
Mexico and the Circum-Caribbean," and that the Southern Cone "forms a regional
128
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subsystem distinguished by a number of characteristics that make it dramatically different
from the northern sector of Latin America" with "intense patterns of interaction among
themselves largely shaped by regional factors with minimal reference to outside states or
intergovernmental organizations."1 ' When these factors are taken into consideration, it
becomes hard to justify why Atkins stick to the notion of a Latin American subsystem as
analytically dominant in the field of international relations over the notion of a South
American and a Middle American regional subsystems. In fact, throughout Atkins' book
there is not a single relevant explanation that is generated by the notion of a Latin
American subsystem, as the author is constantly forced to remember the different patterns
of interaction in the region. Chapter 4 aims to address these weaknesses by making the
case for a South American subsystem. Before that though, a few theoretical
considerations are necessary.

131
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

The concept of a subsystem as applied to international relations theory is
straightforward: an international subsystem can be understood as "any subset" of the
international system.

In general, a subsystem can by and large be considered as "a

component of a larger system" but one "with systemic properties of its own."

Within

this basic conception, a subsystem of the international system can actually be "any set of
specific variables"134 according to the purposes of the researcher.
In fact, the idea of a subsystem within the overall international system has been
used to direct attention to different sets of variables. For example, when Kenneth Waltz
refers to subsystem he means the nation-states.135 Similarly, in his celebrated "level-ofanalysis" essay, J. David Singer uses the notion of subsystem to refer to the domestic
level - the choice would then be selecting between "the international system and the
national sub-systems" as a referent for analysis.

For Morton Kaplan, subsystems can be
1 ^7

either national actors or supranational actors such as the United Nations.

Thomas

Robinson analyzed the "Communist System" as a subsystem of the larger international

132

Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," 100.
Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Prepositional Inventory," 97.
134
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, ed. Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J.
Collier, ECPR Classics (Colchester, UK: European Consortium for Political Research Press, 2005), 20.
135
Waltz, Theory of International Politics: 62-63.
136
J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14, no. 1
(1961): 78.
Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics.
133

53

system.138 One aspect of Niklas Luhmann's Modern Systems Theory is the notion that
subsystems in the international systems are functionally differentiated. Thus, functional
subsystems would include politics, law, the economy and science.139
Consequently, the choice to focus on regional subsystems is but one choice
among other possibilities for subsystemic research in international relations. The
justification for this preference is based on the belief that delimiting the boundaries of
international subsystems in terms of regional factors can bring significant contributions
for the understanding of international politics. Perhaps the main contribution would be
overcoming the conventional domestic-international dualism that has shaped the majority
of the researches in international relations, thereupon opening up different possibilities
for analysis by taking a step down in relation to the neorealist focus on the global system
and a step up in relation to the liberal focus on the domestic system. It is not a matter of
attempting to integrate both theories, but of acknowledging the existence of a third level
beyond the usual two that are considered by these theories. Yet, by identifying a new
locus of investigation between the nation-state and the international system, between
domestic politics and international politics, the regional subsystemic approach holds the
promise of bringing together foreign policy analysis and theory of international politics.
It therefore seeks to transcend the notion that theory of foreign policy and theory of
international politics are utterly distinct140 by using some of the theoretical framework
provided by systemic theories of international relations in order to generate explanations
138
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for foreign policies' outcomes. Thus, a regional subsystemic approach is not
"reductionist" as it does not make reference solely to unit-level attributes of particular
states in order to provide explanations. This approach is in fact "systemic" but its main
focus shifts from the global system to the regional system. It does not look for the
domestic sources of foreign policy, but more for what one author called the "foreign
sources of foreign policy".141
At this juncture, it is important to make a distinction between foreign policy
formulation, which may be satisfactorily explained by references to domestic politics,
and foreign policy outcomes, which cannot be fully understood without making reference
to systemic processes. As Harold and Margaret Sprout demonstrated, for any political
undertaking, it is important to differentiate between "decisions and operational results,"
in other words, to distinguish between "what is undertaken and what is accomplished."142
The regional subsystemic approach - akin to the "ecological perspective" advocated by
Sprout and Sprout - is thus less interested in examining specific foreign policy decisions
than analyzing the "achievements, actual or potential, with reference to a given
undertaking or strategy."

Thus the methodological focus of regional subsystemic

research should not be on what is undertaken, but on what is or can be accomplished. For
that reason, this dissertation will not attempt to explain, for example, why the United
States decided to intervene in Chile in the seventies or to push for a Free Trade Area of
the Americas in the nineties, but how regional subsystemic dynamics contributed to the
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actual outcomes of these initiatives. In general terms, this means that the "absentness"
thesis proposed here is demonstrated not in terms of thoughtful decision-making
processes by US statesmen, but in terms of the particular dynamics of the South
American regional subsystem and its interaction with the United States.
Additionally, the stress on regional subsystems postulates an explicit assumption
that geography matters in international relations.144 This is not only "because geographic
dimensions [...] are nearly always significant in discussions of political undertakings and
the operational results thereof,"145 and it thus has an impact on the aforementioned
distinction between decisions and outcomes, but especially because geography shapes a
number of important interactions such as "the intensity of economic exchanges and the
likelihood of war."

This is particularly relevant for a concept of subsystem that is

based on interactions ranging from the whole spectrum between cooperation and conflict.
Moreover, as Hans Mouritzen argued, besides anarchy, the other fundamental
characteristic of the international system is the fact that "its major units are mutually nonmobile,"

and while the consequences of anarchy have been thoroughly explored by the

international relations literature, the consequences of "non-mobility" have consistently
been overlooked. In fact, both theories of foreign policy as well as theories of
international politics seem to neglect the importance of geography. As a result, most of
the systemic theories of international relations, which were imported from other fields
144
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where the basic units are mobile, do not take into account the fact that states, contrary to
firms for example, are fixed in space.148 The major implication of this characteristic is
that there is "a cleavage between unit and system" 149 which "means that each state faces
a specific and stable salient environment rather than the international system as a
whole."150 The notion of "salient environment" that is explored by Mouritzen is
coterminous with the concept of regional subsystem as employed by this research.

WHAT A REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM IS - AND WHAT IT IS NOT

Following the review of the literature presented in the previous chapter, there are
two - and only two - sufficient and necessary variables for the establishment of a regional
subsystem: geographic proximity and patterns of interaction. This reasonably
parsimonious definition serves the purpose of international relations research and the
field would greatly benefit if it was applied more consistently.
Indeed, the exclusive focus on geography plus patterns of interactions does not
mean that there are no other ways to delimit a region depending on the purposes of the
researcher. Students of geography, comparative politics, or anthropology may find it
necessary to choose among a different set of variables, but if the purpose of the regional
analysis is to refine our understanding of international politics and to advance theoretical
propositions in this field, the regional subsystemic approach seems to be an adequate fit.
For this reason, it may be useful to distinguish the term regional subsystem from the
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usual notion of region, with the first being the focus of investigation of international
relations.151 This distinction is not merely nominal since a region is not necessarily a
regional subsystem. The perspective presented by this research, for instance, is that while
the existence of Latin America as a region is justified from the point of view of other
disciplines, within the field of international relations the view of a North and a South
American subsystem is far more useful. The failure to make this distinction has led to
recurrent errors of analysis, judgment, and policies. This is especially true when it comes
to US foreign policy towards the hemisphere. In particular, it obscures fundamental
differences between US foreign policy toward South America and the rest of Latin
America. Additionally, it prevents a more sophisticated understanding of the role of
Brazil, which has historically felt uncomfortable being labeled as "Latin American."152
As mentioned in the previous chapter, by focusing on geography and interaction a
regional subsystem is understood here as being a subset of the international system
reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum
between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic
proximity. Members of the same regional subsystem have a higher degree of interaction
among themselves in relation to members outside the subsystem, and as a result their
primary foreign policies concerns lie within their own regional subsystem. That means
that they usually seek first and foremost to establish a position within their regional
subsystem before taking into account their situation in the international system as a whole
- this fact, which is commonly neglected by studies focusing on great powers, is
151
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especially consequential when it comes to analyzing the foreign policies of regional
powers. Defining a regional subsystem only in terms of geographical proximity and
patterns of interaction, without specifying a minimum number of states, means that there
can be as many regional subsystems as there are neighboring interacting states. In fact,
one could envisage a number of different regional subsystems containing only two states,
and the fewer the number of states, the more coherence of the proposed subsystem. But at
the same time, the larger the number of regional subsystems identified, the less
parsimonious the subsystemic approach becomes. The question of drawing boundaries
then is related to balancing the need for coherence with the need for parsimony in order
to retain the usefulness of the regional subsystem concept as an analytical tool and a
research program.
The definition proposed above has three main components that deserve careful
consideration. The first is the fact that a regional subsystem is a subset of the
international system as a whole, which means that the international system can be
considered the subsystem's environment. This implicates the acknowledgment that
pressures from the overall system coexist alongside subsystemic pressures, but the latter
is usually more significant for the members of a regional subsystem. Second, a regional
subsystem reflects actual patterns of interaction, which implies that it can only be
detected by looking at past interactions and not by measuring the potential for interaction.
A regional subsystem is conceived here as being a social system and, as James Rosenau
has pointed out, "recurring - and therefore patterned - interaction is the distinguishing
1 S^

feature of a social system."

153
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subsystem in terms of, for example, the "ability to interact militarily", is faulty in the
sense that it does not reflect the actual patterns of interaction.154
One needs to look at a reasonably long period of time in order to detect these
patterns and bear in mind that "not all interactions are equally important in shaping the
external behavior of an individual state; key patterns of interaction must be uncovered
and explored."
challenging.

Nevertheless, the problem of operationalizing interaction is certainly
As Michael Wallace remarked, "nations may enter into relationships with

one another in so many different ways, and interact by such a wide variety of means at so
many different levels, that no single measure, however comprehensive, can claim to be
1 S7

completely adequate."

In fact, the index presented by Wallace himself- based on

common membership in international organizations - is highly inadequate as it
concentrates only in the cooperation aspect of interaction, thus ignoring the possibility of
subsystems in which conflictual relations prevail. Finally, the third characteristic of the
definition suggested above is the fact that a regional subsystem includes members in
condition of geographic proximity. The geographic criterion is crucial regardless of the
level of interconnection or interdependence of the global international system, a condition
that has led some scholars to discount the importance of geography.

As Mouritzen
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suggests "even a perfectly interconnected international system does not overrule the fact
that one is primarily connected to one's neighbors."159 Moreover, geographic proximity is
positively related to intensity and opportunities for interaction, since distance is assumed
to increase costs of both trade and conflict, for example.
But in order to define a regional subsystem, it is also necessary to make clear
what it is not meant by regional subsystem, since there has been much conceptual
confusion regarding the use of the term. Perhaps the two most common misconceptions
are first, equating regional subsystem with processes of regional integration, and second,
the emphasis on variables other than geography and pattern of interactions. The first
common misconception, illustrated by the aforementioned index used by Wallace, can be
explained by the fact that when the literature of regional subsystems emerged in the late
fifties, the literature on regional integration was already well developed.161 Therefore,
there was to some extent an amalgamation of these two literatures, and the inability to
clearly make the distinction contributed to keeping the regional subsystemic approach in
the fringes of international relations theory. As Thompson commented, the focus on
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institutions and integration are "legacies or at least 'spillovers' of the older interest in
processes of regionalism."162
Systems analysis, as applied to the field of international relations, has never been
only about cooperation, as the centrality of the notion of balance of power makes clear.
As Lynn Miller reminds, the term system is "instrumentally neutral as used in the social
sciences: it neither assumes an inevitable growth in cohesion and stability on the part of
the processes studied nor does it prescribe for such growth."163 A regional subsystem can
be less or more integrated, less or more institutionalized, but the degree of integration or
institutionalization should not determine the existence of a regional subsystem. These two
factors can, at best, serve as one variable to explain patterns of interactions - above all in
the cooperation end of the interaction spectrum - or be used to classify different regional
subsystems. The establishment of international organizations may have an effect on
regional subsystem, but only as long as they affect patterns of interactions. Thus, the
mere creation of international organizations should not be fundamental for regional
subsystemic analysis. Equating integration with the establishment of a regional
subsystem entails at least two important drawbacks. The first is neglecting to consider the
role of conflict in regional subsystems. This limitation is particularly relevant if the focus
of study is, for example, on security issues. The second is "the danger of circular
reasoning" whereas a regional subsystemic perspective is used to explain processes of
integration, but regional subsystems themselves are equated with integration.1

This

approach removes a lot of the explanatory power of regional subsystems - including
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when it comes to explaining processes of regional integration. Nonetheless, this
"spillover" from the regionalist literature remains somewhat in place until today, which
makes it important to constantly remember, as Thompson did forty years ago, that "just
as some students of regionalism apparently have little use for regional subsystems
research [...], regional subsystems analysts need not immediately burden themselves with
the problems of regional integration studies." 165
The second common misconception of regional subsystems - and this is
especially relevant for the case of Latin America - is the emphasis on variables other than
geography and patterns of interactions. Most commonly, the notion of a common culture
or identity, or of supposed historical affinities, occupy a central place in this second
category of misconceptions. Since the term Latin America is itself culturally referenced as opposed to being geographically referenced like every other standard regional
classification in the world such as "Eastern Europe," "West Africa," or "Southeast Asia,"
for example, the temptation to justify treating Latin America as a regional subsystem
based on cultural factors is immense. Obviously, this is true only for those who bother
offering an explanation for this choice, since many analysts just assume the existence of a
Latin American subsystem as a self-evident truth. Apart from the discussion of the
questionable wisdom of ascribing to Latin America a "common culture, religion,
language, and race,"166 culture and identity - as in the case of the establishment of
international organizations - only matter for regional subsystemic analysis as long as they
affect patterns of interaction. As a matter of fact, again as Thompson remarked, "with
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emphasis on interaction, these characteristics are rendered unnecessary even though they
may be frequently present and of some significance."
If the culturally-defined concept of Latin America is used to refer to a regional
subsystem, one has to prove that it is somehow more useful to group Mexico with Brazil
than to group Mexico with the United States in a regional subsystem. If culture and
identity are used as the main variables, the first grouping would arguably make more
sense. However, if patterns of interaction (as well as geography, for that matter) are used
as the central factor, the United States and Mexico should be grouped as part of a North
American subsystem. The case of Mexico is illustrative because several analyses seem to
assume that including Mexico in studies that mainly focus on South America makes the
notion of a supposed Latin American subsystem more credible.

In the same manner,

the inclusion of Mexico and other Latin American countries in an all-encompassing Latin
American subsystem instead of in a North American subsystem is often justified in the
basis of the level of development. Because the United States stands out as an
industrialized developed country, the reasoning goes, it somehow does not make sense
for it to be grouped with less developed Latin American states. However, like culture, a
common level of development is not a criterion for the identification of a regional
subsystem. In fact, as also rightfully pointed out by Thompson, "proximate and
interacting actors may be rich or poor."169
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In sum, patterns of interaction and geographical proximity are the only two
variables needed to detect a regional subsystem. Perhaps one of the major reasons that the
regional subsystemic literature has not enjoyed the importance it deserves in the field of
international relations is the irregularity in defining what a regional subsystem is. When it
is equated with integration, is loses significance as it is absorbed by the overwhelmingly
larger literature on regionalism. When other variables are included, it loses definitional
consistency, thus becoming little useful for theoretical purposes. As Arthur Kalleberg
remarks with reference to the study of political systems, in order to classify and compare,
it is crucial that the criterion for classification be the same for all objects being
compared.

Hence, if one uses cultural variables to define a regional subsystem in one

area, but uses a different set of variables for another, the result is typically conceptual
171

confusion and the subsequent loss of scientific utility.

REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS AND SOCIAL THEORY

This dissertation assumes that regional subsystems should be defined not only in
terms of geographical considerations but also in terms of patterns of interactions. This
reliance on patterns of interaction as a key element in delimiting the borders of a given
regional subsystem has several implications, the most important being the fact that
regional subsystems are treated as social systems. This proposition means that in order to
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study the emergence and impact of such systems in the realm of international relations, it
becomes necessary to use a methodological approach that moves beyond the mere
calculations of power in order to incorporate social elements into the analysis so as to
better understand the interplay between individual states and regional subsystems. In
other words, the study of regional subsystems raises the need for the utilization of a social
approach to international relations.
In fact, a central concern of social theories in general is the debate on the
relationship between the individual and society or, more generically, between agents and
structures. In the field of international relations, this debate can be put in terms of the
relationship between individual states and the international system. For the purposes of
the present study, the main preoccupation will be with the relationship between states and
the regional subsystem. The fundamental question here is whether agents are determined
by the structure of a particular social system, or the social system is determined by the
agents. In other words, what is the causal relationship to be studied? Is it the international
- or the regional - system that affects the behavior of states, or is it the foreign policy
actions of states that shape the system? The answer to this puzzle is crucial, for it
determines what the causal direction is and thus which is the independent and which is
the dependent variable to be studied.
One of the most prominent answers to this dilemma in the field of international
relations is offered by the neorealist approach. The neorealist answer to the puzzle of the
relationship between agents and structure is straightforward - the behavior of the first is
directly determined by the configuration of the latter. For Kenneth Waltz, the interaction
among the units in a system should be clearly separated from the properties of the system.

66
The author insists that for a system approach to be valid, one must "carefully keep the
attributes and interactions of the system's units out of the definition of its structure." 172
Thus, any approach that takes into account the interaction among the units should be
classified as "reductionist," in opposition to what would be a systemic approach. In other
words, the neorealist approach implies a clear separation between the structure of the
system and the interactions between the agents within it. The structure of the international
system is thus defined not in terms of interaction among states, which is seen as
exclusively a property of units, but in terms of how the units are arranged in relation to
one another. "To define a structure," Waltz claims, "requires ignoring how units relate
with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to
one another (how they are arranged and positioned). Interactions, as I have insisted, take
1 7^

place at the level of units [...]. The arrangement of units is a property of the system."
For Waltz, the way the units are arranged within the international system is a function of
the distribution of power, expressed fundamentally by military capabilities, and this view
is in light of the anarchical character that is the ordering principle of the international
system. Therefore, by ignoring the systemic effects of interaction among states and
concentrating exclusively on the distribution of power, the neorealist approach becomes
focused solely on material attributes and moves away from any interpretation that may
include elements of a social nature.
These "mechanistic and unsocial"

conceptualizations form the base of the

constructivist critique to neorealism. Whereas Waltz focuses on the material aspects of
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the international system, Alexander Wendt claims that social aspects are more relevant.
The author contrasts the "materialistic" approach offered by neorealism with the
"idealistic" approach proposed by constructivism. Hence, the international system should
not so much be characterized by the distribution of power as it should be characterized by
the "distribution of knowledge." For Wendt, "the character of international life is
determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these
are constituted largely by social rather than material structures." 175 Consequently, the
basic criticism that Wendt advances toward neorealism is not directed toward its systemic
approach, but to its materialism, since he claims that structure is also constituted by ideas.
The author is careful enough to remark that this belief does not mean that material forces
are not important, as a radical version of constructivism would claim. For Wendt, "ideas
1 lf\

are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality"

and

therefore "the ideational aspect of international structure [...] supervenes on this material
base." 177 Among the material factors mentioned by Wendt as having an independent
1 78

effect in the international life are "geography and natural resources,"

the first being

central to the notion of regional subsystem developed in this research.
Since constructivism sees the structure of the international system as also being
constituted by ideas, it is clear that agents have an effect on the structure, which
complicates the neorealist view that the international system should be treated as an
independent variable. Wendt rejects the Waltzian notion that in order to adopt
structuralism as a methodological principle one must clearly separate the structure and
175
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the interaction of the agents within this structure, and argues that, because structure and
agents are not independently existing entities, there cannot be established a causal
relationship between them. "Structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of
agents and their practices,"179 argues Wendt, and therefore "it is impossible for structures
to have effects apart from the attributes and interactions of agents."

Similarly, Walter

Carlsnaes maintains that foreign policy processes "are a consequence of, and can hence
only be fully explained with reference to, a dynamic process in which both agents and
structures causally condition each other over time,"181 and therefore there is the "need to
view the relationship between actors and social structures in terms of mutual linkage
1 QO

rather than causal reduction."

The methodological implication of such a view is that, as

Wendt argues, causal theorizing loses its value in the analysis of international politics,
and for that reason it should give way to "constitutive theorizing."

Since agents and
1 84

structures are in fact "simultaneously involved in the production of social phenomena,"
the question of whether agents determine structure or vice-versa is misplaced since the
relationship is actually one of "co-determination."185 As social structures, the
international system in general, and the regional subsystems in particular, are not
independent of the actors that constitute them, and therefore the effects of interactions
among the actors must become a key element in the analysis.
179
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In separating the structural dimension from the unit level, Waltz, in the words of
Wendt, "reifies" structure and ignores the effects of interaction.186 In fact, for Waltz,
units and the interactions among them are treated as being the same thing. To unravel this
issue, Wendt adds a third level of analysis between unit and structure - the "interaction
level." By doing so, Wendt seeks to situate the "reductionist" charge within the unit level
while keeping both the structural and the interaction level within the systemic camp.
Thus, like Waltz, Wendt also discards theories that attempt to explain international
politics only with reference to unit level factors, since this approach would exclude the
possibility of a social analysis and treat states as being "autistic" as opposed to
"social."187 But instead of putting the question in terms of either systemic or reductionist
theories, he sees different kinds of systemic theories, one that he denominates "macrostructural" and the other as "micro-structural." While macro-structural explanations, like
the one offered by Waltz, would see the structure from the point of view of the system
and would not seek to explain the behavior of individual actors, micro-structural
explanations, by focusing on the interaction level, seeks to see structure from the point of
view of agents. Recognizing the effects of agents on structure opens up the possibility of
structural change through social interaction and the ensuing production and reproduction
of identities and interests. Therefore, focusing exclusively on material elements means to
lose sight of the ideational elements that are also important in international politics and
1 RR

that are a "continuing outcome of interaction, always in process."
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THE TIME DIMENSION

If agents and structure both have constitutive effects on each other, but at the
same time they are not the same thing, there remains the problem of how to treat them for
1 8Q

analytical purposes. In other words, if, agents "are inseparable from social structures"
and, as James Rosenau remarks, they "are so inextricably linked, so endlessly interactive,
that each is a product of the other,"

how can the analyst overcome this agent-structure

challenge in order to identify dependent and independent variables and assess the effects
that one may have over the other? The answer to this question begins by escaping from
two kinds of methodological faults. One is to treat either the units or the system as
completely autonomous, one having ascendancy over the other. This is the kind of
problem that the neorealist approach falls upon. Nevertheless, there is a second
methodological fault, which is treating both as "so inextricably linked" that it is
impossible to separate the two and thus to evaluate how one can have influence upon the
other. Both of these errors fall under what Margaret Archer termed the problem of
"conflation." The author detected three kinds of conflation: downward conflation,
upwards conflation, and central conflation. The first two mean treating structure or agents
"as an epiphenomenon of the other."191 The problem with these approaches is that they
lead to "rather crude unilateral accounts" of the social reality, therefore precluding any
possibility of interplay between the two levels.

Essentially, Archer adds, there is no
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interplay but "one-way domination." 193 Conversely, the problem of central conflation
means denying any autonomy to agents and structures, and treating them as "so tightly
constitutive of one another" that it makes it impossible to separate the two 194 "and thus
their influences upon one another cannot be unraveled."

Hence, the major problem

with central conflation is that even though it acknowledges the interplay between agents
and structure that exists in the real world, "in the absence of any autonomy, it becomes
impossible to examine their interplay"196 Since the "practical analyst of society needs to
know not only what social reality is, but also how to begin to explain it" a methodology
that addresses this concern becomes necessary in order to overcome "one-dimensional
theorizing." 197
The methodological solution for this dilemma is an alternative to conflation that
Archer calls "analytical dualism." The key here is that even though the entities
themselves cannot be clearly separated, they are "analytically separable" and thus their
interplay can be effectively explored.198 This analytical distinction between agents and
structures, as Archer explains, "allows for their independent variation and in turn makes
the interface between them the site of intensive investigation." 199 In practical terms,
when agents and structure are analytically separable, one can attempt to explain a given
system in the present by moving one stage back in time and referring to past interaction
within the previous system. A system in fact originates from agency, Archer remarks, but
with time it acquires autonomy. Hence, we solve the dependent-independent variable
193
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dilemma by analytically separating agents and structures, states and systems, and begin
analysis by assuming that the system is, at one point in time, the independent variable
that affects the behavior of actors, but as actors interact within this system they can
eventually transform it, at which point the system itself is treated as a dependent variable.
As a new system is in place, it can now be analytically treated as the independent variable
once again, and so on. In other words, regional subsystems can be treated as the
independent variable affecting interaction among states and foreign policy outcomes, but
as states interact they can create new patterns and eventually transform the regional
subsystem through foreign policy actions.
The corollary of such approach is that the variable of time gains a central place in
the theory, being "incorporated as a theoretical variable rather than simply as a medium
in which events take place." 200 Without the centrality of time, "the problem of structure
and agency can never be satisfactorily resolved" because it is only "by examining the
interplay between them over time" that the analyst can link structure and agency "rather
than sinking them one into the other."201 Likewise, if the variable time is not properly
incorporated, system change "becomes an immanent but indeterminate possibility,
equally likely or unlikely at any given moment and therefore unpredictable and
•
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inexplicable."

Archer presents a sequential process that she calls a "morphogenetic

approach" which allows for the study of system formation and system change or stability.
This approach is a three part cycle that begins with any given systemic configuration that
can be termed "structural conditioning" of that conditions' action. The next step of the
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cycle is the "social interaction" which happens within the systemic context and is a
response to it. Finally, the last step is "elaboration," which is when the form, structure or
state of the system changes. Accordingly, even though they cannot be separated in the
real world, we can analytically separate system and agency, with system logically
predating action which transforms it, and this interaction being followed by elaboration at
which point a system change can be detected.
In this sense, an approach that focuses on processes of interaction in which the
variable time necessarily plays a central role is inevitably fated to address historical
processes. As Wendt claimed, alongside a structural analysis, historical research is
needed in order "to trace the causally significant sequence of choices and interactions
which lead to particular events (and to the reproduction of social structure)."

For this

reason, this dissertation is organized along historical lines. The fact that this research
covers a lengthy time period allows for a more accurate testing of the hypothesis that the
United States has been an "absent empire" in South America. A focus on a narrower time
span may be biased in the sense that it would reflect a particular configuration of forces
and interactions that would not necessarily translate into a broader pattern, and could
represent an important obstacle when attempting to make generalizations about larger
trends. The problem of confining the research of regional subsystems to a relatively
limited time span, as one scholar had observed in the seventies, was a characteristic of
most of the early studies in this subject.2 4 In the case of South America, for instance, if
the analysis is concentrated between the forties and the sixties, which was the apex of US
influence in the region, one would be more tempted to rely on explanations making
203
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reference to a homogeneous exercise of US hegemony and to blur the distinctions
between South America and the rest of Latin America.

THE SPATIAL DIMENSION

It is crucial to address the particularity of using the methodological tools
aforementioned to analyze not the international system as a whole but the regional
subsystems within it. Such particularity resides in the fact that, in addition to the time
dimension, a spatial dimension is added. To some extent, the application of this
constructivist framework to specifically analyze regional subsystems is a novelty, since
this literature remains largely concerned with the overall structure of the international
system. Nevertheless, even though this is not clearly addressed in the constructivist
literature, the notion that there are distinct regional subsystemic configurations within the
international system is implicitly present, when, for example, Wendt talks about three
different "cultures of anarchy": Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. The author not only
locates these three different cultures temporally, with the first comprising much of
international history, the second emerging during the seventeenth century, and the third
during the late twentieth, but also spatially, since he explicitly locates the Lockean
culture in Europe and the Kantian in the West.

This effort mirrors the literature

dealing with the transformation of the international system into an international society
with shared norms and values. A leading scholar of the international society literature
admits that the emergence of an international society is spatially uneven while, at the
same time, he acknowledges the "difficult problems of the tracing of boundaries" of
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
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where modern international society begun. 20 Later, in an effort to bring the literature of
international system and international society together, Buzan conceded that there was a
need not only to establish the boundaries between international system and international
society, that is, when an international system develops into an international society, "but
also between societal subsystems existing within larger nonsocietal international systems
(i.e., where two or more international societies exist contemporaneously)."207 Thus, for
Buzan, "international societies, like international systems, will emerge initially within
regional subsystems and only later develop at the level of the international system as a
whole."

Indeed, the whole notion of a "Westphalian" system of states was at some

point obviously situated within a regional space.
Similarly, the idea of a spatial variance within subsystems in the international
system is also explicitly present in Hans Morgenthau's realism and latent in Waltz's
neorealist theory. Morgenthau, whose Politics Among Nations is one of the most
influential books in international relations theory, made explicit reference to the existence
of regional subsystems operating under the mantle of the international system. After
describing the functioning of the balance of power in international politics, Morgenthau
warns that a balance of power is not "one single system comprehending all nations," but
instead it is "composed of a number of subsystems that are interrelated with each other,
but that maintain within themselves a balance of power of their own." Using the same
terminology employed by the early scholarship of regional subsystems, Morgenthau
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added that the relationship between the "local systems" and the "dominant system" was
"one of subordination." 209
Waltz was characteristically far less explicit than Morgenthau in admitting
regional variance, but he acknowledges that even though his theory focused on the great
powers, it "could also be applied to lesser states that interact insofar as their interactions
910

are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system."

This affirmation

was clearly meant to open up the possibility of a regional balance of power, which
Morgenthau makes reference to and was eventually taken up by the neorealist literature.
Indeed, a more recent study on the balance of power theory explicitly analyzed the global
and the regional dimensions of balance of power, the latter meaning a clear stance that
balance behavior "tends to be reflected at both systemic and subsystemic levels of
international relations," which therefore means that balance of power theory "is also
relevant to regional subsystems." The difference between global balancing and regional
balancing would be the fact that, in accordance with the Waltzian condition of
"insulated" interactions, "regional powers are less autonomous than great powers, and
often it is the latter that undertake policies that preserve or upset regional balances." 211
The spatial dimension is also evident when dealing with the emergence of the
international system. Because Waltz's analysis is largely ahistorical, he does not have to
deal with this question and seems to assume that the international system has always
existed. When more historical approaches are used, it becomes obvious that one major
209
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problem in the notion of the emergence of an international system is derived from its
inherently Western or Euro-centric approach. Basically, there seems to be the assumption
that once a regional European system was in place, it eventually became global and this is
the international system as we know it. The problem is not specifically the assumption of
the globalization of the European system, but the tacit assumption that at the same time
the European system was globalized, there was no regional European subsystem left, at
least for the purposes of relevant international relations analysis. Accordingly, the
reasoning goes on to say that, after 1945, a global system emerged that included basically
every nation on Earth that substituted the effects of formerly compartmentalized regional
systems. Raymond Aron, for example - whose definition of an international system is
based on the notion of political units "capable of being implicated in generalized war" 919

maintains that, consequently, there was no international system before 1945.

Robert

Gilpin recognizes that the notion of an "international system" is "ambiguous" and that
before the modern era "there was no single international system, but rather several
international systems."213 In sum, the reasoning seems to be based on the assumption that
before 1945 there were several regional systems, but afterwards, one encompassing
international system emerged concomitant with the disappearance of those regional
systems. The obvious question is if regional patterns of interactions that were operative
before 1945, in Europe and other regions, suddenly ceased to have any relevance for
analytical purposes. The reason for this negligence is known - the claim that the study of
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international politics should be "necessarily be based on the great powers." 214 Therefore,
with the emergence of the bipolarity of the Cold War, the regional dynamics in Europe
apparently lost analytical relevance. While it is perfectly understandable the
methodological need to concentrate on great powers in order to explain broader patterns
in international politics or, as Waltz put it, "a small number of big and important
91 S

things,"

it is also true that this approach misses a lot of important things of all sizes that

happen below the great-power game. Regional patterns of interactions were important
before and continued to be important after the emergence of the modern international
system.
THE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM AS AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

At the same time that neglecting the importance of regional patterns of interaction
in the name of an overwhelming present international system seems analytically faulty,
recognizing the existence of regional subsystems, with dynamics of their own, should not
negate the effects of the broader international system on the behavior of states. This is
why the prefix "sub" is used, since it purports to convey the idea that it is a system within
a dominant system. With the emergence of the modern international system, previous
compartmentalized regional systems became regional subsystems. It is not that the
modern international system is the sum of the different regional subsystems, but they
operate with diverse logics. The regional subsystems can be seen as "a complement to the
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global nature of the overall international system."

The way to interpret this analytically

is to acknowledge the fact that systemic pressures under which states are subjected
coexist alongside and interact with subsystemic pressures at the regional level. But while
systemic pressures, as Waltz makes clear, explain more international politics than foreign
policy, regional subsystemic pressures are more useful to explain the outcome of
particular foreign policies followed by states.217 In other words, while, in accordance with
neorealism, systemic pressures explain general patterns of state behavior in an anarchic
environment, regional subsystemic pressures may be more helpful in explaining specific
state actions and their outcomes without the necessity of having to make reference to unit
attributes.
The international system and the regional subsystems are not just two different
levels of a system. They are, in fact, two different types of system. In his General
Systems Theory, the biologist Ludwig von Bertanffy, considered a pioneer in applying the
concept of system scientifically, described two kinds of systems: closed and open
systems. The basic differentiation here is between the system and the environment in
which the system exists. While open systems are characterized by the possibility of
interaction between its internal elements and the environment, closed systems are a
limited case wherein the environment has no significance, that is, the system does not
interact with its environment.218 The international system, as Lake and Morgan remark,
can be analytically treated as closed systems, whereas regional systems "are inherently
open. The global system, other regional systems, and even 'outside' states can have a
216
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major impact on a region. In open systems, the constraints and processes of the system
are only partial explanations of behavior."219 This caveat is important in order to
underscore the fact that the focus on regional subsystems should not be intended to offer
a complete explanation for the behavior of states, since outside factors must be taken into
account. Nonetheless, regional subsystemic dynamics should be understood as an
important part of the analysis.
Moreover, the fact that the international system is a closed system while regional
subsystems are open generates different possibilities for research. If the international
system comprises the total set of interactions across the globe, the notion of an
environment in which the international system exists is problematic. Fred Riggs, for
example, characterized the international system as "a power structure in which the weight
of external pressures approaches the vanishing point," which is equivalent to saying that
it is a system with no environment.

Rosenau attempted to solve this issue by making a

distinction between political and non-political forms of interaction, the latter comprising
the environment of the "international political system."221 Gilpin refers to the
"environmental conditions" of the international system when describing things such as
economic factors and military and transportation technologies which are directly
999

connected to the possibility of system change.

For Waltz, there should be a

differentiation between the "environment of states," which would be the international
99^

system, and the "environment of the system."
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"environment" to refer to the international system and uses instead the notion of
structure.

The problems in using the notion of environment to refer to international

systems are so evident that in a book dedicated to the application of this concept to the
study of international politics, Harold and Margaret Sprout claimed that the solution
should be dropping the concept altogether to describe the international system.225 On the
other hand, since regional subsystems are open systems, the notion of an external
environment seems to make more sense and the interaction between the subsystem and
their environment can be more easily detected. As a matter of fact, one could conceive of
the environment of regional subsystems as being the international system as well as other
subsystems. The regional subsystems themselves constitute what Mouritzen called the
•
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"salient environment" for the states members of the subsystem.
Even though the international system and the regional subsystems consist of
different types of systems, the variance that is being explained by reference to the
regional subsystems is indeed systemic, but it relates to what was referred to above as the
interaction level more than to the structural level. To use Wendt's terminology, the
regional subsystems approach is inherently "micro-structural" rather than "macrostructural."

While the first sees structure from the point of view of agents, and thus

patterns of interactions can be uncovered, the second sees it from the point of view of the
system. Like the unit level, the interaction level explains foreign policy rather than
international politics, but unlike the unit level, the interaction level incorporates a
systemic dimension. Assuming the relevance of regional subsystems as an analytical tool
224
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involves the acknowledgment that there are variances in the pattern of interactions among
states along spatial lines, which implicates in tandem, as mentioned earlier, the
acknowledgment of the importance of space, or of geography and territoriality in the
realm of international relations. While the focus given on patterns of interactions means a
shift away from mainstream neorealism, the emphasis given on territoriality means a
similar shift away from some of the constructivist literature. The notion of regional
subsystem used here is thus one that emphasizes concomitantly the importance of
material conditions and territoriality as well as the importance of ideational conditions.
From the point of view of a regional subsystemic approach, geographic location is
considered to be the material base that influences - but do not determine - the production
and reproduction of patterns of interactions. Geography is then one "independently
•

existing physical reality" that regulates interaction among states.

99R

In a certain sense,

this means bringing together the ontological dispute between the neorealist literature with
its stress on material structures and the constructivist literature with its stress on social
structures. This double focus on interactions and territory also makes clear why the
concept of regional subsystem is well-suited for the purposes of this research. The term
region is more static as it implies a focus on geography and does not highlight the notion
of patterns of interaction. On the other hand, using just the term subsystem without any
qualifier would be incomplete since other criteria for the identification of subsystems can
be devised, as shown at the beginning of this chapter. Therefore, the term regional
subsystem, by underlining the effects of space on the interactions in the international
level, is compatible with the objectives of this research. As already mentioned, the
literature on international relations has focused on either domestic or systemic structures
228
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as the main variables affecting interests of states, thus neglecting the role of regional
subsystemic structures. This is one important gap that this research intends to fill.
Accordingly, the focus on regional subsystems means the introduction of an
additional level of analysis between the nation-state and the international system, which
constitutes the traditional way of thinking in international relations. As Singer described,
the level-of-analysis problem is a central conceptual issue to be resolved by any research
•
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in the discipline.

Singer argued that choosing each level entails advantages and

disadvantages. Taking the international system as a level of analysis means the analyst
will be able to offer a comprehensive approach at the cost of sacrificing a more detailed
description, whereas taking the nation state as the level of analysis would entail the
opposite problem. Moreover, the international-system-as-level-of-analysis approach
usually results in an "inaccurate homogenization" of subsystemic actors, while the
nation-state-as as-level-of-analysis results in "a marked exaggeration" of their
9^0

differences.

In one well-known attempt to synthesize these two levels, Robert Putnam

argued that international relations should be understood as a "two-level game" where
both international and domestic factors interact to produce policy outcomes, and therefore
every policy-maker should deal with pressures emanating from both sides.231 While the
boundaries of domestic politics can be cleared defined, it is not clear what would
constitute the international level in Putnam's analysis. If it consists of "the totality of
interactions which take place within the system and its environment", as Singer describes
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the international level,

then any analysis of specific foreign policy outcomes would

constitute a herculean task. One way of overcoming this complexity is considering the
international level itself as a two-level game: global and regional. The regional subsystem
as level of analysis allows the student to concentrate on interactions restricted in space,
instead of having to consider the totality of interactions comprising the international
system. When regional subsystems are brought to the picture, the analytical toolbox at the
disposal of the analyst increases by one additional level, thus converting the study of
international politics into a "three-level game."
In the same way that taking the nation state as level of analysis provides
explanations for foreign policy behavior that may be different than the one offered by the
international system as the level of analysis, focusing on regional subsystems may also
produce specific sets of explanations as well as generate distinct research questions. For
example, in his celebrated study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison looks into
the nation state to provide three conceptual models for the actions of governments.233 He
is interested in answering, for example, why the Soviet Union decided to place missiles in
Cuba and why the United States chose to respond with a blockade. He explains these
actions through three different models he presents - the rational actor model, the
organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, all of them of little
or no consideration to systemic pressures at work outside the nation state or beyond the
scope of US-Soviet bilateral relations. This absence may be explained by Allison's
conception of international relations as a mere "overlap" of "intra-national games."234 On
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the other hand, to remain with the same example, a systemic approach to the Cuban
Missile Crisis would probably refer to US and Soviet preoccupations with the global
balance of power of the Cold War in order to explain their respective actions. This
systemic approach would likely be unable to answer why the United States chose to
respond with a blockade rather than other options, but would explain the US concerns
with the Soviet action in the first place. A regional subsystemic approach would probably
follow the same line of reasoning as the systemic one, but, in order to understand how
regional subsystemic pressures work, one would have to ask what would US actions and
ensuing outcomes would be demonstrated if the missiles been placed a few miles away,
let's say, in Venezuela. Would other actors, like Brazil, weigh in, and would that affect
the outcome in any way? Obviously, the answer to this question is only speculative, but
what we know is that both the nation state and the international system as level-ofanalysis are largely unable to offer a complete account for this putative regional variance.
Likewise, the same is true in explaining foreign policies of South American states in
relation to the United States. If one takes the systemic approach, the explanations for the
behavior of states in South America would be based on concepts such as US hegemony
and the presumed effects of it, whereas the regional subsystemic approach that considers
South America as a distinct subsystem would include other notions, such as the
functioning of a regional balance of power and the role of regional powers.
One important way to explore what possible explanations the regional
subsystemic point of view could offer is by looking to the historical record. This
dissertation will look at different historical periods in order to argue that the analytical
framework offered by the regional subsystemic approach illuminates important aspects of
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United States-South America relations that are obscured by alternative outlooks
traditionally used to study that relationship. For example, if the traditional systemic
approach concludes that the Monroe Doctrine was a relatively homogenous policy
adopted for all Latin America, the regional subsystemic alternative reevaluates and
reinterprets the true scope and actual outcome of the this policy. If traditional systemic
approaches understand US actions in Chile in the sixties and seventies as following the
same pattern of intervention in the rest Latin America during the Cold War, the regional
subsystemic alternative unveils the profound differences in the Chilean case. If traditional
systemic approaches saw the launch of the Free Trade Areas of the Americas as the
confirmation of US global preponderance in the nineties, with which all Latin America
would be inevitably fated to go along given the disparities in power, the subsystemic
alternative helps to explain its ultimate outcome. The case studies selected for this
dissertation will explore each of these three historical examples.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

As seen in the previous chapter, there are only two sufficient and necessary
variables needed to identify a regional subsystem: geography and patterns of interactions.
Both of these criteria justify the existence of two relevant regional subsystems in the socalled "Western Hemisphere" - a South American and a North American subsystem.
This chapter makes the case for the existence of a distinctive South American subsystem
based on the criteria established earlier. It demonstrates that, in addition to geography,
there is a pattern of conflict and cooperation in South America that is distinct from the
rest of Latin America. The chapter also addresses the usual explanations for US relative
absence in South America and explores why they do not provide a completely
satisfactory explanation for this fact. Finally, by stressing the role of Brazil in the South
American subsystem, this chapter lays out the framework for the subsequent case studies
by arguing that Brazil is a status quo regional power that has sought to affect the structure
of costs and benefits of US involvement in that regional subsystem.

THE CASE FOR A SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

The division between a North and a South American continent is part of the
"standard seven-part continental scheme employed in the United States,"
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immediately provide evidence that the geographic criterion for the establishment of a
regional subsystem is fulfilled. But dividing and labeling the globe into continents
implies a great deal of arbitrariness, and in much of Latin America, for example, North
and South America are grouped as one "American" continent, which was indeed the view
prevalent among geographers until the nineteenth century.236 In any case, even though
there is a degree of arbitrariness in any geographic division, from the point of view of a
pure spatial analysis, when one looks at "the massive triangles of North and South
America, tenuously linked by the Panamanian isthmus,"2 7 it becomes clear that if one
intends to divide the Americas in two parts, common sense would advise the line to be
drawn at the Panamanian isthmus rather than at the Rio Grande. In fact, in a study of
South American geopolitics, Philip Kelly described North America and South America as
"two largely disconnected American continents" which are "widened by great distances,
•

sometimes harsh climates and topographies."

9^8

Ronald Steel notices that "New York is

closer to Paris than it is to Lima; closer to Athens than to Buenos Aires. Seattle is nearer
to Tokyo than it is to Santiago. Geographically, most of South America might as well be
in another hemisphere, which indeed it is."

In sum, this brief geographical digression

is just to make obvious that if the only criterion used to divide the Americas was
geographic proximity, the notion of Latin America would probably not subsist.
What this discussion is meant to make clear is that the concept of Latin America
is not based on spatial geographical considerations - even though it is often used as a
geographical concept - but on presumed cultural similarities. It is not the purpose of this
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research to challenge the assumption of cultural homogeneity in Latin America, but
rather to present a critique of the use of cultural variables as the primary factor for
regional classification.240 If culture is assumed to be the central variable for the
identification of regions for the purposes of international relations analysis, several - if
not all - other conventional regions of the world would have to be reclassified.
Additionally, a case would have to be made as to what cultural aspects matter the most
for the purposes of identification of regional subsystems. If it is assumed to be, for
example, religion and language, then it makes as much sense to disassociate the United
States from Mexico as it makes disassociating France from England, Egypt from Israel,
and India from Pakistan and locating them in different regional subsystems. Nevertheless,
very few international relations scholars would make the case that it is practically and
analytically useful to do so. In fact, the implicit reason why it would not be helpful to do
so is exactly because France and England, Egypt and Israel, and India and Pakistan are
proximate and interacting states and this is what really matters when analyzing their
international relations.
Nevertheless, some would say that even though it is proper to conclude that Latin
America does not fit the geographic criterion, it might very well suit the criterion of
patterns of interaction. Before evaluating this claim, it is necessary to clarify the idea of
patterns of interaction. In its broader sense, interaction is understood as being the result of
reciprocal responses of action and reaction.

240

In international relations, forms of

For a critique of the concept of Latin America in cultural terms as justifying the perception of the
American "self against the Latin American "other" see: Joao Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of
Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social Scientific Discourse" (PhD diss., City
University of New York, 2003). Also useful for this debate is Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'."
Sprout and Sprout, The ecological perspective on human affairs, with special reference to international
politics: 24.

90
interaction may include, for example, diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural,
•

949

and personal interactions.

Likewise, the instruments of interaction can be diplomatic,

psychological, cultural, economic, or military.

These interactions can range in a

spectrum from conflictual to cooperative. Conflictual interactions include events such as
war, intervention, blockade, clandestine actions, embargoes, covert intelligence activities,
etc. Cooperative interactions consist of, for example, trade, capital investment, aid,
military grant, arms transfers, personnel exchanges, etc.

These different interactions

"may exhibit regularities, or patterns, in space and through time, both in the foreign
policies of particular states and in political relations of two or three or many states." 245
Therefore, by examining the spectrum of interactions through space and time in a given
area of the world, certain regularities may be uncovered and general patterns can be
identified. Some states will exhibit a higher degree of interactions with particular states in
comparison with others. More often than not, neighboring states will tend to exhibit a
relatively high degree of interaction, which is why geography matters. This relatively
high degree of interaction is likely to create all sorts of interdependencies among states.
States are considered to be interdependent "when the outcome of an interaction for each
depends on the choices of the others."246 For example, states have security
interdependence when they are linked "together sufficiently closely that their securities
cannot be considered separate from each other." 247 In contrast, the lower the degree or
intensity of interaction, the lower the interdependence, the extreme case being
Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel; Setting, Images, Process: 51.
Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System: 16.
244
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indifference. A regional subsystem is then characterized by a higher degree of interaction
- and thus of interdependence - among the states in the subsystem relative to states
outside the subsystem. Detecting these patterns of interaction across space and time helps
the analyst to draw the boundaries of different regional subsystems.
Yet the issue remains of how to operationalize these patterns of interactions in
order to assess the degree of interactions and locate them within the spectrum varying
from intense contacts, or interdependence, to infrequent contacts, or indifference. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, this is an obviously difficult task that apparently
has not been completely resolved by the literature. Among the few who present some
evidence of interaction patterns, the main shortcoming is focusing only on a narrow
aspect of interactions. For example, Haas and Lemke concentrate on the military aspect,
Buzan and Waever on security patterns, and Wallace on international organizations
membership.

This research does not intend to dwell upon interaction in order to

unravel this operationalization issue because our main concern is not the analysis of the
South American subsystem per se, but how it interacts with and affects the outcomes of
US foreign policy. In any case, a few remarks must be made in order to make the case for
our assumption of the existence of a South American subsystem in terms of patterns of
interaction. Along with these remarks, a suggestion on how to operationalize patterns of
interaction will be proposed.
The first prerequisite for operationalizing patterns of interactions is that it should
be made in such a way as to cover at least one aspect of each end of the interaction
248
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spectrum, which means including variables that account for both conflict and
cooperation. Moreover, it would be useful to include different forms and instruments of
interaction, such as economic, military, and political. It would also be noteworthy if the
data required were easily available in order to make this operationalization effort
attainable. Taking into consideration these qualifications, three variables could be used in
order to evaluate patterns of interactions: wars and/or armed conflicts, trade, and regional
organizations. Although far from reflecting all possibilities of interaction among states,
these three variables characterize three important kinds of interstate interaction within the
range between conflict and cooperation. Wars and armed conflicts represent conflictual
interactions, while trade and regional organizations correspond to cooperative
interactions. Moreover, these three variables cover military, economic, and political
instruments and forms of interaction. Finally, data collection for these variables is readily
available.
An additional advantage of using the three variables suggested above is that they
have gone through extensive examination throughout the years, and therefore there is
currently little significant debate in regards to definitional issues. Interstate war and
armed conflicts are the classic object of international relations. Although determining the
point in which a conflict becomes a war is far from being an uncomplicated task, scholars
at least since the late sixties seem to agree on the 1,000 battle-connected deaths
threshold.249 Therefore, a war can be defined as comprising "sustained military hostilities
between the regular armed forces of two or more states, resulting in 1,000 or more battle

Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Patterns in International Warfare, 1816-1965," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 391(1970).
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fatalities."

An armed conflict can be understood in the current parlance as a

"militarized interstate dispute" short of war and it has been defined as "a set of
interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of
military force, or actual uses of military force."

Therefore, when a militarized interstate

dispute results in more than 1,000 battle-connected deaths, it can technically be
considered a war. The expectation of this research is that any detailed examination of
militarized interstate disputes and wars in the Americas would probably reveal a pattern
following the subsystemic perspective explored here.
The trade variable is pretty straightforward, and in fact, within the literature on
interdependence, trade has been used almost as a synonymous with interdependence, or at
least economic interdependence, with occasional addition of capital flows as a
supplementary variable.252 One could begin, for example, by looking at individual
countries and assessing what percentage of the value of their imports and exports comes
from each of the subsystems in the Americas. In any case, this research would expect that
an analysis of trade patterns would reveal a higher concentration of trade within each of
the subsystems in the Americas, rather than a coherent Latin American pattern of trade.
Finally, membership in regional organizations is a classic measure of the level of
regional integration and it has been widely used in the literature on regionalism.253 One
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possible good criterion for selecting the organizations for purposes of identifying patterns
of interaction in the Americas could be those in which at least two countries in the
Western Hemisphere participate. Counting the number and membership of regional
organizations is a quantitative endeavor that can be accomplished without much
complication. However, it would be relevant if a qualitative analysis was also pursued,
that is, one that would assess the trajectories and the actual effects of each of these
organizations. Mentioning the moribund Latin American Parliament as a Latin American
organization on par with, for instance, Mercosur or CACM, means ignoring the profound
differences in substance and importance between these institutions. Therefore, alongside
an investigation of the number and geographic concentration of the regional
organizations in the Western Hemisphere, an analysis of their quality would be pertinent.
This research would expect that the number and relevance of regional organizations in
the Americas would reveal the existence of a South American regional subsystemic
pattern that would be more salient than a supposed Latin American pattern.
As mentioned, it is not the aim of this research to conduct an extensive
investigation of patterns of interaction in the Americas, but, by using the approach
suggested above, we can at least indicate evidence that there are two different patterns in
Latin America which justify treating it as two distinct regional subsystems. A number of
authors have made mention to wars in Latin America to justify patterns of interaction at
the conflictual end of the interaction spectrum. Cantori and Spiegel, for example, argue
that what they identify as the Latin American subsystem was at that time characterized by

Belanger, eds., The Americas in Transition : The Contours of Regionalism (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
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a low level of conflict, but they except the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, as
well as "a variety of disputes which include Peru vs. Ecuador, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia,
Argentina vs. Chile, and Argentina vs. Brazil."254 The fact that all exceptions mentioned
by the authors are in South America seems to have escaped their analysis. Atkins
mentions a number of "inter-Latin American" disputes and conflicts to express
conflictual patterns of interaction and makes reference to the Chaco War, conflicts
between Peru and Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, Ecuador and Peru, and Argentina and
Chile. It is true that, contrary to Cantori and Spiegel, he at least mentions other conflicts
outside South America, such as disputes between Haiti and Dominican Republic in the
thirties and the war between El Salvador and Honduras in the sixties, as well as a variety
9SS

of "Central American conflicts" during the eighties.

Similarly, Robert Burr talks about

"intra-Latin American rivalries" adding that "above all, the Latin American nations are
concerned with rivalries among themselves." He mentions rivalries between Argentina
and Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Chile, Peru and Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador,
Dominican Republic and Haiti, Guatemala and other Central American countries, and
9S6

Mexico and Guatemala.

What becomes obvious from this picture is that what is

termed by these authors as "inter-Latin American" conflicts are not exactly inter-Latin
American, but inter-South American, inter-Caribbean, or inter-Central American. This is
because there is no way to provide evidence that there is a pattern of conflict in Latin
America; instead, the patterns of conflict have followed the subsystemic division
proposed here. The obvious reason for this pattern is that in most of these conflicts Cantori and Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: 61.
Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System: 325-43.
256
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particularly in South America - there was some kind of territorial dispute involved. This
is an unquestionable example of geographical proximity affecting patterns of interaction
and of the fact that geography is the main factor contributing to the durability of regional
subsystems.
Patterns of conflict are especially important because they determine one key
systemic characteristic: because a system is defined by the interaction among the units, a
change in one unit tends to cause changes in others. This means, for example, that an
arms race caused by higher defense spending in one state of the subsystem that is not a
global power tends to be confined within the regional subsystem. If Honduras suddenly
decided to acquire new weapons to modernize its army, it is conceivable that Bolivia or
Argentina would not be as concerned as El Salvador or Nicaragua, for example. As a
matter of fact, in 2007, there were reports about an arms race in South America that did
not spill over to other places in Latin America. At the same time Venezuela started
acquiring military equipment from Russia, Brazil announced an increase in defense
9S7

spending.

When Chile started upgrading its armed forces, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina

reacted.258 This example shows clearly that, as Robert Pastor noticed, the "principal
geopolitical concerns" of the countries in the South American subsystem "are with each
other. Many have fought each other; some have lost territory to another."

5

In fact, one

scholar examined the works of sixteen South American writers in the field of geopolitics
and concluded that one common theme among them was that "their geopolitics pertain to
257
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South American regional and subregional affairs."

This makes evident the

interdependence aspect that is characteristic of a regional subsystem.
But demonstrating the absence of any serious conflict that is truly "inter-Latin
American" is a relatively straightforward and uncomplicated task that, once examined
with more careful attention, becomes self-evident. Nevertheless, patterns of trade could
reveal a different picture. A comprehensive investigation of the patterns of trade would
require looking at every individual country and assessing the percentage of exports and
imports with every other country in the hemisphere across a reasonably long period of
time. Although this investigation is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, evidence
suggested by other studies seems to indicate that if this task was to be completed, it
would reinforce the notion of two different subsystems in the Americas and these would
not be Latin America and North America, but South America and North America. For
example, in his classificatory effort in the seventies to identify regions, Russet, when
using only the criterion of economic interdependence based on trade, concluded for the
existence of a South American and a North/Central American region. Indeed, he observed
that the major discrepancy in the western hemisphere was on trade "where the
hemisphere was split into two components, a North and Central American aggregate, and
one for South America."261 Because Russet's book was published in 1975, the data he
used went only up until the seventies. Later, Gordon Mace and Louis Belanger examined
trade patterns in the western hemisphere using data from 1975 to 1994. Using a variety
of statistical tools, the authors concluded that the "pattern clearly reveals the relative
260
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weakness of the Southern Cone's relationship with North America, as well as its
969

remarkable lack of economic ties with Central America and the Caribbean."
Additionally, when looking at the four last years of their data, they detected a pattern
showing that "the Southern Cone is developing a distinct regional trading structure" and
that the "Southern Cone's integration into the region as a whole is relatively weak." 2 3
Similarly, Jeffrey Schott, when analyzing trade patterns in the Americas, observed that
"[t]he trade profiles of Western Hemisphere countries differ markedly from one side of
the equator to the other," with the countries in the northern half of the hemisphere
generally far more dependent on the United States.

Mace and Belanger's conclusion is

particularly relevant for the purposes of this research and deserves to be quoted in full.
They see
a growing concentration of commercial relations around two main centers: In the
northern part of the hemisphere, Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central
America and the Caribbean are coalescing around the United States, which acts as
the central magnet. A similar situation is developing in South America around the
96S

Brazil-Argentina axis.
For the authors, the future of any hemispheric integration scheme will be
determined by how these two centers interact. Chapter 7 of this dissertation will explore
the significance of this notion in more detail.
Beyond conflictual relations and trade patterns, the separation between the South
American subsystem and the North American subsystem can also be demonstrated in
political terms. Traditional analyses of the emergence of the so called Inter-American
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System that culminated with the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS)
begin by distinguishing two phases: before and after 1889.266 The reason is that only after
1889, with the First Pan-American Conference, the conferences summoned were truly
inter-American in the sense of including most Latin American countries and the United
States. Before that year, there were four Hispano-American conferences - thus with
limited participation and not including both the United States and Brazil - with few
concrete results: in 1826, 1847, 1856, and 1864. The usual historiography informs that
these first conferences helped to establish the "fundamental rules of national behavior
967

destined later to become basic features of inter-American cooperation,"

thus giving

the impression that the Inter-American system was the result of the absorption by the
United States of patterns of interaction that had been previously established among Latin
American states. However, closer examination again indicates the existence of two
regional subsystems from the political interaction point of view, even at that early stage.
For example, by focusing on the Hispano-American conferences, these analyses overlook
that, in 1888, one year before the First Pan-American Conference, Argentina and
Uruguay summoned a "South American Congress of International Private Law" in
Montevideo which was attended also by Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile.
Commenting on the fact that the conference included only South American states, the
Foreign Minister of Argentina justified it on the basis of "their close bonds of political
and commercial interests and even of neighborliness. The other states of North and
Central America either would not come or would come late, and perhaps one of them
266
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would assume a disturbing role of supremacy."

This short sentence expressed the two

main components of the South American subsystem - distinct patterns of interaction
given especially their "neighborliness," and a certain wariness regarding the potential
influence of the United States in the region.
Like most analyses on the emergence of the Inter-American System, those who
concentrate on the establishment of regional institutions to demonstrate the level of
political interaction in Latin America often overlook the existence of a double pattern.
Cantori and Spiegel claim that "Latin American relations are characterized by
cooperation of the alliance variety, as is evidenced in LAFTA and the Central American
960

Common Market."

Again, what the authors present as evidence of a Latin American

subsystem actually confirms the notion of two different subsystems, the first organization
basically a very limited South American scheme of integration that included Mexico,
while the second was exclusively Central American. To reinforce the notion of Latin
American political cohesiveness, the authors add that Latin American leaders had "met
with President Johnson at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967 and declared their
970

intention to create a region-wide Common Market by 1985."

While this meeting

actually took place, when one goes beyond a declaration of intentions and examines what
actually happened afterwards, one will again detect that regional subsystemic pressures
seem to have contributed to keep South America a separate subsystem. Following the
meeting with President Johnson, Central American states issued a separate invitation to
the Unites States for a "Central American Summit Conference," and what actually
2 8
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happened in 1985 was the initial push for the creation of a Southern Common Market,
when Brazil and Argentina signed a cooperation agreement that would eventually
develop into the Mercosur. Indeed, as Atkins observed, the "actual practice of Latin
971

American, integration favored the subregional approaches."

The author mentions

several integration schemes from the fifties to the nineties, all basically organized around
979

two areas: "Circum-Caribbean" and "South American."

It is curious, though, to notice

that Atkins refers to NAFTA - the North American Free Trade Area - as a "hemispheric"
97"5

arrangement, even though it is clearly a North American arrangement.

However, as

some authors have remarked, NAFTA in North America and Mercosur in South America
can actually be seen as "competing models" of integration in the hemisphere.
Therefore, evidence indicates that in all three variables considered here to
measure interaction among states, it is possible to detect two different patterns of
interaction in the region referred as Latin America. From this point of view, it makes
little sense to think about a Latin American subsystem, since Latin America, as a
Brazilian scholar has recently put it, is "separated not only by the Panama Canal, but it is
actually divided by divergent interests, economic links, and conflicting geopolitical
271
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factors."

On the other hand, by any criterion of actual interactions, Mexico, for

example, "would appear to be entirely North American."276 The same would also be true
for Central American and Caribbean states. Nevertheless, by focusing on other variables,
a significant portion of scholarship has given little attention to the actual patterns of
interaction in the Americas, which has led to frequent errors of judgment, analyses, and
policies. It is true that when studies focusing on regions resurfaced after the Cold War,
the analytical disadvantages of treating Latin America as a coherent unit of analysis
became more evident, as shown in chapter 2. Even though there seems to currently be a
more widespread acceptance that South America comprises a distinct subsystem, its
implications have to be considered more deeply than has been the case thus far.
Acknowledging that there are analytical and empirical grounds to treat South America as
a distinct regional subsystem in its own right opens up unique possibilities for research
that are usually neglect by the customary approaches to studying international politics of
Latin America.
Obviously, drawing precise boundaries of a regional subsystem just on the basis
of geography and patterns of interaction may be a problematic task, since not every state
in a given regional subsystem may conform to these patterns. In South America, some
borderline cases would include Venezuela and Colombia, for example. Because of their
geographic position, these countries can be considered as having a "dual nature of being
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both Caribbean and South American."277 This is also reflected by their patterns of
interaction, particularly in regards to their trade profiles. Nevertheless, especially after the
second half of the twentieth century, they can be increasingly considered part of the
South American subsystem because of the main factor that contributes to hold the
subsystem together - the role of Brazil.

BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

Comprising about half of South America's territory, GDP, and population,
sharing borders with every South American country except Ecuador and Chile, and
having the second largest economy of the Americas, Brazil stands out as the backbone of
the South American regional subsystem and is the key country for explaining it. Because
of its size, population, and economy, Brazil is the country with the greatest capability of
affecting patterns of interaction in the region. It also is the country that connects the "hard
core" of South America - the Southern Cone - with the northern part of the continent,
thus giving a certain level of coherence to the subsystem. Brazil connects the La Plata,
the Andes and the Amazon region, and it could hardly be ignored by any South American
country. This combination of factors means that "Brazil's looming, at times threatening,
presence seems to imprint strongly on the foreign policy of the other republics" in South
978

America.

As Buzan and Waever argue, even though the differences between the

southern and the northern part of South America could be "striking enough to justify
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seeing them as distinct subcomplexes, Brazil remains the linchpin that holds the South
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American" regional subsystem together.
This is why it is justified to include the northern countries of South America in
the regional subsystem, particularly after the seventies when Brazil began to be more
concerned about developing and populating its northern part. A clear example of Brazil's
"looming" presence imprinting on the foreign policy of northern South American states
was the fact that, by the early seventies, when Brazil's military government had laid
down the plans to develop the Amazon region, the Venezuelan president visited six
countries in South America and suggested a Spanish-American alliance against
"Brazilian expansionism" at the same time he initiated efforts to develop Venezuela's
southern region as a response. 280 Likewise, the 1969 Andean Pact, signed by Bolivia,
Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia, and joined by Venezuela in 1973, was motivated in part
981

by a desire "to counter growing Brazilian power" in the region.

In 1976, Brazil

proposed a treaty of cooperation with the members of the Andean pact as an effort "to
989

reduce fears of Brazilian imperialism,"
Venezuela."

which were "particularly [evident in] Peru and

The Amazon Pact was finally signed in 1978 after Venezuelans and
984

Peruvians were reassured of the inexistence of "Brazil's expansionist intentions."
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fact, as John Martz argues, Venezuela has historically been interested in Central America
and the Caribbean, especially because of economic interests, but "territorial integrity and
national security necessarily lie at the core of foreign policy interests," thus the
importance of neighboring South American countries of Brazil, Guyana, and Colombia in
98S

the formulation of its foreign policy.

Obviously, the opposite is also true. For example,

in its annual report of 1956, the Brazilian army noted that "the impetuous development of
Venezuela requires special attention" adding that the possibility that Venezuela would
986

become a military power should "demand closer vigilance."
The focus on Brazil for the purposes of studying the South American regional
subsystem is also justified for theoretical reasons. If the traditional systemic approach to
international relations should be "necessarily based on the great powers,"

the regional

subsystemic approach should likewise be based on the regional powers. According to
Robert Gilpin, the international system's focus on the major powers is justified because
the system generally tends to reflect the interests of the most powerful actors, which have
"determined the patterns of international interactions and established the rules of the
system." 288 In a passage that could be better applied to the regional subsystemic than to
the international systemic approach that he makes the case for, Gilpin argued that:
The boundaries of the system are defined by the area over which great powers
seek to exert control and influence [...] geographic boundaries do matter, in that
they affect which other actors and considerations a state must take into account in
the formulation of its foreign policy. 289
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This same theoretical position generally used to analyze the international system
can be applied to regional subsystems. As Donald Hellman remarked:
The regional subsystem is seen not only in terms of its relationships to the global
system, and the local (regional) patterns of international politics, involving
conflict as well as cooperation, but in terms of the actions and capabilities of the
major regional powers.
Hence, it is unlikely that any analysis of the South American regional subsystem
that neglects the role of Brazil will be entirely successful. The history of South America
also shows that Argentina and Chile could play the role of regional leaders. Contrary to
Brazil, these countries are limited by their geographic position which tended to confine
their concerns to a more restricted area. Recognizing the role of Brazil as the key to
understanding the South American subsystem does not imply considering Brazil as a
regional hegemon with power to dictate the course of the subsystem as it pleases. In fact,
as David Myers observed, for reasons of domestic and regional considerations, "Brazil is
far from being a regional hegemon."

But Brazil is and has consistently been a regional

power, and even if only because of its size, population, and geographic circumstance, this
is a fact to be taken into consideration by the other states' foreign policies. Likewise,
Brazil's foreign policy choices and behavior are definitely important to determine the
dynamics of the subsystem. "A stable Brazil tends to stabilize the continent," writes
Kelly, and any radical transformation of Brazil, such as breaking up in smaller
909

independent countries, would radically transform the South American subsystem.
Correspondingly, had Brazil, like the Spanish-American republics, had its territory

Donald C. Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East Asian International Subsystem," International Studies
Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1969): 422.
291
Myers, Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response, 226.
292
Kelly, Checkerboards & Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America: 53.

107
fragmented when obtaining its independence from Portugal, the history of the South
American subsystem would most likely be considerably different.
A central characteristic of the South American regional subsystem is that not only
must the other states of South American necessarily take Brazil into consideration in
matters of conflict and cooperation, but also, as will be explored later, Brazil has
historically considered South America as its privileged area of influence. This assumption
by Brazilian policymakers is one key factor determining the boundaries of the subsystem.
If the boundaries of the international system, as Gilpin argues, can essentially be "defined
by the area over which great powers seek to exert control and influence,"

the same

should be true for the boundaries of a regional subsystem, which could be then defined by
the area over which regional powers seek to exert influence. According to Moniz
Bandeira, it is the "geopolitical" notion of South America that has effectively guided the
foreign policy of Brazil, and not the "ethnic" concept of Latin America, which "is not
consistent with its actual economic, political, and geopolitical interests." 294 For this
reason, a former Brazilian foreign minister mentioned "the South American component"
as a central aspect of Brazil's "international identity."

Thus, if US policymakers have

occasionally seen the whole of Latin America as its sphere of influence, their Brazilian
counterparts have seen consistently throughout history the hemisphere's two halves in a
different way - a South American half, where Brazil would strive to exert influence, and
a North American half that constituted the sphere of influence of the United States in
which Brazil would thus abstain to be seriously involved. By the same token, Brazil
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would attempt to limit US influence in South America. Because of the centrality of this
argument for the present research, I will return to it later in this dissertation.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

Focusing on the most important powers in the system is also vital to detect and
understand potential processes of systemic change. In his prominent endeavor to study
political change in international politics, Gilpin distinguished between three types of
international change: system change, systemic change, and interaction change. While the
first entails a change in the nature of the most important actors that compose the system for example, from nation-states to empires or multinationals - the second is a change
within the system in which the focus is the relative changes of power culminating with
906

"the replacement of a declining dominant power by a rising dominant power."

The

third type of international change described by Gilpin involves modifications in the
patterns of interaction and may presage systemic changes. In fact, Gilpin comments that
both systemic and interaction changes involve changes in "the rules and rights embodied
in the system."

7

We can adapt this framework originally created for the study of

international systems to the study of regional subsystems. According to Gilpin's
approach, the central factor to understand the destabilization of the system and systemic
change is the rise of new powers and the consequent redistribution of relative power in
the overall system. What is central in his argument is the idea that the power of the
members of the international system changes at different rates, and thus this "differential
296
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growth in power of the various states" is the most important factor in explaining systemic
908

change.

This theory can also be applied at the regional level, but while Gilpin

considers the international system as whole and thus must find the sources of power
redistribution exclusively within the system, the regional subsystem approach allows for
a second source of power redistribution which comes from outside the subsystem.
In the case of the South American subsystem, the main candidate for changing the
regional distribution of power from the outside is the United States, which seems to be
the only actor that could incorporate the South American subsystem in an allencompassing American system. If the United States acted in South America the same
way it has done in the rest of Latin America, the concept of a South American regional
system would indeed lose much of its analytical muscle as the North American country
would absorb most of their regional interactions. There is little doubt that the United
States has possessed the capabilities to change the subsystemic status quo in South
America and to effectively affect the distribution of power in the subsystem through
direct action either in the form of military intervention or action of some other kind that
Cantori and Spiegel called "politically significant involvement," which, as quoted in
chapter 2,
is expressed by the possession of a colony; economic or military aid producing an
alteration in the balance of power in the region; formal alliance, troop
commitment, or any agreement which causes the external power to act in ways
which resemble the types of actions that would ordinarily be taken by a country
indigenous to the region.299
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For Gilpin, the international system tends toward stability as long as no state
judges that it is profitable to change it.

Adapting Gilpin's framework to the study of the

regional subsystem, if US policy makers at some point concluded that the benefits of
transforming the South American subsystem's status quo would outweigh the costs, they
could have attempted to do so through significant political involvement. The argument of
this dissertation is that Brazil has affected this calculation by either increasing the costs or
reducing the benefits of subsystemic change for the United States. Therefore, the stability
of the South American subsystem must be explained not only in reference to geography,
but also through the interaction between the United States and Brazil, which has
contributed to maintaining the United States as an "absent empire" in South America in
contrast to other regions of Latin America. From this follows that the present, past, and at
least the near future of the South American subsystem depends largely on the relationship
between the United States and Brazil, a theory which is in line with the discussion
mentioned in the previous chapter of the relationship between agents and structure. In
other words, the structure of the South American subsystem affects the outcomes of US
foreign policies but does not determine them, and, depending on how the interactions
between the United States and Brazil develop, this structure can be changed, whether
because the United States may be willing to pay the costs of change or because Brazil
may be unwilling to affect US calculations.
Therefore, the patterns of interaction aspect of the South American subsystem is
characterized both by distinct patterns of cooperation and conflict within the subsystem
as well as by a relative US absence in comparison to the rest of Latin America. Both of
these factors are interrelated and contribute to keeping South America as a separate
300
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regional subsystem. While the first has already been emphasized, this research will focus
on the latter. The main goal is to demonstrate that the resulting interaction between the
United States and the South American regional subsystem has not led to a subsystemic
change in South America, which would mean its outright incorporation into either a Latin
American or an American subsystem. In other words, this dissertation aims to explain the
remarkable degree of stability of the South American subsystem and to make the case for
the analytical strength of treating South America as a separate regional subsystem in
order to assess, and possibly predict, the outcomes of given US foreign policies initiatives
toward the region. If it is true that the outcomes of interaction "have an inherently
systemic dimension,"

a refinement of the understanding of a given system - in this case

the South American subsystem of the international system - holds the promise of
generating better explanations.
It is true that many authors have noticed the relative US absence from South
America in comparison to the rest of Latin America. These authors focus generally on the
most evident aspect of this difference - the lack of direct unilateral US military
intervention south of Panama. Two basic sets of explanations are usually provided to
account for this difference - South America is too far away or it has little strategic
significance, and South American states are more stable than other countries in Latin
America. Typically, the combination of these two factors - proximity and political
instability - is used to explain the abundance of US military involvement in Central
America and the Caribbean in contrast to South America. For example, Pastor argues that
Central America's and Caribbean's "proximity, vulnerability, and instability" are the
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three characteristics that "make the region of special concern to the United States." 302
For Harold Molineu there are "obvious security interests" that arise "out of the region
nearness."

Ronald Steel asserts that, while the Caribbean is of immediate interest,

some nations in South America "are twice as far from the United States as Europe" and
therefore they could be considered "irrelevant" for the security of the United States.304
David Myers sees South America as less subjected to US influence in general because of
the "greater difficulty of projecting North American military, diplomatic and economic
O AC

power into an arena that is larger, more populous and geographically remote."

The

notion of "geographic proximity" as "the most important factor" in explaining US
involvement in Central America and the Caribbean is also present in more recent
•

studies.

^06

•

David Healy and Thomas Leonard single out the "search for stability" as the
^07

main characteristic of US actions in Central America and the Caribbean.

Likewise, for

Molineu "the constant seeking of stability for its own sake may be the common
denominator in understanding the definition of U.S. interests in Latin America." 308 Louis
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Perez Jr. remarks that American officials saw US presence in the Caribbean as necessary
to bring "political stability and fiscal responsibility." 309
From the perspective presented by the present research, there are three main
aspects of these approaches that deserve particular consideration. The first is that, by
focusing on how geographical proximity affects interactions between the United States
and the two different subsystems in Latin America, the approaches implicitly
acknowledge the existence of a North American subsystem distinct from a South
American subsystem. However, because this is just implicit, the research is unable to
explore the consequences of this separation and to go beyond an overemphasis on Central
America and the Caribbean. In fact, it seems apparent that the overwhelming majority of
the works on "United States-Latin America relations" are works on the relations of the
United States with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, with occasional
references to one or other South American state just to give the impression of covering
the whole region. Because South America is considered too far away, too irrelevant, or
relatively stable, it does not deserve any deeper analytical treatment by specialists in US
foreign policy. In other words, studying a region where the United States has been an
absent empire is far less interesting than looking at the instances where the imperial urge
has been very present. Thus, the result of US relative absence from South America results
in an absence of South America in the study of US foreign policy.
The second aspect that deserves consideration is closely related to first. As
mentioned, geographic proximity and instability are often mentioned as the main reasons
for why the United States has been less involved in South America in comparison to the
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rest of Latin America, but with the overemphasis on the "unstable" Central American and
Caribbean states, little attention is given to the supposed stability of South American
states. While geographic distance is self-explanatory, the sources of stability or instability
are not an unchangeable and permanent fact of nature and must therefore be explained. In
addition, while geographic distance is definitively a sound explanation for the lack of
involvement in South America until around the first two decades of the twentieth century
- when the United States lacked actual power projection in the region and had to compete
with a strong European presence there - it becomes less compelling after the United
States became a global power. After all, geographic distance did not restrain the United
States from occasionally employing imperial policies in different parts of the globe.
Finally, the third aspect of the explanations mentioned above is that, at best, they
can explain a supposed lack of U.S. interest towards South America. Nevertheless, the
explanatory power of those approaches is unequipped to account for the instances when
the United States demonstrated a clear interest in South America and yet the actual
outcome was relative absence. Lacking an adequate theoretical approach to explain these
cases, authors frequently attempt to fit their interpretations within the usual "United
States-Latin America" framework, where dissimilar events in what are actually two
distinct regional subsystems are seen as equivalent. This is clearly evident and especially
relevant in one case in which the United States clearly demonstrated an interest in South
American events and that turned out to be definitely the most mentioned event by any
scholar trying to demonstrate a supposed coherent pattern of US intervention in Latin
America as a whole - the 1973 Chilean military coup. By making reference to the
Chilean case along with a number of US interventions in Central America and Caribbean,
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those who propose to analyze US foreign policy towards Latin America feel satisfied and
relieved that he or she was able to find a case to demonstrate a consistent pattern for the
whole region, and therefore are free to concentrate on aspects considered more important.
Therefore, the next chapters will attempt to address these three aspects from the
regional subsystemic perspective in order to tackle their shortcomings. First, by providing
a framework for the study of the international relations of South America, this research
aims to bring attention to an important region of the hemisphere that is commonly
neglected by the majority of the studies on United States-Latin America relations for the
fact that the United States has not been as active in South America as it has historically
been in other regions of Latin America. In other words, by providing explanations for the
relative US absence from South America, this research seeks to overcome the relative
absence of South America in US studies on Latin America. This is especially relevant
given the rising interest in Brazil as an important power in the evolving configuration of
the international system.

Second, by considering reasons beyond the mere geographic

remoteness and lack of interest, this research intends to provide alternative explanations
for US absence, as well as to address the question of apparent "stability" of South
America as compared to the other regions of Latin America. And lastly, by focusing on
particular case studies when the US policy makers demonstrated a clear interest in South
America, this dissertation intends to offer explanations for the actual outcome of US
initiatives. In his pioneering study on regional subsystems Binder compared extraregional power to rays of light that were "refracted" when projected into regional
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subsystems.

In the same way, the goal of this research is to help to understand how US

power is "refracted" when projected into the South American subsystem.
Perhaps the major casualty brought about by the regional subsystemic
perspective as applied to South America is the usual framework of US "hegemony" in
Latin America as multipurpose explanation for the international politics of the Western
Hemisphere. In terms of interpretation, this approach equates, for instance, the 1954
Guatemalan coup with the 1973 Chilean coup as equivalent events, both being examples
of countries that "were unable to break away from U.S. dominance." 312 In terms of
analysis, the US hegemony approach would predict, for example, that the regional
integration model set by NAFTA would inevitably be extended to all Latin America
T I T

"because of U.S. power."

The traditional focus on the United States is reminiscent of

the conventional global systemic approach to international relations. Nevertheless,
outside the boundaries of the North American subsystem - i.e., in regional subsystems
where the United States is an external power, and not an integral member - a
disproportionate focus on US actions often leads to neglecting the dynamics of the
regional subsystemic game that is being played simultaneously. Obviously, in some
circumstances the distinction between the United States (or any other great power, for
that matter) as an external power or as an integral member is blurred - the United States
in Western Europe in the fifties, for example, comes to mind. Yet, even in those extreme
situations, regional subsystemic pressures are at play, and geography makes sure that
states will remain concerned about their neighbors and attempt to manipulate external
311
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powers for their own advantage in order to achieve a better position in the regional
chessboard.
For the reasons aforementioned, the role of Brazil as a regional power will be
emphasized in order to explain the interaction between the United States and the South
American regional subsystem. This does not mean to negate the role of the United States,
or to assume that Brazil has "more power" or "more influence" than the United States in
South America, or that somehow there is a balance of power between Brazil and the
United States in that subsystem. What it does mean, is that the supposed hegemonial role
of the United States in South America has not been exercised as it could have been
because of the particular dynamics of the South American subsystem in which Brazil has
played a central role by manipulating the cost-benefit structure of subsystemic change. If
the United States has acted occasionally as an empire in other regions of Latin America,
in South America it has been an absent one, even though it has had the required
capabilities to be a present one. Geographic distance obviously plays an important role,
but it is far from being a sufficient explanation - the regional subsystemic perspective is
thus required in order to allow us to detect alternative reasons.

BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

An important assumption of this dissertation is that, as a regional subsystem
develops, regionally influential states value their position in the subsystem and thus they
have an incentive to maintain the integrity of the subsystem by reducing opportunities for
outside penetration, which could at the limit promote subsystemic change if the regional
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distribution of power was substantially affected. Because their main focus is usually
regional rather than global, regional powers tend to concentrate their attention primarily
on their own regional subsystems. Accordingly, at the same time these states adopt
strategies to maintain their influence within the subsystem, they work either to limit
influence from outside or to shape that influence in accordance to their interests. The
capacity of regional powers to restrict outside penetration is obviously limited by the
power relationship between them and the external powers, but they can be successful if
they create conditions that reduce the incentive or the opportunity for outside penetration,
thus affecting the structure of costs and benefits of subsystemic change. Correspondingly,
they may also be unable or inefficient to affect the structure of costs and benefits, in
which case outside penetration can lead to subsystemic change. Weaker states within the
subsystem may also bargain with outside powers to improve their own positions but they
generally have little to gain by completely ignoring the pressures of more powerful
neighboring states.
The assumption stated above helps to explain the role of Brazil in the South
American subsystem and the relative absence of the United States. Because of its
privileged geographic situation in South America, Brazil has been a "quintessential status
quo power,"

which means it has had a lot to gain by maintaining the stability of the

subsystem. The argument proposed here is that Brazil, which has historically displayed
"a strong vested interest in regional stability,"315 has successfully manipulated the
structure of costs and benefits of subsystemic change for the United States in two main
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ways. First, it has reduced the benefits of subsystemic change by acting as a
•J 1 /T

"subhegemonic state"

•

"517

or a "hegemonic stabilizer"

at the regional level, thus

preempting the role that could potentially be played by the United States, and
consequently reducing the opportunities and incentives for US interference. Because, like
Brazil, the United States has also been a status quo power when it comes to Latin
America in general and to South America in particular, there has been "a congruence of
US-Brazilian interest in stability in the region," 318 in spite of occasional divergence of
interests. Thus, while standard explanations for the relative stability of South America
would argue that "American hegemony mutes a real conflict,"

this research takes a

different approach. As one observer put it in the late seventies,
Not U.S. intercession, but Brazilian power diplomacy seems most responsible to
date for preventing the outbreak of violence in the region. If this is true, there may
exist some basis for beginning to think of South American relations in terms of a
regional balance of power (in which Brazil plays the role of balancer) rather than
in the more conventional framework of North American hegemony.
Therefore, Brazil has played in South America - although essentially through
other means - a similar role as the United States has played in other parts of Latin
America, which explains in part why the US military interventions on behalf of a "search
for stability" could be regionally restricted to the north of Panama. On the other hand,
Brazil has attempted to increase the costs of subsystemic change by increasing the
incentives for other states in participating in the subsystem and at the same time avoiding
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openly playing the "subhegemonic" role. This is both a conscious decision by Brazilian
policymakers as well as a reflection of Brazil's limited means to be a hegemonic power.
Both strategies - decreasing the benefits and increasing the costs of subsystemic change have often been used simultaneously to affect the profitability of change, but the first was
more evident during the Cold War, while the second became preeminent after the
eighties. The cases selected for study in the next chapters will better explore these
arguments.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the fact regional subsystems are subsets of
the broader international system means that they cannot be studied in complete isolation.
A complete analysis of regional subsystems can only claim to be satisfactory if it includes
references to the international system that constitutes the environment of the regional
subsystems. For this reason the next chapters are arranged in accordance with different
configurations of the international system. The first period, which goes from the time of
the independence of the American states until the first decades of the twentieth century, is
considered by many analysts as being multipolar, but this multipolarity was essentially
restricted to the European context. In the Western Hemisphere the United States was the
major power and its foreign policy had basically a regionalist orientation, from which the
Monroe Doctrine is the clearest example. The second period under study is the Cold War,
when an actual international system came about, together with a bipolar configuration of
power. During this period, the United States adopted a global orientation in its foreign
policy, focused mainly on the European continent, at the same time it reached the peak of
its influence in Latin America. The Cold War is a particularly relevant period for the
purposes of this study because it was when the United States had clearly both the
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incentive and the capability to become a "present empire" in South America. Finally, the
last period under consideration goes from the end of the Cold War until the present days,
when the disappearance of the Soviet Union left the United States as the "lonely
superpower."321 For each of these configurations of the broader system, a corresponding
role for Brazil in the South American subsystem is identified. For the purposes of the
present study, the first period will be characterized as the "unwritten alliance" with the
United States; the second will be termed as the "regional imperialist" phase; and the third
as the "leader of a South American bloc." The juxtaposition of these three factors - the
configuration of the international system, the role of the United States, and the role of
Brazil will be the basic framework to analyze the three periods under study. It is the
expectation of this research, that this framework is a better alternative to understand US
foreign policy towards South America than the ones offered by the existing literature.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF A SOUTH
AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

As previously mentioned, any research that aims to address patterns of interaction
is inevitably fated to address historical processes. How far back in time it is necessary to
reach is a choice of the analyst. In the case of the interactions among American states,
this choice is comparatively easier since most of these countries have been independent
for only about two hundred years, which allows the researcher to identify the beginning
of their interaction processes among those nations as formal actors of international
politics without great difficulty.
In fact, an appropriate year to start the analysis is 1823, when the independence of
the American states was recently completed and the United States issued the doctrine that
is probably the most resilient of its history: the Monroe Doctrine. Aiming specially at the
European states that then constituted the Holy Alliance - composed of Russia, Prussia,
Austria, and France - which entertained plans to help Spain regain their lost colonies in
America, President Monroe declared that "the American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers" and that if they
attempted to do so, this would be interpreted "as the manifestation of an unfriendly
^99

disposition toward the United States."

The Monroe Doctrine was thus a unilateral

Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History,
1937 (Gloucester, Mass.,: P. Smith, 1966), 3.

declaration by the United States instituting a separation between Europe and the
Americas through the commitment to actively oppose any new European colonization
attempts in the Western Hemisphere.
This chapter examines the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine beyond its original
promulgation in 1823 in order to demonstrate that the development of the interactions
between the countries in the hemisphere made it progressively clear that, rather than
being a policy directed to be homogeneously applied in all Latin America, the Monroe
Doctrine and its offshoots—such as the Roosevelt Corollary—were explicitly Caribbean
or, to use the terminology employed by this dissertation, restricted to the North American
subsystem. In South America, the doctrine acquired a rather different character. The
chapter argues that both distance and the relative stability of key South American
countries allowed for this development of an embryonic South American subsystem
organized around Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The chapter also shows that Brazil in
particular considered itself as a guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine in South America and
thus it pursued an "unwritten alliance" with the United States, meaning that each country
would take care of its respective regional subsystem. Although this was not entirely
reciprocated, the understood alliance was relatively convenient for the United States as
Brazil was a friendly country and because it would allow the United States to concentrate
its actions in the Caribbean. As Chile's power declined and Argentina adopted a foreign
policy with a strong anti-US orientation, Brazil's position became even more relevant.

124
ACTION AND REACTION: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Those who concentrate on the Monroe Doctrine only as it was promulgated in
1823 may conclude that no differentiation should be made between the two halves of the
Americas. After all, at no point in Monroe's speech was this differentiation made.
Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine was "not an event but a historic development," 323 and
consequently it should be studied taking into consideration a broader historical
perspective in terms of how it developed through time. In other words, what should be
determined is how the process of interaction among the American states shaped the actual
outcome of US policies following the 1823 declaration. When this is done, the first signs
of the configuration of two different regional subsystems in the Western Hemisphere
become evident, illustrates both by geography and by the way the interactions among the
American countries unfolded.
Because there was no previous significant interaction among the independent
countries in the Western Hemisphere, the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, given its
presumed hemispheric reach, can be considered as equivalent to a "first social act" which
"creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior" thus setting in
motion a process of action and reaction that would lead to the creation of "intersubjective
meanings,"

which would eventually determine important aspects of the patterns of

relationship in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the first reactions when Monroe's
message reached the Latin American states seems to have varied from indifference to
323
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enthusiasm. The indifference aspect is explained by the fact that many governments in
Latin America were still more connected to Europe than to the other countries in the
Americas and tended to look to Great Britain more than to the infant United States as a
source for protection,

but the possibility of being able to rely on a second power in

their own hemisphere to ward off the European powers could not be completely ignored
by the newly independent Latin American states. Alejandro Alvarez notices that four
countries took special interest in the doctrine: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
-196

Mexico.

Dexter Perkins adds that also in Chile "the message was better received than

in any other part of Spanish America."327 All of these countries, recently independent and
fearful of possible attempts of reconquest by Spain or Portugal, became interested in
finding out more about US intentions and indeed they "asked point-blank what means the
^98

United States intended to use for their protection."

The Empire of Brazil "was the first
-390

South American government to take notice of the Doctrine"
requested a defensive-offensive alliance with the United States.

and within two months
A similar call for an

alliance was made by Mexico and by Simon Bolivar's Colombia. A few years after
Monroe's message to the US Congress, the Argentinean government called for the
application of the Doctrine in a conflict against Brazil because, according to the
Argentinean president at the time, of the "obvious connection between Europe and Brazil,
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more especially of Portugal."

The US response was basically the same in all cases. To

the Colombian government, Secretary of State Adams replied that "the fear of
intervention by the Holy Alliance in the countries of the New World had practically
disappeared,"

and therefore there was no need for a formal alliance. In the case of

Brazil, the United States government was cool towards the request for an alliance and
"excused itself, believing this compact unnecessary,"333 and later on the two countries
signed a more limited commercial treaty. The Argentinean government was informed by
Secretary of State Clay in 1828 that the request for intervention against Brazil was
unfounded, and that "the United States did not consider itself obliged to intervene in
defense of the Monroe Doctrine at every request of interested parties."

To leave no

doubts about his views, Clay added that "[e]ven if Portugal and Brazil had remained
united, and the war had been carried out by their joint arms, against the Argentine
Republic, that would have been far from presenting the case which the message
contemplated."

Similarly, to the Mexican President, Clay explained that the Monroe

Doctrine did not mean that the United States had contracted any kind of legal obligation
to maintain it.

But in contrast to the South American countries, Mexico would soon

learn that the Monroe Doctrine was silent about the United States' own ambitions.
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Obviously, given the fact that during the most part of the nineteenth century the
European powers were more capable than the United States to project power in South
America, it could hardly be conceivable that US statesmen would be willing to take any
significant action in a region that was far from their borders. By the 1840s, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster felt it necessary to make clear that the Monroe Doctrine "did not
commit us, at all events, to take up arms at any indication of hostile feeling by the powers
of Europe toward South America," adding that it would be a "very different case" if any
European power "landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced a war in
our immediate neighborhood."

While in the 1860s the United States was so concerned

about the French presence in Mexico as to plan to use all means necessary to force their
withdrawal, when Chile went into conflict with Spain at about the same time, Secretary
of State William H. Seward offered no more than "the moral support of a sincere, liberal,
and, as we think it will appear, a useful friendship."

In summary, the actual actions of

the United States made clear that, as the Monroe Doctrine acquired the contours of a
policy rather than a declaration of intentions, a clear separation between the North and
the South American part of the American continent was beginning to take shape.
During this process of action and reaction between the United States and the Latin
American governments, the actual scope of the Monroe Doctrine became progressively
more delineated. In a message to Congress in 1845, US President James Polk had already

" Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation: 92.
338
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"formally confirmed the geographical limitations of the Doctrine"

when he declared

that it would
apply with greatly increased force should any European power attempt to
establish any new colony in North America [...] The reassertion of this principle,
especially in reference to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a
policy which no European power should cherish the disposition to resist.... It
should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future
European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established in
any part of the North American continent."
This explicit declaration by President Polk demonstrated categorically that instead
of having a true hemispheric scope, the Monroe Doctrine was in actuality "essentially a
Caribbean doctrine, affirming the vital interest of the United States in the tranquility of
what it considered to be its inland sea." 341 The repeated allusions to "North America" in
lieu of hemispheric references continued to be made throughout the latter half of the
nineteenth century. In making the case for the annexation of Santo Domingo as "an
adherence to the Monroe Doctrine," President Grant stated in 1871 that he believed that
"we should not permit any independent government within the limits of North America to
pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a
European power." 342
Perhaps the only exception to this overall concentration "within the limits of
North America" was during Venezuela's boundary dispute with the British colony of
Guyana, but in this case it appears that the personal characteristics of Secretary of State
Richard Olney played a significant factor. The Venezuelan government had been
disputing the Guyana boundary with Britain since the 1880s, but until 1895, when Olney
J
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succeeded Walter Gresham as Secretary of State, the United States "pursued a most
cautious and circumspect course." 343 It was only after Olney became Secretary of State
that the United States decided to take a firm stand on the issue by forcing Great Britain to
accept US arbitration, and making reference to the Monroe Doctrine as "the accepted
public law of this country."344 In what appears to be an effort to extend the geographical
scope of the doctrine as it had been tacitly defined until then, he added that the American
states "South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by
similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and
politically, of the United States."345 This was not only a matter of friendship, the
Secretary of State observed, but also the reality of the growing American power. As
Olney famously put it: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this
continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

It

must be recalled that Monroe's original message referred explicitly to new European
colonies and not existing ones, which means that Olney's application of the Monroe
Doctrine as a justification for US intervention in a boundary dispute was a singular
interpretation that led the British government to respond, in astonishment, that even
though admitting that "the Monroe Doctrine in itself is sound," the "disputed frontier
with Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President
Monroe. It is not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any portion of
America." The note, written by Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, concluded that Olney's
34j
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interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was a "strange development."347 Albert Hart,
whose book provided the aforementioned quotes, commented that "[n]o previous
President or Secretary of State had ever taken such a broad and sweeping ground" and
that Olney's interpretation was "little related to the doctrine of 1823."

In fact, the

Venezuela-Guiana boundary dispute seems an isolated case within an overall pattern, but
while Hart concentrates on the question of the application of the Monroe Doctrine to an
issue apparently unrelated to the original declaration, for the purposes of this research,
the relevant aspect is the fact that the Venezuelan case was perhaps the only instance
when the Doctrine was actually invoked to justify US actions south of Panama. Indeed,
Secretary Olney himself declared in the following year, when the Cuban insurrections
occupied the minds of American statesmen, that the United States was in fact "interested
in any struggle anywhere for freer political institutions, but," he added, "necessarily and
in special measure in a struggle that is raging almost in sight of our shores."34 Once
again, the actual practices forced the confinement of the geographical application of the
doctrine.
Evidently, as the true scope of the Monroe Doctrine became clear for Latin
Americans, reactions differed radically from the almost unanimous support received right
after it was first promulgated. In particular, the United States' expansion into Mexican
territory after 1848 made clear to Mexico and to the nearby Central American and
Caribbean countries, that "the Monroe Doctrine was never a guarantee against ambitious
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designs of the United States itself"350 When a "policy of hegemony" came to be
considered as a "natural complement of the Monroe Doctrine" by US statesmen,351 it is
not a surprise that some countries, Mexico in particular, began to develop "a great
aversion to the Doctrine, for they look upon it ordinarily no longer under the aspect
which it had in 1823 but under the new aspect which has been given to it."

5

During the

Spanish-American War in 1898, when the United States took at once Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines, this notion was greatly reinforced. Predictably, by the beginning of
the twentieth century, a Mexican President stated publicly his opposition to the Monroe
Doctrine, because, from his point of view, it "attacks the sovereignty and independence
of Mexico and would set up and establish a tutelage over all the nations of America."353
The growth in US power and the relative decline of Europe changed the initial view that a
number of Latin American states initially had of the Monroe Doctrine as a guarantee
against intervention. The question which now dominated several of the Pan American
Conferences was how to deal with the major power in their own hemisphere. As Gordon
Connell-Smith remarks, "a system which was promoted to prevent extra-continental
intervention became at once concerned with the question of intervention by the
promoting power."354 After the Spanish-American War and a number of interventions in
Central America and the Caribbean throughout the first decades of the twentieth century,
it would become evident that the notion of a homogeneous US "Latin American" policy
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was in fact far more restricted in its geographical scope.

Having defeated a decadent

European empire at the turn of the century, and still living in a world of empires, the
United States flirted with imperial solutions for itself.356 Nevertheless, the scope of this
American "empire" rarely reached the countries south of Panama. As will be seen below,
because of their different experiences with US power, the South American countries by
and large developed a very different outlook than the one developed by the rest of Latin
America, which can be clearly illustrated by the cases of Mexico and Brazil.

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF A SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

The strategic importance of the Caribbean area in comparison to South America is
just one dimension of the explanation for the US lack of involvement further south in
these first years of interaction among the independent American states. The other
dimension must be found in the simultaneous development of a "continental South
American system of power politics" around the core formed by Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile.

Geographic distance allowed this system to develop during the nineteenth

century, before the United States was actually capable of effectively projecting power in
the Southern Cone of South America. Therefore, when the United States eventually
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acquired the capabilities for transforming the Monroe Doctrine into an authentic
hemispheric doctrine beyond its Caribbean scope, it had to deal with a regional
subsystem that had already been reasonably advanced in a way that was considerably
different than in the rest of Latin America.
In contrast to other former Spanish colonies, Argentina and Chile managed to
develop early in their independence relatively stable governments. Despite some
moments of political precariousness - especially in the case of Argentina - none of these
two countries experienced the kind of political upheaval that prevailed in Mexico for
example, in which "between 1821 and 1848, there were six or seven different
governments."

Brazil was a different case in which contrary to Spanish America, it

had not been fragmented into parts and experienced no great political ruptures when it
achieved independence from Portugal. It is suffice to say that the first ruler of
independent Brazil, Dom Pedro I, the Portuguese Prince, ruled as Emperor of Brazil for
nine years. The second ruler, Emperor Dom Pedro II, was Dom Pedro I's son and ruled
for forty-eight straight years until Brazil became a Republic in 1889 - again with no
bloodshed. Contrary to what his long reign may suggest, far from being a typical Latin
American caudillo, Dom Pedro II was an erudite and liberal statesman who allowed
freedom of press and speech, and invested heavily in education.

5

Because of a

functioning and active parliament, "with solid and competitive parties,"
even characterized the Brazilian Empire as "a crowned democracy."

one author

After meeting
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Dom Pedro II, British Prime Minister William Gladstone referred to him as "a model to
^69

all sovereigns of the world."

When Dom Pedro II died, the New York Times wrote an

extremely flattering obituary - which was a relatively unusual deference for any Latin
American leader in the late nineteenth century - making reference to Gladstone's
remarks, adding that Dom Pedro II was "one of the most enlightened monarchs of the
century [...] a liberal patron of letters, arts, and sciences," and commenting that "Dom
Pedro made Brazil as free as a monarchy can become."363 The following day, the US
newspaper referred to him as a "genial philosopher" and - what is really surprising in
light of Monroe's original idea of separation between the European and the American
systems of government - questioned the wisdom of establishing a republic in Brazil,
saying that "it is doubtful whether a republic meets the requirements of Brazil so well as
a monarchy."364 In fact, the popularity that the Brazilian Emperor enjoyed was so
substantial that the most renowned statesman of the early years of the Brazilian Republic
was the Baron of Rio Branco, a diplomat during the Empire and son of another prominent
statesman during Dom Pedro IPs reign. Rio Branco was the Brazilian Minister of Foreign
Affairs under four different administrations, from 1902 to 1910. Therefore, along with
Brazil's sheer size, this relative continuity of policies and stability, with no significant
breaks or political upheavals, provided the country with the basis for its consolidation as
a regional power in South America.
As one author observes, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina,
Chile, and Brazil "represented at the time literally the only group of historically mature,
362
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constitutionally stable, traditionally peaceful, and physically secure sovereign states to be
found anywhere in the world."

This unique condition allowed for a development of a

regional subsystem early on in the international life of those states. Because of the
existence of three countries in geographical propinquity with the potential for playing the
role of regional powers as well as the relative absence of the United States during the first
years of their independence, states in South America were less concerned about the
overwhelming power of the North American country than about themselves, which was
clearly the opposite situation in relation to the countries in the northern half of the
hemisphere. Robert Burr describes the development of a system of power politics in
South America throughout the nineteenth century, first with two relatively separate
regions - the Plata and the Andean region - which eventually joined in a single
"continental" system by the 1860s.

Therefore, South American statesmen, at least since

the second half of the nineteenth century, "tended to think is terms of a continent-wide
balance-of-power system,"

and used to make constant references to a "South

American equilibrium." 368 As Burr argues, by the end of the nineteenth century, "the
idea of a balance of power had become an accepted part of the international life of South
America."369 Nevertheless, the notion of a separation between South and North America
was manifest in the minds of South American statesmen at least as early as 1840. For
example, when internal problems in Mexico indicated that an attempt to summon a
365
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conference among American states that year was about to fail, the Chilean government
suggested that "it would perhaps be well for the South American plenipotentiaries to
meet together ... without awaiting the arrival... of their Mexican and Central American
colleagues" adding categorically that "[t]he republics of South America and the Brazilian
Empire form a compact system whose ties with Mexico and Central America are
comparatively weak."
While their distance from the United States put the South Americans countries
outside the actual scope of the Monroe Doctrine and made them less preoccupied about
the possibility of US intervention, as the relative strength and stability of Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile became clear by the end of the nineteenth century, policymakers in the
United States began to entertain new possibilities for the application of the Monroe
Doctrine and the maintenance of stability in the Americas. Although this is barely
mentioned in the literature, it would become a key feature of the separation between the
North and the South American regional subsystems in these formative years - the United
States would take direct responsibility for its area of immediate strategic interest in North
America, while it would seek to involve the stronger South American countries in the
affairs of the South American continent. Indeed, this prospect was already mentioned by
the end of the nineteenth century when President Grant considered intervening in the
dispute between Chile and Peru. Leaving aside the unilateral phraseology commonly used
when dealing with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, the US President
mentioned the possibility of intervention by stating that the United States "would hold
itself free to appeal to the other Republics of this continent to join in an effort to avert
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consequences which cannot be confined to Chili [sic] and Peru."

Nevertheless, the

notion of a possible entente between the United States and some South American
countries took shape by the time the most famous extension of the Monroe Doctrine was
promulgated - the "Roosevelt Corollary," which was officially announced in 1904.
Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt, who famously brandished the "big stick" to maintain order
in the Caribbean area, is perhaps the first US president to explicitly consider the
advantages of shared responsibilities for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in the
southern half of the hemisphere.

ROOSEVELT, WILSON AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM

In a chapter of his autobiography entitled "The Monroe Doctrine and the Panama
Canal," Roosevelt starts out by acknowledging that the Spanish-American War left the
United States "with peculiar relations to the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, and with
"XT)

immensely added interest in Central America and the Caribbean Sea,"

therefore clearly

establishing the boundaries of the US sphere of influence at the time, as many of his
predecessors had done. A few lines later, he makes clear the differentiation in the
Western Hemisphere between that area and South America, when he adds:
The great and prosperous civilized commonwealths such as the Argentine, Brazil,
and Chile, in the southern half of South America have advanced so far that they
no longer stand in any position of tutelage toward the United States. They occupy
toward us precisely the position that Canada occupies. Their friendship is the
friendship of equals for equals. My view was that as regards these nations there

1
2
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was no more necessity for asserting the Monroe Doctrine than there was to assert
it for Canada.373
Roosevelt concludes that if some European nation attempted to occupy one of
these countries, the United States would provide assistance, but "the initiative would
come from the Nation itself, and the United States would merely act as a friend whose
help was invoked." Evidently, as he immediately recognizes, the situation would be
"widely different" in the case of "the states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean Sea."374
Roosevelt's reasoning for the often overlooked double standard for the
enforcement of his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine seems to be based on two
pillars. The first is strategic-military. Already by 1901, the General Board of the Navy
had produced a report that clearly stated:
Whether the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, so far as it is the policy of this
Government, covers all South America, including Patagonia and the Argentine, is
not for the consideration of the General Board, but only the fact that the principles
of strategy and the defects in our geographical position make it impracticable
successfully to maintain naval control by armed force beyond the Amazon, unless
• •

»

^7S

present conditions are radically changed.
This view was shared by the prominent strategist Captain Alfred Mahan, who
believed "that United States security concerns ended at the Amazon River, making it
•>76

unnecessary to apply the Monroe Doctrine south of it."
To this strategic-military aspect Roosevelt added a second pillar, based on the
notion of state capacity, that is, the states requiring US intervention would be the ones
that proved incapable "to do their duties to outsiders or to enforce their rights against
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outsiders."377 In his original message to Congress which gave birth to the Roosevelt
Corollary, Roosevelt famously mentioned that "wrongdoing or impotence" would be the
causes for US intervention in the hemisphere, adding that if the countries in the
Caribbean area had the same "progress in stable and just civilization [...] which so many
of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliant showing, all questions of
interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end."378 Later, Roosevelt
explicitly singled out "Brazil, the Argentine, Chile," which, he said,
have achieved positions of such assured ... progress, of such political stability and
power and economic prosperity,... it is safe to say that there is no further need for
the United States to concern itself about asserting the Monroe Doctrine so far as
these powers are concerned.
In another occasion, Roosevelt remarked that
There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a
point of stability, order, and prosperity, that they themselves, though as yet hardly
consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine ... If all the republics to the
south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need
for us to be the special champions of the Doctrine will disappear, for no stable and
growing American Republic wishes to see some great non-American military
•

^80

power acquire territory in its neighborhood.
This notion that the more stable South American republics could be the guarantors
of the Monroe Doctrine led one scholar to comment that Roosevelt viewed some
countries like Argentina and Brazil "as junior partners that would help enforce the
Corollary." 381 Another author stated that "[i]n a burst of enthusiasm," Roosevelt "is
reported to have told Chile that, had Santo Domingo been in the Pacific, he would have
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called her to police the island."

When he was already out of office, Roosevelt

confirmed this view of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as partners that could enforce the
corollary, in a letter to his son, when he wrote that
it would be mere folly, the silliest kind of silliness, to ask Mexico [fallen into
revolution], Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, to guarantee the Monroe Doctrine
with us. It is eminently proper to ask Brazil, the Argentine and Chile to do it...;
but to ask the other countries I have named to guarantee it would be about like
asking the Apaches and Utes to guarantee it.383
What the above quotations intend to make evident is that, if Theodore Roosevelt
is often associated with the pursuit of an US "empire," his views about how South
America would fit in his scheme should serve to reinforce the notion that in the Western
Hemisphere this imperial urge was geographically limited.384
Part of this "growing recognition in the United States that not all of Latin America
was disorderly or backward,"385 seems to be the work of Roosevelt's Secretary of State
Elihu Root, who was the first sitting Secretary of State to visit South America (or any
foreign country for that matter), where he was warmly received. Like his predecessors,
Root is quoted as acknowledging that "as one passes to the south and the distance from
the Caribbean increases, the necessity of maintaining the rule of Monroe becomes less
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immediate and apparent."

Like Roosevelt, Root believed that this was so not only

because of geographic distance, but because of the different level of organization that he
attributed to key South American states. For Lars Schoultz, "Elihu Root's specific
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contribution to inter-American relations was to disaggregate the nations of the region into
two different classes - one the turbulent Caribbean region, the other the stable,
"?87

progressive countries of southern South America and Mexico."

In one instance, Root

claimed that he wanted to help Central America to go "along the road that Brazil and the
Argentine and Chile and Peru and a number of other South American countries have
travelled - up out of the discord and turmoil of continual revolution into a general public
TOO

sense of justice and determination to maintain order."

These statements by both

Roosevelt and Root plainly contradict some observations regarding the Roosevelt
Corollary at that time (and since) that pointed to the fact that US statesmen "seem to be
blind to actual conditions in the largest and most important parts of Latin America, such
as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile."

This kind of interpretation tends to assume that the

Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary applied homogenously to Latin America.
The approach set forth by Roosevelt and Root was picked up by another
champion of intervention in Latin America - President Woodrow Wilson. Like
Roosevelt, "Wilson wanted to think that the stables states of South America might play a
role in bringing order to the unstable ones around the Caribbean." 390 Indeed, for Wilson,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were the centerpieces of his "Pan American" approach.391
The instance when it became most evident was during the confrontations between the
387
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United States and Mexico in the midst of internal instabilities in the latter country after
the Mexican Revolution in 1910. The Wilson administration started considering
intervention, but sought the mediation of the abovementioned South American countries
in order to, in the words of a US official, "give a Pan American tone" to the issue and
"gain the lasting sympathy of the rest of Latin America."

Later, when intervention

seemed imminent, the State Department considered alternatives for a "joint action" with
the three South American countries aiming to "reduce the cost and divert ill will." 393 The
US envoy to Argentina in 1915 suggested that if it "finally becomes necessary under the
terms of the Monroe Doctrine that the United States intervene, I would suggest that we
invite Argentina or Brazil or some other American country to join with us" adding that
with this attitude the doctrine would "cease to be unilateral, which is today its one great
defect." 394 In the end, the mediation did not have any significant impact, the Carranza
government in Mexico was recognized by the United States and the Latin American
countries in 1915, and no joint intervention occurred.395 Nonetheless, Wilson's efforts to
work together with the South Americans "earned acclaim as a precedent and as a useful
guide for the future" on both sides.396
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BRAZIL AND THE "UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE"

As Schoultz remarks, the "disaggregation" of Latin America in two regions was
not only supported by the United States, but by South American countries as well.397
However, there is more to this support than Schoultz's observation that the South
American countries were indeed willing to "let the United States dominate the Caribbean
region."

As mentioned earlier, a system of power politics had developed in South

America that had little relation to North America, so that South American countries were
less concerned about Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean than they were about
their own regional subsystem, whose core was then composed of Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile. If proximity from the United States led nearby countries to generally fear US
power, geographic distance and regional power politics provided South American states
with a different perspective. Contrary to the general assumption, their policy towards the
United States was generally "subordinate" to their "South American policy,"399 which
means that they tended to look to the United States mostly in terms of their own regional
situation. The same was true for smaller South American countries, which were generally
more concerned about their own neighbors. For example, Arthur Whitaker shows that
prominent Uruguayan statesman Luis Alberto de Herrera saw US friendship as
"exceptionally important to Uruguay because (and he recorded this comforting thought
twice in three pages) a mere hint from 'that great power' would be enough to 'call our
neighbors to order' and 'restrain Argentina's pretensions in the Plata estuary'." For
Herrera, who was the Uruguayan envoy to the United States in the early 1900s, the
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United States "would continue to expand, but not south of Panama, and it would not
intervene in South America 'in this century', for 'no urgent interest calls the Colossus
here'." He therefore concluded that the Monroe Doctrine "is no threat to us." 400 Around
the same period, an Argentinean author observed that "in the two opportunities that called
for" the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the case of Argentina, the United States
did not act: during the imbroglio with Great Britain involving the Falklands Islands, and
during the Anglo-French blockade of Buenos Aires.

He therefore concluded that

South America was "out of reach of Monroeism" and could develop itself as an
independent center of international politics.

As a matter of fact, one author remarked

that by the early twentieth century there was in Argentina an "awareness of the fact that
[Roosevelt] had distinguished between Central and South America," and when he visited
Buenos Aires as an ex-president in 1913 "he received ovations wherever he went" and
reinforced once again that "the Monroe Doctrine is not intended to apply to
Argentina,"403 implying that Argentina had the means to protect itself.
No country in South America had a more favorable view of the Monroe Doctrine
and of US policies at the time than Brazil, which, after Root's visit to the country in
occasion of the third Pan American Conference, changed the name of the building where
the sessions were held to "Monroe Palace." Indeed, the interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine given by Brazil was very similar to the notion expressed by Theodore Roosevelt
himself. One possible reason for this is that, contrary to Mexico, which had good reasons

400

Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone : Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
The American Foreign Policy Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 364.
401
Carlos Alfredo Becii, El "ABC'y su conceptopoliticoy juridico (Buenos Aires,: Libreria "La Facultad"
deJ. Roldan, 1915), 14.
402
Ibid., 18.
403
McGann, Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914: 303-04.

to be suspicious of US power, for Brazil, US interventions in the North American half of
the Western Hemisphere not only did not threaten its national interests but apparently it
"raised the matter of whether Brazil might be able to manifest greater influence, greater
hegemony, on its borders as well."404 This notion that Brazil would acknowledge the
hegemony of the United States in North America while hoping that the United States
would respect Brazilian pretensions of having its own sphere of influence in South
America was the basis of what E. Bradford Burns famously called the "unwritten
alliance" between the two countries.

5

Brazil, which had been the "only Latin American

nation sympathetic to the United States during the Spanish-American War," 406 gave its
own "multilateral interpretation" of the Monroe Doctrine as a "responsibility of the
hemisphere." 407 Thus, whereas other Latin American countries stressed the unilateralist
aspect of the Monroe Doctrine, Brazil emphasized its "collectivist nature" instead. 408
As such, the new Republic of Brazil saw the Roosevelt Corollary with very clear
eyes. One example can be found in the following sentence:
If those countries do not know how to govern themselves, if they do not possess
those elements necessary to avoid continual revolutions and civil wars that follow
one another ceaselessly, they do not have a right to exist and ought to give up
their place to a stronger, better organized, more progressive, and more virile
nation.409
What sounds like a statement coming from the mouth of Theodore Roosevelt
himself is actually an excerpt of an interview from Rio Branco, the renowned Brazilian
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Foreign Minister, to an Argentinean journalist. In fact, in stark opposition to the majority
of Latin American countries, "Brazil was traditionally much less critical of forceful
American diplomacy in Central America and the Caribbean region." 410 While this
position can be "partly explained by the fact that Brazil had little political or economic
contact with the area," 41 ' it also reflected the Brazilian view of South America and North
America as two distinct systems that operated with different logics. For example, when
the United States intervened in Cuba in 1902, Brazil "adopted a sympathetic attitude,"
but when the United States seemed to support Bolivia in a dispute with Brazil in the same
year, the Brazilian government reacted by ordering the closure of the Amazon River to
foreign shipping, which irritated the United States.

Similarly, when Panama seceded

from Colombia in 1903 with US backing, Brazilian official reactions "were generally
favorable," and the public opinion was "indifferent."413 In contrast, Rio Branco "reacted
energetically" when the United States attempted to favor Peru in a territorial dispute with
Brazil 414 and threatened to break diplomatic relations with the United States when the
Taft administration, in consonance with the "Dollar Diplomacy" that was then underway,
issued an ultimatum to Chile to pay reparations in an issue involving a US private
company.415 Commenting on the US interference in the case of the territorial dispute with
Peru in a telegram to Joaquim Nabuco, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Rio
Branco remarked that
410
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I understand to be our right to operate in this part of the continent without asking
for permission or to give explanations to this [US] government, as for the several
proofs of our friendship we have the right to expect that they do not get involved
to help our opponents on matters in which we are engaged.
Moniz Bandeira interprets Rio Branco's notion of a special relationship with the
United States as a view of "the transformation of the continent in a sort of condominium,
where Brazil would have a free hand to exert its hegemony in South America" and
therefore would "preserve its independence of action" in that regional subsystem, even if
that occasionally meant confronting the United States.417 For Joseph Smith, Rio Branco
used a "strategy combining firmness with friendliness" in the cases of border disputes
with its neighbors in order to keep the United States out of South American affairs.418
In the United States, for the most part, the view that Brazil could be responsible
for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in the southern part of the hemisphere seemed to find
"a climate of opinion favorable to its claim of moral hegemony over South America."419
One article in the newspaper The Washington Star about Root's tour to South America
asserted that the purpose of the US government was "to arrange an informal - but none
the less strong - alliance with Brazil, and to relegate to her the policy of the Monroe
Doctrine in South America."420 Two years later, the New York Times commented that
"The two republics [United States and Brazil] are working out on the Northern and

4

, Presenga dos Estados Unidos no Brasil: (dois seculos de historia), Colecao Retratos do Brasil
v. 87 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizacao Brasileira, 1973), 177.
4,7
Ibid., 169-70.
418
Smith, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930: 41.
419
Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations: 174.
420
Ibid., 163.

Southern Continents of America aims of substantially the same nature, by institutions and
methods closely allied in principle"
Another aspect of Rio Branco's strategy within the framework of an unwritten
alliance with the United States was the organization of the South American space along
with the other two regional powers, Chile and Argentina. If US statesmen treated the
North American and the South American regional subsystems differently, this attitude
was reciprocated by the South American leaders, particularly in Brazil. Like Roosevelt
and Root, Rio Branco considered that Brazil, Argentina, and Chile had no reasons to be
concerned about the Roosevelt Corollary, adding that "the Latin American republics that
feel threatened by the US international police" should simply decide to "choose honest
499

and provident governments."

Thus, in order to do its part in South America, Rio

Branco conceived a pact that became known as the ABC, which would give Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile the responsibility for guaranteeing the maintenance of peace and order
in the southern half of the Americas. For Burns, the purpose of the ABC pact was to
establish a "moral policing by the large South American republics" with a purpose
similar to Roosevelt's in North America, that is, "the maintenance of stable and
responsible governments."

One Brazilian scholar, who examined primary Brazilian

sources during the initial formulation of the ABC treaty, concluded that Rio Branco's
central objective was to establish a "shared hegemony" in South America among the
signatories.

Nevertheless, traditional regional rivalries hindered the formalization of

the ABC treaty as conceived by Rio Branco in 1909. A few years later, however, on May
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149
25, 1915, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile finally signed a formal treaty with a more limited
scope than the original Rio Branco's conception and the aim of facilitating the solution of
controversies among the three South American countries. The treaty was initially
received with concern by the Wilson administration, which though it could "compete
with the Pan American pact."

5

Although it was never ratified by the governments, the

ABC Treaty represented an important diplomatic effort and consolidated the view of the
three countries as the key to US policies in the Southern part of the hemisphere.

FROM ABC TO B

As for the relation between the ABC countries and the United States, some
noteworthy changes occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century, which
contributed to giving Brazil a central role in US foreign policy towards South America.
The first change was the decline of the relative power of Chile, which had been one of the
most powerful countries in the hemisphere. Two factors contributed to this decline: first,
there were internal disorders that eventually led to a civil war in 1891426 and the growth
of relative power by the other two South American powers, Brazil and Argentina, which
now struggled for continental predominance. The second change that affected the
relations between the United States and the three countries that composed the core of the
South American regional subsystem was the foreign policy that was eventually followed
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by Argentina during and after the First World War. Like Chile and Mexico, Argentina
was neutral during the conflict, but, after the war, the Argentinean government adopted a
posture that at times was frontally opposed to the United States. In fact, during the war,
the Argentinean attitude was "regarded as a fully conscious challenge to United States
leadership in the hemisphere."427 This posture was generally kept throughout the Second
World War as well, and Argentina was one of the few countries refusing to make an open
commitment to the war effort, which helped to undermine US attempts to implement the
"Good Neighbor Policy" in that part of the hemisphere.428 When Argentina later joined
the Allies in breaking relations with Germany and Japan - with WWII already practically
over - its actions justified more in terms of sympathies towards Great Britain than
because of any belief in hemispheric solidarity.

In fact, the "Argentina problem" was a

constant preoccupation for US policymakers when dealing with South America around
the period of World War II.430 In his memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull went as far
as to call Argentina a "bad neighbor."

]

This Argentinean approach to foreign policy

would only change in the late eighties, when "Argentina developed a bond with the
4 "3 9

United States unlike it had ever had before."
In a stark contrast, Brazil's policy was "as conciliatory and obliging as possible"
A'l'i

towards the United States.
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United States - even if at times it was not reciprocated by the North American country was kept with impressive constancy. For example, by the time of the sixth Pan American
Conference in Havana in 1928, Brazil sided with the United States against the criticism
that the latter country was receiving because of the constant interventions in the
Caribbean.

Most importantly, Brazil was the only Latin American country with

effective participation in both world wars. During the First World War, it was the only
country in the hemisphere to cooperate militarily with the United States, and in the
Second World War it even contributed with an infantry division that engaged in combat
on the Italian front, again the only Latin American country to do so. One explanation for
this Brazilian position, which was evident since the years of Rio Branco, was that US
friendship provided "a value counterweight against any potential hostility from the
Spanish-American nations."435 Therefore, whereas Argentina had, since the First World
War, "flirted with Pan Hispanic alternatives" of integration, Brazil remained steadily
supportive of US hemispheric approach, thus becoming the "pivot" of US policies in
South America.436
For the purposes of the present study, the important thing to observe in regards
both to the Argentinean and Brazilian foreign policies was that they represented two
different approaches with similar ends - to achieve a privileged position in their own
regional subsystem. In this sense, the two countries' relationships with the United States
434
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should be looked at beyond the mere bilateral framework, but especially within the
context of their own regional subsystemic preoccupations. For example, when
Argentinean officials - concerned about the military collaboration between the United
States and Brazil - approached the United States during the Second World War, the
Argentinean foreign minister asked his US counterpart if the United States would make a
"gesture of genuine friendship" by sending armaments to Argentina in order "to restore
Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other South
American republics." 437 Because of Argentina's lack of collaboration in the war, this
requested was promptly rejected by the United States, but it again serves to show that the
main concern of Argentina was its relation to other South American countries.
Conversely, Brazil's collaboration with the United States was intimately related to its
"ambitions to be the leading power in South America," which in fact happened with US
help when Brazil "was rewarded with economic and military benefits, especially in
World War II when substantial U.S. Lend-Lease aid enabled Brazil to surpass Argentina
•

and become the leading military power in South America."

4^8

As one author puts it,

Brazil's "unwritten alliance" with the United States helped to advance Brazilian foreign
policy goals such as "the neutralization of Argentine designs of regional leadership."4
Indeed, Brazil saw the support of US foreign policies in regions other than South
America as the better strategy to guarantee the Brazilian position in their own regional
subsystem. For example, when one of the most prominent Brazilian diplomats, Oswaldo
Aranha, was the ambassador in Washington, he commented to Under Secretary of State
7

Barclay, Struggle for a Continent: The Diplomatic History of South America, 1917-1945: 166.
Smith, Brazil and the United States : Convergence and Divergence: 3-5.
439
W. Michael Weis, "Pan American Shift : Oswaldo Aranha and the Demise of the Brazilian-American
Alliance," in Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, ed. David Sheinin (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 135.

153
Summer Welles in 1935 that "nothing explains our support to the United States in its
Central American and world issues, without a reciprocal attitude of support to Brazil in
South America."440

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The examination of the early interactions among the independent American states
offers a good opportunity to detect the development of patterns of relationships between
the United States and the different parts of Latin America that were functions both of
geography and of the particular characteristics of some South American states. These
factors reciprocally reinforced each other, as both distance and internal characteristics
allowed South America to develop a system of power politics that was often just
marginally connected with the United States and which evidently was not the case for
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, in other to make these
patterns more evident, it is necessary to reinterpret the policy that was definitely the most
significant US initiative towards Latin America during these early stages - the Monroe
Doctrine. While the original declaration of 1823 did not make any differentiation
between the two halves of the Americas, the actual practices after 1823 increasingly
made evident the Caribbean scope of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, two of the most
interventionist US presidents of the twentieth century in Latin America, Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, explicitly made a differentiation between South
America and the rest of Latin America. They were able to make this differentiation
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because South America could be organized around a core of states - the ABC countries that were relatively stable and therefore could be counted on to stabilize their own
neighborhood. This meant that the Roosevelt Corollary, commonly seen as a prime
example of US unilateral and imperial disposition in Latin America, actually had a
multilateral component that is often neglect by the literature.
No other country in South America was more enthusiastic about the multilateral
facet of the Roosevelt Corollary than Brazil. For the largest South American country,
Roosevelt's approach to the Monroe Doctrine was a confirmation of Brazil's view of
South America as its area of influence, which was the basis for the Brazilian policy of an
"unwritten alliance" with the United States. This policy meant that while Brazil would
support US designs in the North American subsystem, composed by Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean, it would expect the United States to support Brazilian
aspirations in South America. This became increasingly evident as Brazil was often the
lonely Latin American supporter of US actions in the North American subsystem,
beginning with the Spanish-American War, while it reacted strongly against a number of
US attempts to meddle in affairs that affected Brazilian interests in South America. The
fact that Brazil was the main supporter of the multilateral view of the Monroe Doctrine
became progressively more significant as Chile decreased in power by the end of the
nineteenth century and Argentina adopted a foreign policy that was often confrontational
towards the United States by the early decades of the twentieth century.
Both Argentinean and Brazilian foreign policies basically sought to establish
predominance in South America, but while Argentina believed it could achieve this by
keeping the distance from the United States in order to show autonomy and lead the
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Spanish-speaking countries, Brazil had a different perspective in which it saw the
approximation with the United States as an important factor for its pretensions in South
America. In other words, while one sought leadership through distancing from the United
States, the other sought it through approximation. One author remarks that, in the end,
both Brazil and Argentina had "the same independent policy" towards the United States,
with the difference being "that Brazil publicly and privately at every turn assured the
United States of its solidarity, whereas Argentina seemed to take pride in open
confrontations with Washington."
By reducing the benefits for the United States to change the subsystemic
configuration in South America - or increasing the benefits for the maintenance of the
status quo - the US-Brazilian unofficial entente contributed to hold the United States
generally at arm's length in the southern part of the hemisphere. This relative absence
meant that the foreign policies of South American states were primarily concerned with
their own neighbors, and the relationship with the United States was subordinate to their
regional subsystemic considerations. This assumption was and has been valid ever since,
and it should be taken into consideration when analyzing both the foreign policy of the
United States towards South America as well as the foreign policies of South American
countries. Nevertheless, as time goes on and as states interact and the international
system changes, other regional subsystemic dynamics may be uncovered. When the Cold
War transformed the United States in a global superpower with concerns beyond the
Western Hemisphere, it also greatly increased the incentives for the United States to
become more actively involved in South America in order to stop the advance of
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Communism. Brazil would have to review the earlier "unwritten alliance" strategy in
order to affect the new structures of costs and benefits for US intervention.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM DURING
THE COLD WAR

With the end of the Second World War and the reconfiguration of the
international system, the United States would take on new priorities in its foreign policy
and turn its eyes mostly toward Europe, which meant that its policies in the hemisphere
tended to be generally relegated to a second plan. As Whitaker remarks, after the forties,
the main substance of the "Western Hemisphere Idea" with its emphasis on the separation
between the American and the European continent, was basically lost since, from the
point of view of US policy-makers, the world was now divided between communists and
non-communists and Western Europe became a natural ally.

The kind of interests the

United States had when it was a regional power would thus be reframed to fit the new
international environment in which it occupied a key position as a global power.
The ideological aspect of the Cold War bipolar system was particularly important
in US relations with Latin Americans countries, which meant that the central goal of US
foreign policy during the Cold War - to contain the spread of communism - would
strongly characterize the hemispheric approach of the United States. Even though the
United States had essentially the same policy towards the whole of Latin America, the
argument put forward by this dissertation is that the regional subsystemic perspective
allows the analyst to uncover distinct regional dynamics of a policy that was global in

Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1954), 154-77.

character. The objective of this chapter is to show that despite having now both the
capabilities and the interest to shape new patterns of relationships in the hemisphere that
would lead to a regional system change, regional subsystemic dynamics contributed to
keep the stability of the South American subsystem. In other words, even during the Cold
War, a case can be made that if the United States could now be characterized as a global
empire,

in the South American subsystem it remained a relatively absent one, which

evidently does not mean that it was not a relevant player.
Obviously, within the North American subsystem, the United States was anything
but absent, despite often-heard claims of episodes of "neglect."444 US troops invaded the
Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989, and although it did
not send troops, the United States was actively involved in overt and covert operations to
topple governments - including equipping and training armed groups - in Guatemala, in
1958, in Cuba in 1961, and in Nicaragua in the eighties. These interventions - all of them
north of the Panama Canal - were carried out under different administrations, when both
Republican and Democrat Presidents occupied the White House. In fact, the period of the
Cold War provides perhaps the clearest evidence of the existence of two different
regional subsystems in the Americas, but typical analyses based on the notion of Latin
America as a homogeneous entity in international politics coupled with a perspective that
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neglects regional subsystemic pressures often overlook this reality. To help to make their
case, these analysts commonly present as evidence of a pattern of relationships
throughout Latin America the case of the military coup that overthrew the Salvador
Allende government in Chile, in 1973.
This chapter examines US participation in the overthrow of the Chilean
government in 1973 in order to demonstrate that both the Johnson and the Nixon
administrations were greatly concerned about the Chilean situation, and yet they stopped
short of pursuing truly imperial policies that would have had a better chance to decisively
affect the outcome of events. The chapter shows that the bulk of US actions was
concentrated before Allende was elected in 1970 and were aimed towards avoiding him
from taking office. Allende's ascension to the presidency in Chile is thus a clear
illustration of the limitations of the kind of policies the United States pursued.
Additionally, this chapter asserts that while there is no clear evidence of US direct
involvement in the coup that eventually overthrew Allende, there are a number of
indications pointing towards a Brazilian connection, which is little explored by the
literature because of the lack of available documentation, especially when compared to
the abundance of documents from the US side. It is demonstrated that Brazil's military
regime's involvement in Chile can be largely understood as an extension of its overall
policy in South America, both before and after 1973, which permitted the United States
to limit its involvement in the region. In other words, Brazil's interventionist disposition,
which could be termed as a sort of "regional imperialism," increased the benefits of
subsystemic stability for the United States. The chapter claims that Brazil's position was
not be subordinated by the US, but rather that its interests coincided with those of the
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United States. To reinforce this point, the role of the United States in the 1964 military
coup in Brazil is put in perspective.

BUILDING A NARRATIVE

The case of the military coup that overthrew the Salvador Allende government in
Chile fits perfectly the common narrative of an American (or Latin American) regional
subsystem in which US hegemony is exercised rather homogeneously in what is, after all,
typically considered to be its "backyard." For example, in his otherwise insightful work
on regions, Peter Katzenstein argues that, contrary to Asia and Europe, there are no
regional powers in the American continent because the "overwhelming presence of the
United States dwarfs all other states and has prevented the emergence of states both
supportive of American purpose and power and central to the region's political affairs."
445

The "region" that Katzenstein has in mind is a coherent entity composed by Latin

America plus Canada, both uniformly subjected to US power, since they would be "close
to the center of the American imperium." 446 In the case of Latin America, this
overwhelming US presence would yield a particular kind of regionalism based on
"informal rule, patron-client relations, coercive diplomacy, and military interventions."
As evidence of this pattern of relationship, Katzenstein mentions US interventions in
Central America together with the "deep U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the
Salvador Allende government in Chile" as being both equally strong examples of "the
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behavior of a traditional imperial power."

Similarly, David Mares mentions that,

contrary to Cuba, "Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973) were unable to break away from
U.S. dominance."449 Likewise, Cole Blasier puts US activities in Chile together with
Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic in the same level of US "interference" in
Latin America.450 This narrative still remains strong. A recent book on United States
relations with Latin America argues that the United States "has shaped Latin American
history, intervening at key moments (Guatemala 1954; Chile 1973; Nicaragua 1979; El
Salvador 1979-82)."451
The examples above suggest that, by bundling together US actions toward Chile
with interventions elsewhere in Latin America, an impression of cohesiveness is created.
The problem with this approach is that it not only neglects fundamental differences
between the US participation in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and, for
example, the overthrown of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, but also overlooks the
important role played by external forces other than the United States in the South
American case. One reason for these analytical simplifications may be the use of
approaches that are excessively US-centered, coupled with the lack of a theoretical
framework able to offer explanations for moving beyond the domesticsystem/international-system dichotomy. This dissertation maintains that the regional
subsystemic perspective can fill this gap and provide a distinctive narrative for the
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Chilean case in particular, and for South America in general. This alternative narrative
would relativize the role of the United States by stressing regional subsystemic pressures.
Obviously, in the Cold War environment of the time, successive US
administrations were concerned about the situation in Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere in
South America where regimes that were perceived as being sympathetic to communism
coming to power. This concern was indeed translated into policies that actively sought to
prevent these regimes from coming to power, or to negatively affect them subsequently.
To expect the United States to stay on the sidelines during the Cold War whenever there
was a perception of increased Soviet influence in Latin America would be unrealistic.
However, putting unilateral armed interventions in Central America and the Caribbean
under the same category of the kind of actions the United States undertook in South
America is confounding an imperial policy with a great power policy. The objectives of
the United States were the same in all Latin America, as they were in the rest of the world
during the Cold War: to contain the spread of communism. Nevertheless, it can be argued
that the outcome of these policies varied according to the particular configuration of
distinct regional subsystems. In the North American subsystem, both during and before
the Cold War, the United States often acted as an empire, sending its own troops or
training and equipping mercenary armies in order to pursue its objectives. In the South
American subsystem the same measures were not taken - not necessarily because the US
could not or did not want to, but mainly because, as will be shown below, it did not need
to. Treating Latin America as a coherent regional subsystem where US influence is
exercised homogenously blurs this distinction and oversimplifies the analysis with
detrimental consequences for policy-makers and academics alike.
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THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY COUP AND US INFLUENCE

Because the role of the then Brazilian military government is central for the
argument developed in this chapter, it is necessary first to address the extent of US
influence in the Brazilian case. As in the case of Chile, the coinciding of the US foreign
policy establishment's wishes and the actual unfolding of events is often interpreted as
evidence of a causal relationship. For example, Jan Black saw US influence as a
"significant contributing factor" to the 1964 military coup in Brazil 452 and interpreted
this and the subsequent coups in South America as evidence of the "the consolidation of
U.S. hegemony, or dominance, over the furthermost reaches of the South American
continent." 453 In a study of US interventions after World War II, William Blum
contends that in the case of the military coup in Brazil, the "American Embassy had been
intimately involved." 454 In his well-known CIA Diary, former CIA officer Philipp Agee
wrote from Uruguay in an entry one day after the Brazilian coup that the overthrow of the
civilian regime was "without doubt largely due to careful planning and consistent
propaganda campaigns dating at least back to the 1962 election operation," when the US
government financed opposition candidates in Brazil.455 Agee reaches this post-factum
conclusion even though there is barely any mention of CIA activities in Brazil earlier in
his diary, the first entry of which goes back to 1956. Therefore, as in the case of Chile,
the political outcome in Brazil in 1964 is also commonly mentioned as evidence of a
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uniform dominance of the United States over Latin America, even though there seems to
be an acknowledgment that the extend of US involvement in the Brazilian case was far
less significant than in the Chilean coup of 1973.
Basically, two kinds of evidences are frequently presented to make the case for
US influence on the Brazilian military takeover of 1964. The first and most recent, which
was uncovered several years after the coup, is the fact that the United States government
had prepared a "contingency plan" to intervene in Brazil and support the plotters in the
case of a prolonged civil war. The second relates to the period before the coup, when the
United States on one hand supported opposition candidates and anti-communist forces,
and on the other made efforts to indoctrinate the Brazilian military. As for the first
evidence, the support is usually offered through quotes from US officials and the so
called "Operation Brother Sam," which consisted of a plan for providing equipment and
especially petroleum to the coup plotters. In fact, official documents declassified in 2004
show President Lyndon Johnson saying over the phone that "we ought to take every step
that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need" to support the overthrow of
Brazil's civilian government. These documents also show the arrangements made for the
shipment of weapons, ammunition, and oil to Brazil.

5

Although then US ambassador to

Brazil Lincoln Gordon later remarked that the coup plotters "knew nothing whatever
about the 'Brother Sam' task force," 457 other analysts dispute this information. One recent
study on the "Operation Brother Sam" by the Brazilian historian Carlos Fico, who
examined a number of official US and Brazilian declassified documents, maintains that
456
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Brazilians were, in fact, aware of the operation.

Indeed, one of the most active coup

plotters stated that he had actually asked the US military attache Vernon Walters if the
United States could supply petroleum in case the coup led to a prolonged fight, which in
turn would have led to the "Operation Brother Sam."459 It should be noted that this
passage is the only reference made to US participation in the long interview he gave to
the book editors. In fact, it is hard to find any mention of decisive US participation or
influence in the memoirs published by the Brazilian officers who participated in the coup.
In any case, the best conclusion that can be reached by analyzing the currently
available documentation is that it demonstrates an "interventionist disposition" of the
United States.460 Johnson's statement on being "prepared to do everything we need to do"
was made on March 31, 1964, and Brazil already had a military government on the next
day without a civil war or significant disorder. Likewise, preparations for "Operation
Brother Sam" began in late March and, as Gordon points out, "was still ten days' sailing
time away when Goulart abandoned the presidency."

' The fact of the matter is that all

US planning proved unnecessary, as the coup went forth without any help from the
United States. Indeed, it is clear that "Brazil's military leaders resolved to act, with or
without Washington's approbation."462 As Phyllis Parker remarked, [a]ll planned U.S.
support was of a marginal nature" and the United States was not involved in the coup
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"because there was no need to be."

When the Johnson administration decided it should

help the coup to come about, it was already too late. Although occasionally underplaying
the extent of US knowledge about the coup, the evidences to date seem to corroborate
Ambassador Gordon's confirmation "that we welcomed the overthrown of Goulart is
well known. But there was no American participation in his removal by military
force."4 4 What would have happened had the fight been prolonged and a civil war
ensued is a matter for speculation, but the obvious fact is that actual intervention should
not be confused with potential or desired intervention. "Operation Brother Sam" is a clear
example of US willingness, interest, and capability to intervene in South America. Its
outcome is a clear example of its needlessness.
The second argument presented for making the case for US influence on the 1964
military coup in Brazil asserts that the United States was actually not too late because it
had helped to create the conditions for the coup through earlier covert operations
designed to strengthen anti-communist forces and through its supposed indoctrination of
Brazilian military officers. This is the line with the argument made by Agee immediately
after the coup, when he attributed it to US "careful planning and consistent propaganda
campaigns." 465 Likewise, Jan Black and Ruth Leacock mention US assistance to
opposition candidates in the Brazilian 1962 elections as having played a central role.466
Leacock points out that the United States funded "some of the anticommunist literature"
in Brazil and provided an opposition candidate for governor in the Northeast state of
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Pernambuco with "anticommunist films, comic books, and pamphlets."467 The author
regards such activities as examples of "extensive American interference."468
Nevertheless, the results of aforesaid US support were virtually fruitless since the USfunded opposition gubernatorial candidate mentioned by Leacock lost the election to an
openly pro-communist candidate and the general outcome of US support to the
opposition 1962 was extraordinarily unimpressive as it did little to alter the balance of
political forces prevailing before the 1962 election. In fact, in that election, leftist forces
gained more space in the Brazilian political landscape.469 Moniz Bandeira remarks that
the money spent to influence Brazilian elections "were not good for the CIA." 470 As
Robert Wesson notices, "[t]he concrete actions taken [by the United States] seem to have
been trivial in their effects."471
If the support for opposition candidates was anything but effective, on the other
hand there is the argument that at least the United States was successful in indoctrinating
the Brazilian military into anti-communist ideology and teaching them the intricacies of
counterinsurgency tactics. Here, the role of the Brazilian ESG - Escola Superior de
Guerra (commonly translated to English as Superior School of War) is regarded as
central, since many of the coup plotters attended that institution, which was inspired by
the National War College in the United States. For Leacock, "under American guidance,"
the ESG "stressed anticommunism and the American view of the Cold War."472 Black
also emphasizes the US influence in that institute and thus over the coup plotters and
467

, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969: 113; 21.
Ibid., 121.
Bandeira, Presenga dos Estados Unidos no Brasil: (dois seculos de historia): 430.
, Formula para o caos : a derrubada de Salvador Allende (1970-1973) (Rio de Janeiro:
Civilizacao Brasileira, 2008), 86.
Robert G. Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence, Studies of Influence in
International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1981), 48.
472
Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969: 183.
468

concludes that support of, association with, and training by the U.S. military reinforced
the anti-democratic biases of the Brazilian military elite." 473 A more careful examination
would demonstrate that such allegations seem exaggerated at best. Besides the fact that
Black presents no evidence that association with the US military would reinforce the
supposedly "anti-democratic biases of the Brazilian military elite," which sounds
somewhat counterintuitive, a more important question is whether the Brazilian military
needed to be educated by the United States as to the alleged perils of communism. After
all, the army in Brazil was concerned about communism even before the Cold War. One
Brazilian diplomat argues that anticommunism in the Brazilian army dates back at least
to 1935, when military officials linked to the Brazilian Communist Party staged a revolt
in order to overthrow the president and establish a communist government.474 This
episode led to the persecution of individuals associated with communism in Brazil, and
was used as a justification for giving dictatorial powers to President Getulio Vargas in
1937. By 1939, the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian army exteriorized concerns with the
"Bolshevik menace."475 Interestingly enough, in view of what later happened in the
United States in the fifties, US ambassador to Brazil Adolf Berle Jr. asked in 1945 for an
end to the persecution of communists in Brazil. 7 Against the advice of US Secretary of
State George Marshall, Brazil was the first country in the western world to break
relations with Moscow, and a Brazilian General is reported to have criticized the Truman
477

administration for its "excessive tolerance" of communism.

When Truman visited

Brazil, it was Brazilian President Dutra who asked him to put anti-communism at the top
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of his agenda.478 By 1951, the Brazilian army had produced a report entitled
"Communism in Brazil" in which it expressed special worries about communist
infiltration in the army.

7

Hence, when the United States became concerned with the

advancement of communism in Latin America in the early sixties, after the Cuban
Revolution, the Brazilian Generals needed no indoctrination. In fact, the Brazilian
Army's annual report in 1961 already expressed concern with Cuba and its "subversive
ideas" as well as with communist activities in Brazil.480 As had been the case with
Truman years earlier, when the Nixon administration developed the policy of detente,
some in the Brazilian military criticized the US President for being too "soft" on
communism.

81

However, it could be argued that even if there was no need to teach anticommunism to the Brazilian army, "American guidance" and "training," particularly
through the ESG, would constitute central factors in the development of the
counterinsurgency strategy that was employed to fight domestic subversion. Here again,
closer examination of domestic dynamics put these allegations under perspective.
Brazilian General Cordeiro de Farias, who was responsible for the organization of the
ESG during its initial years - in the late forties, it should be noted - recounts the episode
when the US government sent three military officers to provide advising for the
establishment of the school, which was, after all, inspired by the National War College.
According to Farias, the US officers
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came in with the statute of the National War College and tried to make us adopt it
without restrictions, claiming that what had worked in the United States would
work for Brazil. I fought against them but I could not convince them. I defended
the proposition that the ESG, as a center of studies, could not be disconnected
from our national concerns.
General Farias concludes that after he took the US officers on a trip throughout
Brazil, they were finally convinced of the need to adapt the school to the particularities of
the country. In fact, as Alfred Stepan remarks, the Brazilian institution had two
fundamental differences in relation to its US model. The first was that, because of
Brazil's condition as a developing country, "the question of a strong armed force could
not be separated from the question of economic development" and therefore there was the
need to put greater "emphasis on internal aspects of development and security." 483 It
should be noted that the United States would only incorporate the notion of development
in the concept of security by the sixties. Hence, when the Kennedy administration came
up with the Alliance for Progress linking instability with poverty, it was not launching a
revolutionary new idea but answering to a demand that existed previously. The second
difference between the National War College and the Escola Superior de Guerra relates
to the first. Because of the central focus on development, in contrast to the largely
military-oriented National War College, civilian participation would be a key aspect in
the Brazilian institution.484
As for US training of Brazilian officers in counterinsurgency strategies, this is
also an argument that loses some of its appeal when the researcher is curious enough to
investigate its actual validity. When one examines the origins of the so called
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"counterrevolutionary theory," the original contributions of the French become evident.
While in the United States the notion of "counterinsurgency" acquired relevance only
with the war in Vietnam, the French, who had already fought and been defeated in
Indochina, had by then developed the notion of "guerre revolutionnaire," and were
48S

applying it in the Algerian war during the fifties. It is revealing that when US
Lieutenant-Colonel Donn A. Starry drew attention in 1967 to the fact that the United
States had only been giving serious consideration to the problem of "wars of liberation"
since 1961, he entitled his article as "La Guerre Revolutionnaire."

In comparison to

the French approach, John Shy and Thomas Collier regard the US counterinsurgency
strategy developed during the Vietnam War as "shallow" with an inadequate "almost
487

purely military approach."

Armand Mattelart remarks that although the US military

had to deal with counterinsurgency strategies before, it had not been translated into a
formal doctrine, since the "strategic consciousness" in the United States
was totally absorbed in deterrence and the debate between partisans of 'massive
retaliation' and those who favored 'flexible response' [...] There was a prevailing
belief in technological determinism, conductive to viewing the future from the
perspective of nuclear apocalypse. 488
This is the basic reason why the Brazilian army did not look for inspiration in the
US strategy in Vietnam, which did not fit the domestic reality in Brazil, but to the French
experience in Algeria. The libraries of the Brazilian army were indeed filled with French
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literature on the Algerian War.

Commenting on the development of counterinsurgency

strategies in ESG, a Brazilian General singles out the "French military literature" as a
decisive influence.490 Certainly, Brazilians Generals had no problems reading in French,
as many of them attended schools in France, including the first president of the military
regime, Castelo Branco. The inauguration speech of General Gois Monteiro as Chief of
Staff of the Brazilian army in 1937 is permeated with quotes from French Generals, all in
the original French.

A Brazilian military officer commented that "the boasted

American influence" in the doctrines adopted by the Brazilian army was "practically
null" and adds that "the future historian, in a serene examination of this episode, will
certainly find a certain French influence."

The French influence was not only restricted to Brazil. Ernesto Lopez
demonstrates that the biggest foreign influence in the development of the Argentinean
National Security Doctrine also came from France.

Several translations to Spanish

from books written by French generals were published in Buenos Aires,494 and the French
Colonel Patrice de Naurois wrote several articles for the magazine of the Argentinean
Escuela Superior de Guerra.495 Thus, the problem of revolutionary war and the strategies
to fight it were in the minds of Brazilian as well as Argentinean militaries before the
Kennedy administration shaped its counterinsurgency doctrine in the sixties. While
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Lopez points out that by 1958 the Argentinean military was already in the final stages of
the development of its counterrevolutionary doctrine,496 Stepan observes that "[e]ven
before the emphasis in the cold war shifted in the United States from atomic to
revolutionary warfare, the ESG became the center of ideological thought concerning
counterrevolutionary strategy in Brazil."
Although the CIA collaborated with Brazilian intelligence services, there is no
evidence of any US official who participated in torture sessions in Brazil. Indeed, the
most noteworthy case of a relationship between foreign torturers and the Brazilian
dictatorship was during 1973 when the French government sent to Brazil General Paul
Aussaresses, a prominent leader of the repression and torture operations in Algeria.498 By
that year, the School of the Americas, regarded by many as a center for indoctrination of
Latin American military coup plotters,

had received about 30,000 students, with just a

little over 300 from Brazil.500 Obviously, as Stepan observes, "the United States, as the
major anti-Communist country, was viewed as a natural ally," 501 and Brazil sought as
much collaboration as it could - and the United States was willing to provide it,
particularly after the Cuban Revolution. This was true only to the extent that it was
understood by the Brazilian military government to serve Brazilian interests - when the
Carter administration in 1977 required a report on human rights performance by the
recipients of military assistance, the Brazilian government interpreted it as constituting
interference in its domestic affairs, and it simply revoked a military assistance agreement
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that it had with the United States since 1952, virtually ending any formal military
collaboration between the two countries.

Brazil and United States would only sign

SOI

another military agreement in 2010.

BRAZIL'S "REGIONAL IMPERIALISM" IN THE COLD WAR

The above discussion is pertinent because it helps to understand a reality that is
repeatedly overlooked by those who neglect the regional subsystemic perspective and
interpret every episode of the Cold War from the point of view of Washington or
Moscow. This reality is that the advancement of communism in the world - or what was
perceived as such - threatened the interests of the United States as a global power, but the
advancement of communism in South America also threatened the interests of Brazil as a
regional power, and this had been true even before the inauguration of the military
regime in 1964, as suggested above. Even President Janio Quadros, whose resignation in
1961 originated the crises that led to the overthrow of his vice-president Joao Goulart in
1964, is described as being "viscerally anticommunist."504 In 1961, Quadros considered
the possibility of annexing Guyana because of what he saw as communist infiltration in
that country.5

The fact that Quadros famously received Che Guevara in Brazil and

bestowed a medal of honor on him has equivocally been interpreted as a signal of
sympathy for communism by those who tend to reason in binary terms, thus failing to
understand Brazilian political intricacies. These and other symbolic gestures became part
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of Quadros' foreign policy, which was termed "independent" and it was seen in many
ways an alibi for his "reactionary" domestic policy.506 In summary, understanding the
role of Brazil in the South American subsystem during the Cold War begins by
deconstructing the myth that anticommunism was exclusively a US cause that was
somehow incorporated by its "client" states through diligent work from Washington.
Because the typical analyses of the relationship between the United States and
South America neglect the fact that - for economic, security, and political reasons - the
advancement of governments that were seen as identifying with communism in South
America were perceived as a threat to Brazilian interests, the existence of overlapping
interests is confounded with mere subordination. This interpretation is undoubtedly
reinforced by the fact that the majority of the declassified documents available for
research comes from US sources, since much of the Brazilian and South American
sources remain classified or are simply unavailable because, for example, not many South
American presidents kept records of their conversations. Without this discernment
between subordination and overlapping interests, it becomes difficult to understand how
regional dynamics influenced the extent of US involvement in South America, in
comparison to elsewhere in Latin America and other parts of the world, beyond the
argument that it was somehow a matter of lack of interest or neglect. If there is anything
that the official declassified documents and the sheer amount of money spent in trying to
influence the political landscape in South America show is that lack of interest is a weak
explanation. The United States did try to help a coup succeed in Brazil and, as will be
shown below, actively planned a coup in Chile, but the fact was that the planning was
never translated into decisive action, that is, the kind of action that the United States as a
5
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global power could easily have taken, as it did so many times in Central America, the
Caribbean, and other parts of the world during the Cold War. The United States did send
money and equipment, provided training, moral support, and helped anti-communist
forces throughout South America in order to defend its interests, but it was just supplying
an existent demand and never went beyond that relatively modest role of supplier, which
is a far cry from an imperial policy, particularly in its own "backyard." This chapter's
argument is that one reason for this imperial absence during the Cold War is that the
United States did not need to adopt a costly imperial policy in South America because its
major interests coincided with those of Brazil, a country which was willing to actively
prevent the emergence of governments associated with communism in the South
American subsystem.
The reasons for this Brazilian willingness can be found in a combination of rapid
economic growth with the authoritarian character of the military regime. According to
Bandeira, this combination allowed Brazil to take an "offensive, imperialist" posture in
South America.507 Similarly, Wesson notices that Brazilian "economic muscle" in the
seventies "permitted Brazil to indulge in a little imperialism of its own."

Indeed, the

Brazilian military regime was heavily influenced by a geopolitical view that stressed the
role of Brazil in South America. The role of the United States was described by the most
prominent geopolitical theorist of the Brazilian military regime as being part of a
"barganha leal" or "fair bargain" with Brazil: Brazil would support the United States in
the global East-West conflict and the United States would support Brazil to fulfill its own
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"manifest destiny" in South America.

This geopolitical perspective, not very different

from the old idea of an "unwritten alliance," led to the development of the notion of
"ideological frontiers" and the "encirclement theory." Together, these conceptions meant
that the advancement of communist regimes in South America would isolate Brazil, and
thus the challenge should be to "reverse the wave of international subversion" on its
borders.510 In 1971 Bolivia "got the first stab" 5 n after leftist General Juan Jose Torres
took power in 1970, the same year Salvador Allende became president in Chile and the
Brazilian consul in Uruguay was kidnapped by the Tupamaros, a Marxist guerrilla
organization that operated in that country.
The coup that toppled Torres in Bolivia counted with "logistical, political, and
ideological support from Brazil, both in the planning stage as well as in the process of
execution."5

Brazil helped the coup plotting with "money, arms, aircrafts, and even

mercenaries" as well as by providing "open logistical support" for the coup itself.
Brazilian airplanes landed in Bolivian airports to bring equipments without concern of
concealing its identification. As James Dunkerley observes, "Brazil's intervention was
scarcely discreet."514 In case the coup failed, the Brazilian government is thought to have
considered the possibility of direct military intervention.515 The Bolivian coup was also
supported by the United States and, to a lesser degree, by the Argentine military
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government.

The Bolivian Minister of Interior during the Torres government refers to

Argentina and Brazil as the "two proimperialist partners," but focuses mostly on the US
and Brazilian participation, which he defines as a "dark organization of the political
police in Brazil and the CIA."

A few days after the coup, the Brazilian government

granted Bolivia ten million dollars in credit and an average of forty-six million for the
following years.

To Brazil, the successful coup in Bolivia represented "the end of its

regional isolation" and led to a "reverse Domino Theory" in South America - Uruguay
and Chile would come next.519
In Uruguay, US and Brazilian concerns with the guerilla groups in that country
became more salient after the head of the US Public Safety program in Uruguay, Dan
Mitrione, and the Brazilian Consul Aloisio Gomide were kidnapped by the Tupamaros in
the early seventies. While Gomide was released after seven months, Mitrione was
executed after the US and Uruguayan government refused to comply with the guerilla's
demands. Therefore, when the leftist coalition Frente Amplio gained ground in the 1971
elections, both countries were apprehensive, especially in the view of the victory of the
Unidad Popular in Chile a year earlier. For the United States a victory of the Frente
Amplio would represent a dangerous trend in South America, while for Brazil it would
confirm the view of the "encirclement theory," in addition to representing more
immediate threats of subversion along its strategic southern border. US documents
declassified in 2002 make clear the concern of US officials with the situation in Uruguay,
but do not show any direct involvement or plans to intervene in that country in order to
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avoid a victory of the Frente Amplio. One of the documents is a secret telegram of the
State Department to US embassies in Brazil and Argentina asking for their likely reaction
to a strong showing of the Frente Amplio and mentioning speculations of the Latin
American press about the "possible Brazilian plan for action in Uruguay to frustrate the
Frente from taking over, including use of armed force."

Another relevant document is

a "Preliminary Analysis and Strategy Paper" on Uruguay recommending US action in
five areas: psychological, economic assistance, political, labor and security. However,
this paper was explicitly written for the subsequent 1972-1976 period, "based on the
premise that the Frente Amplio will not win the 1971 elections." The major concern of
the paper was how the United States should proceed to work with the new government
and to "increase support for the democratic political parties in Uruguay and lessen the
threat of a political takeover by the Frente." In the security area, the analysis suggested
that it would be "especially desirable that such neighboring countries as Argentina and
Brazil collaborate effectively with the Uruguayan security forces and where possible we
should encourage such cooperation."
The US documents released to date thus show a combination of concern with the
situation in Uruguay, and hope that Brazil, or perhaps Argentina, would ultimately take
action. These US concerns are in line with the expectation of this chapter that the role
played by Brazil allowed the United States to limit its involvement in South America
during the Cold War. In fact, the most notorious document released on this issue show
President Nixon at a meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath commenting that
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"[fjhe Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election," in a reference to the supposed fraud
that would have happened in the 1971 election, won by the incumbent party.

The

Brazilian government was clearly satisfied with the outcome of the elections and the then
recently elected president of Uruguay immediately declared that he had "ideological
affinities" with Brazil.523
What the Nixon administration did not know, besides speculations in the South
American press, was that the Brazilian army had in place a plan to invade Uruguay in
case the Frente Amplio won the elections. This plan was called "Operagao Trinta Horas"
("Operation Thirty Hours") in reference to the time frame estimated by the Brazilian
military to take over the country.524 As noted above, the unavailability of declassified
documentation pertaining to the Brazilian military period complicates the task of the
investigator. Therefore, the evidences must generally be sought in testimonies by people
involved in the operation or through researchers who had access to them.5 5 Perhaps the
most explicit testimony from someone directly involved in the plans to invade Uruguay
came from Brazilian Colonel Dickson Grael, who was a supporter of the 1964 coup but
later became disillusioned with the course of the military regime. Grael participated in the
formulation of the plans to invade Uruguay and he makes clear how closely the Brazilian
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army was from actually intervening. He further claims that Brazilian military units were
mobilized and put in alert, just waiting for the result of the Uruguayan elections "to
execute the plan".

6

It is noteworthy that while Brazil explicitly took into consideration

the Argentinean reaction to a possible invasion of Uruguay, it apparently made no
mention to the United States'.527 Indeed, a report from the State Department expressed
that the major concern for the United States in relation to the situation in Uruguay "may
well not be the outcome of Uruguayan election" but the deterioration of relations between
Brazil and Argentina or a major change in the regional balance of power in the case of a
unilateral action from any of them in Uruguayan affairs.52

CHILE AND THE "BRAZILIAN CONNECTION"

It is within the context exposed above that Brazilian attitudes toward Chile should
be understood. Brazil's clear disposition to intervene in Uruguay and Bolivia denoted a
low level of tolerance for regimes that were identified with communism, both for reasons
of ideological incompatibility as well as because of a spillover of the domestic repressive
apparatus. The coincidence in goals with those expressed by US foreign policy during the
Cold War meant this Brazilian "regional imperialism" allowed the United States to exert
what one could call a sort of "soft imperialism" in South America.529 Although it is
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commonly ignored in many studies, the United States was not the only country in the
hemisphere concerned with Allende's ascension to power in Chile, and Brazilian
involvement may provide an important part of the explanation when it comes to assessing
the role of foreign influences in the 1973 coup. Here again, the problem of insufficient
records on the Brazilian side contrasted with abundant documentation on the US side
may create the impression of a monologue when there may be in fact more voices
present. While circumstantial evidence already strongly suggested a "Brazilian
connection" in the military coup that overthrew Allende,

documents declassified in

2009 present the clearest evidences to date corroborating these suspicions. But before
analyzing these documents, a brief overview of US actions in Chile is needed.
Undoubtedly, the best account of US involvement in Chile up until the 1973 coup
is the 1975 US Senate "Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," also known as the "Church Report"
since it was chaired by Senator Franck Church of Idaho.531 Although it was produced
only two years after the fall of Allende, no new information since then has significantly
changed the assessments of the Church Report, which remains as the main source of
information for the majority of the analyses of US activities in Chile. A more recent
report by the CIA produced in 2000, known as the "Hinchey Report," after US
concept of imperialism, which, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, is distinct from the argument
made here. Moreover, the notion of subimperialism implies a condition of subordination, which is also not
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Congressman Maurice Hinchey of New York, basically corroborates and complements
the findings of the 1975 Senate report, adding little new information that would
drastically transform what is currently known about the actual extent of US involvement
coo

in Chile in the events leading to the downfall of Allende.

These two reports offer a

detailed and comprehensive account of US activities in Chile and will thus be used as the
basic sources for the analysis that follows.
There are at least two aspects of the US actions in Chile that deserve careful
consideration in order to produce an accurate analysis. The first is the fact that the
overwhelming majority of the money spent in covert action in Chile - more than ninety
percent - was in propaganda, including support for mass media and for political parties.
From the analyst's point of view, the problem with this kind of strategy is that, in spite of
some assumptions equating investment in propaganda with actual influence, it is
obviously complicated to assess its real impact on the overall political process.
Nevertheless, while it is hard to infer a perfect causal relationship when there is a
coincidence between the political outcome and the objectives of propaganda action, if the
first differs from the latter it seems reasonable to assume that the latter was unproductive.
As mentioned earlier, CIA support for opposition candidates in Brazil's 1963 elections
was largely fruitless, which made evident the limits of such kind of assistance. Likewise,
the CIA spent more money in Chile in the period between 1964 and 1969, during the
Johnson administration, and despite this support the Chilean left gained ground during
532
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these years. One could argue that had the United States not helped with money, the left
would have made even more gains, but, aside from this speculation, the reality shows that
the actual results could hardly be considered a case of success, as will be further explored
below. The second aspect of US actions in Chile that deserves special attention is the fact
that the bulk of CIA activities in Chile, including an attempt to encourage a military
coup, was concentrated in the period before Allende became president in 1970 and were
thus aimed to prevent him from taking office. Consequently, the eventual inauguration of
Allende as the President of Chile is another indication of the actual effectiveness of the
operations undertaken by the United States in the South American country.
As noted above, the peak of US propaganda actions in Chile was during the
period between 1964 and 1969. In spite of the high investment, it is hard to conclude that
the results were satisfactory. The Church Report remarks that CIA help in 1964 "enabled
Eduardo Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a plurality,"
but adds that it is not clear "why it was necessary to assure a majority, instead of
accepting the victory a plurality would have assured."

The same report also notices

that, in the years between 1965 and 1969, the portion of the vote of the CIA-backed
Christian Democrats fell from forty-three to thirty-one percent. CIA efforts were not only
concentrated on political parties, but also on influencing Chilean institutions, particularly
those related to labor and peasants. The CIA evaluation of these projects, according to the
Church Report, concluded that they were "rather unsuccessful in countering the growth
of strong leftist sentiment and organization among workers, peasants and slum
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dwellers."

All in all, the most optimistic definition would characterize the outcome of

CIA covert operations in Chile during the period between 1964 and 1969 as a limited
success, but a case could also be made that the outcome was largely ineffective.
In 1970, the CIA spent around one million dollars to affect the outcome of that
year's election by "undermining communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist
forces which could gain control of the presidency" and "strengthening non-Marxist
political leaders and forces in Chile in order to develop an effective alternative to the
Popular Unity coalition in preparation for the 1970 presidential election."5 5 On the other
hand, the Church Report indicated that "the Cubans provided about $350,000 to Allende's
campaign, with the Soviets adding an additional, undetermined amount."5

The Soviet

figures were later disclosed by KGB senior archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, who had access to
extensive documentation in the USSR that reveals a close and regular association
between Allende and the Soviets, picturing him as "the most important of the KGB's
confidential contacts in South America."

The documents, which are part of the so

called "Mitrokhin Archive," show that "Allende made a personal appeal [...] for Soviet
funds" and that the KGB provided the Chilean Communist Party with $400,000 plus a
"personal subsidy of $50,000 to be handed directly to Allende" and $18,000 to persuade a
left-wing senator to remain within Allende's coalition and not to stand as presidential
candidate in order to prevent splitting the leftist vote. Additional funding, including
money handed directly to Allende, continued to be sent throughout his term in office.538
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The fact that Allende won a plurality - though a very narrow one - of the 1970
election made obvious that US efforts to prevent a leftist coalition from gaining a
plurality of the votes "did not succeed."

Indeed, if one seeks to attribute every political

outcome of 1970 Chile as a result of foreign influence, the conclusion should be that it
was the KGB who was successful, and in fact, "[i]n its report to the Central Committee,
the KGB claimed some credit for Allende's victory."540 By the time Allende was elected,
"little was left of the CIA-funded propaganda apparatus."541 Yet, Allende's victory was a
significant blow to US foreign policy in an age of Cold War and President Nixon decided
not to let him come to power. Nixon informed the CIA that "an Allende regime in Chile
would not be acceptable to the United States,"5 and it was decided that "a more
aggressive covert action initiative" was necessary, which included a plan to form a coup
to prevent Allende from actually taking office.54 In order to block Allende's accession to
the presidency, the Nixon administration considered taking action in two different
"tracks." "Track I" included political, economic, and propaganda activities "designed to
induce Allende's opponents in Chile to prevent his assumption of power," while "Track
II" went a step further and included actions "directed toward actively promoting and
encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende."544 Because Allende had won
a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes, the Chilean constitution required that he
should be confirmed as president by the Congress. "Track I" failed to gather support from
5j9

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities., "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973."
540
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World:
72.
541
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities., "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973."
542
" i bIbid.
id.
543
U.S. CIA. General Reports., "C.I.A Activities in Chile."
544
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Govei
Intelligence Activities., "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973"
1

187
opposition forces to intervene in the Chilean political process in order to challenge
Allende and also failed to generate an economic crisis strong enough to impact the votes
in the Congress. Allende's victory was not only approved by the Congress, but was
approved by such a wide margin - 153 to 35 - that labeling "Track I" as a complete
failure may be an understatement.
When it became clear that "Track I" was shipwrecking, "Track II" was
intensified. The CIA made several contacts with the Chilean military in order "to
convince them to carry out a coup" and met Chilean officers "who were actively involved
in coup plotting."545 According to the Hinchey Report, the CIA met with three different
groups of coup plotters and all of them indicated that the success of the coup required the
kidnapping of Chilean Army Commander Rene Schneider, who favored Allende's
confirmation as president. The CIA therefore provided arms and ammunition to one of
the groups in order to abduct Schneider. However, the group that eventually kidnapped
Schneider did not have the CIA's support and acted "independently of the CIA," which
had concluded a few days before the operation that that particular group of plotters could
not successfully carry out the coup. 546 The weapons that the CIA had provided to its
preferred group "were later returned unused to the Station."547 Schneider was mortally
•

wounded during the attack and his death "provoked a strong reaction in Chile,"

S48

ruining

the prospects for the execution of a coup against Allende, and making "Track II" as
unsuccessful as "Track I." On November 3, 1970, Salvador Allende was inaugurated as
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the President of Chile, making it plainly obvious that "U.S. efforts, both overtand covert,
to prevent his assumption of office had failed."5
Hence, if the ultimate outcome of the 1970 Chilean elections demonstrates
anything, it is the limits of US influence in certain areas of Latin America. Had a coup in
Chile succeeded with significant CIA assistance, it would have represented an important
challenge to the argument of this dissertation characterizing the United States as an
absent empire in South America. However, the way things actually developed provides a
clear demonstration of the limits of US influence in that regional subsystem, especially
when compared to similar events in the North American regional subsystem. Despite the
explicit orders by a US President to carry out plans to overthrow a Latin American leader
seen as an important threat to US interests, Allende was inaugurated in accordance with
the precepts of the Chilean Constitution. Perhaps the closest instance of a comparable
failure is the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba, but if in the case of Chile the US
imperial toolbox included relatively "soft" measures such as propaganda actions and
"encouragement" within the existent Chilean institutions for a military coup, the Cuban
case could hardly be classified under the category of "soft imperialism." The Bay of Pigs
was indeed an outright case of intervention through invasion, including the use of US
aircraft and US trained and equipped mercenary army to invade Cuba and topple the
government. While both are equivalent instances of failure, the Chilean case differs from
the Cuban case in the relative timidity of the actions undertaken in order to fulfill similar
objectives. If historians and political scientists want to classify both events under the
same category of "US intervention in Latin America" to make the case for US imperial
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thrust in the region, they may not be conceptually wrong depending on the definitions
used for "intervention," but they surely miss distinctions that are not negligible. This
dissertation expects to make these distinctions more discernible.
When Allende was finally overthrown by a military coup, it was not the CIA who
brought him down. There is a reasonable consensus that domestic factors played the
biggest role in the fall of Allende, and he would probably have been overthrow at about
the same time even "without the slightest encouragement from the United States."550
When it comes to foreign influences leading to the 1973 coup, there seems to be strong
indication that Brazilian actions played an important role, as will be explored later.
Obviously, having actively tried to prevent Allende from taking office, it would be
surprising if the Nixon administration made his life any easier, especially considering
events during his first twelve months in office such as the expropriation of US copper
companies with no compensation (in fact, these companies were told that they actually
owned Chile money due to "excess profits") and Fidel Castro's highly publicized monthlong visit to Chile. Although covert operations continued to be undertaken after 1970, the
major official action to influence the course of Chilean politics in that period was
economic pressure. Nevertheless, Washington's actions to affect the Chilean economy
after Allende was inaugurated president, in spite of claims of intervention, can be
interpreted as being perfectly legitimate. Withholding support for loans, reducing
investments, commercial credits and bilateral aid to a government identified as opposed
to US interests and had actually taken steps in an anti-American direction could only be
considered as intervention under the most vague of the definitions of the term. After the
United States had badly lost the bet to prevent Allende from coming to power in Chile, it
Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone : Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay: 415.

would be unrealistic to expect it to finance the so called "Chilean path to socialism,"
which was the political platform of the collation that supported Allende.
In fact, Allende's term as president was characterized by enormous economic and
political difficulties. However, attributing which part of the difficulties was the direct
result of US policies and which part lies within domestic factors and other international
conditions is a challenging endeavor. It is beyond the scope of this research to conduct an
extensive examination of Allende's management of the economy in order to assess its
effectiveness, but, when it comes to international factors, it should come as no surprise
that the socialist reforms carried out by Allende would scare some of the international
investors, particularly in the United States. In addition, in terms of international
conditions, perhaps more important than any individual US action was the drop in the
price of copper in 1971, which has historically represented a significant share of Chilean
exports. In terms of access to international credit, Paul Sigmund comments that Chile
"had surprising success in securing loans from countries other than the United States-and
these were by no means restricted to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China." 551
Sigmund maintains that loans from communist countries, plus Canada, Argentina,
Mexico, Australia and Western Europe "more than counterbalanced reductions from U.S.
and U.S.-influenced sources" and that by August of 1973, "Allende had more short-term
credits available to him ($574 million) than at the time of his election to office ($310
million)."
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States were counterbalanced by alternative sources from other parts of the world.

Juan

Batista Yofre informs that, from Argentina alone, Chile had secured a line of credit of
one hundred million dollars.

Commenting on the US strategy of economic pressure, the

Church Report noticed that while it could work on the long term, in the short term Chile
"was not immediately vulnerable to investment, trade or monetary sanctions imposed by
the United States."555 Indeed, the Foreign Minister of the Allende administration,
Clodomiro Almeyda, commented that even though US economic actions may have
contributed to the deterioration of the economic situation in Chile, "it cannot be said that
they were the primary cause of these difficulties."556 These statements help to put into
perspective the notion that the United States was responsible for all misfortunes of the
Chilean economy during the presidency of Salvador Allende. In any case, the important
theoretical question remains as to the effectiveness of external economic pressure,
especially if exerted unilaterally, in order to bring about political change.557 The example
of Castro's Cuba, which was even more economically dependent on the United States
than Allende's Chile, seems to demonstrate the limits of such influence.
But the state of the economy tells only part of the story, as Allende's political
situation was not any better. Elected by a margin of around just one percent in relation to
the candidate that came in second place, Allende presided over a divided country, and
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Chilean political life became increasingly polarized as the economy floundered. His own
coalition quickly came apart as the left and the "ultra-left" split, the latter reproaching
Allende for being "more reformist than revolutionary."558 The economic problems,
including shortages and growing inflation, exacerbated the political problems and
brought unrest to several sectors of the country.5

As time went by, there was a growing

notion that Allende was losing control of the situation and it was a common say in Chile
that "the President does not govern."

US covert support to the opposition - combined,

incidentally, with the far less researched Soviet covert support to the other side - may
have contributed to aggravating political tensions but it is implausible to assume they
were the major factor in creating them. This assessment is identical to the one made by
Allende's Foreign Minister, who remarked that "U.S. activities designed to destabilize
the UP {UnidadPopular] Government - activities which the U.S. authorities have
cynically acknowledged - did not create the factors which caused the UP Government to
fall but rather increased and intensified the impact of those factors."561 The Chilean forest
was burning and, while the United States threw in a few gallons of fuel, it definitely did
not start the fire.
As for direct US involvement in the military coup that eventually overthrew
Allende, the evidences to date seem to be conclusive in indicating that there was no such
participation. After extensive investigation, the Church Report found "no hard evidence
of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid."562
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Likewise, the Hinchey Report concluded that the CIA "was aware of coup-plotting by the
military" but that it "did not instigate the coup that ended Allende's government on 11
September 1973," given that "the consensus within the US government was that the
military intended to launch a coup at some point, that it did not need US support for a
successful coup, and that US intervention or assistance in a coup should be avoided." In
fact, continues the report, after Allende was inaugurated president, "the US government's
long term objective" was not a military coup but "to keep the opposition active in the
hope that it could defeat Allende in the 1976 election."5 These conclusions corroborate
US ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis' allegation that he "did not engage in coup
plotting" and that he was "unaware of any of my U.S. colleagues having done so,
including the personnel of the CIA station, the attache offices, and the Military Advisory
Group." 564 As Whitaker observed, the responsibility of the United States in the coup that
overthrew Allende seems to be very limited "to the disappointment, no doubt, of the
makers of U.S. policy towards Allende who flattered themselves on their success."

5

But if is true Davis did not engage in coup plotting, there are strong evidences that
his Brazilian colleague in Chile apparently did not share the same behavior. While
refuting the notion that the United States helped in coup plotting, Davis remarked that
"there is no real doubt in my mind that allegations of a Brazilian connection are true."5
Davis' predecessor in Santiago, Edward Korry, who served as ambassador from 1967 to
1971, was even more explicit when he stated in 1981 that"[t]he CIA did not overthrow
Allende [...] It played almost no role. The actual technical and psychological support
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came from the military government of Brazil."

Earlier, Korry had mentioned that the

Brazilian support for the coup was a "well-kept secret" in Washington.

Davis recounts

an episode of March 1973, six months before the military coup, when the Brazilian
ambassador to Chile met him and "made a series of leading suggestions (which I turned
aside), trying to draw me into cooperative planning, interembassy coordination, and joint
efforts toward the Allende government's demise."569 Indeed, there are several indications
that "Brazil's complicity was, actually, more extensive than it appeared" 57° and that
Brazilian ambassador to Chile, Camara Canto, was in fact actively involved in coup
plotting. Yofre, who conducted extensive research on the Argentinean ambassador to
Santiago during the Allende years, recounts the episode of a meeting between the
Argentinean and the Brazilian ambassador in 1969 when they discussed the possibility of
a coup in Chile in the case of an Allende victory in the following year. Yofre emphasizes
that this meeting made evident the close connections between Camara Canto and the
Chilean military.

Likewise, Bandeira comments that Canto was "intimately related

with those who conspired against Allende's ascension to the presidency of Chile."572
Before Allende's election, Camara Canto was informed by Santiago that the army would
not accept him as president, and when a coup failed to materialize, he attributed that to
"the lack of a leader."573 The Argentinean ambassador reported to Buenos Aires that
Brazil saw Allende's election as a "headache" and "a source of disturbances to all
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countries in the Southern Cone."

During a busy reception hosted by the Brazilian

embassy in Santiago a couple of days before the decision for the coup was made, the
main topic was the military coup that was about to happen.

In fact, a week before the

coup, the Brazilian Minister of War told the Paraguayan ambassador to Brazil that Chile
was "already in military hands."

A Brazilian Congressman close to Allende said that

the Chilean president had told him two days before the coup that "the Brazilian embassy
in Santiago was one of the main focuses of subversion against his administration, having
a more ostensive activity than the US embassy" and that a week before the coup, Allende
was actually preparing to denounce the "Brazilian connection" internationally.577
Besides official governmental participation, there is also evidence that private
sectors in Brazil helped with the coup. Marlise Simons, who interviewed Brazilian
businessmen and politicians, reports that "private business and interests" in Brazil "gave
money, arms and advice on political tactics" to coup plotters. Simons points out that the
Brazilian businessmen helped to plot the 1964 military coup in Brazil "were the same
people who advised the Chilean right on how to deal with Marxist President Allende,"
and that Chilean businessmen met with Brazilian businessmen to learn how "to prepare
the ground for the military to move."5 Brazilian political advice included instructions on
how to create chaos and mobilization, particularly in exploring the role of women in
mobilizing society and marching through the streets. A Brazilian politician reportedly
said that "we taught the Chileans how to use their women against the Marxists. Once we
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saw Chilean women were marching, we knew that Allende's days were numbered."

A

member of Brazil's Anti-Communist Movement claimed that he took money to anticommunist organizations in Chile and that the money came "from Sao Paulo and there
was a lot of it." 5 In addition, there is strong indication that the experience of the 1964
•

«

SRI

coup in Brazil was used as a model for civilian and military sectors in Chile.

One

Brazilian historian interviewed by Simons commented that "[t]he first two days I felt I
was living a Xerox copy of Brazil 1964. The language of Chile's military communiques
justifying the coup [...] was so scandalously identical to ours, one almost presumes they
had the same author."

In sum, although far less documented than the US participation,

these evidences indicate that Brazilian participation in the events in Chile also
contributed fuel to the fire that was consuming the Chilean political forest.
COT

Furthermore, while Argentina was "passive" during the coup,

and there is no

evidence that the United States was informed of the date beforehand,5

Brazil knew

about the beginning of the coup with "several hours of antecedence."

A representative

of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs said that "Allende's overthrown was not a
surprise" for the Brazilian government.

Five days after the coup, the first trip abroad of

a Chilean official was to Brazil. 587 General Augusto Pinochet, the chief of the military
junta who substituted Allende in the presidency, is reported to have said that "[w]e were
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still shooting when the [Brazilian] ambassador communicated the recognition."5

Indeed,

Brazil was the first country to recognize the new government and Ambassador Camara
Canto was apparently so pleased that he is reported to have answered the phone on the
day of the coup with the phrase: "We won."

Soon after the coup, Camara Canto

"coordinated measures of support to the new authorities"

and Brazil sent food and

medication in addition to political and military help and a credit of $200 million to
Chile.591 During the first year after the coup, Brazil provided $150 million in direct
economic aid to Chile, more than the United States.592 When the Pinochet regime
captured people accused of subversion, several accounts indicate that a number of the
captors spoke Portuguese.

One of the Brazilians tortured by the Chilean military

regime reports that Brazilian agents wrote the questions, and the medicine he took had a
label that stated "donated by the Brazilian Navy." 594
In regional subsystemic terms, the Chilean coup d'etat, combined with the
previous coups in Uruguay and Bolivia, meant an end to the feeling of isolation and
"encirclement" in Brazil and indicated in fact "an enlargement of Brazilian regional
influence."

Undoubtedly, the Brazilian military government "was pleased with the shift

to the right in the Southern Cone" since "it would remove many of the political obstacles
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to Brazil's goals" in the region.596 On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil's main competitor
for regional influence, became increasingly isolated, which was one of the contributing
factors for the 1976 military coup in that country.597 In fact, after Allende was
overthrown, Argentinean official communication reported that Brazil was "the biggest
beneficiary" from the coup and expressed concerns about the balance of power in the
region.598
All the above evidence was already fairly well known and was by and large based
on interviews, testimonies, and foreign governments' official communication. As has
been suggested, the student interested in exploring the role of Brazil in Chile in detail will
have to wait until Brazil makes available a larger part of the classified documentation
related to its military period. Nevertheless, recently declassified documents in the United
States present perhaps the strongest evidence to date of Brazil's official involvement in
Chile. These documents, declassified in July 2009, refer to a meeting between US
President Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici in December
1971. The records of the meeting show that Nixon and Medici got along really well,
shared basically the same views about hemispheric issues, and overall the meeting took
place in a particularly friendly atmosphere. General Vernon Walters, who was then the
US military attache in Paris and spoke several languages, served as interpreter for the
meeting. Walters reports twice in the same memorandum that Nixon "was greatly
impressed with Medici." He adds that the US president was "delighted at the personal
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rapport they had established and the closeness of their views. With only very few chiefs
of state had he developed so quickly a close relationship."599 The record of the meeting
states that since Nixon had felt that he and Medici "had gotten along so well and found
that their views were so close together, [...] it was important that they maintain close
contact and have a means of communicating directly outside of normal diplomatic
channels when this might be necessary."600 While Nixon appointed National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger as the representative for such private channels, Medici
appointed Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. More importantly, and what is
certain to make the life of the future researcher of the subject even more difficult, is the
fact that, according to Medici, Barboza kept a "special file in which all items were
handwritten, instructions or questions from the President and Gibson Barbosa's replies all
handwritten, so that not even typists had knowledge of them."
Barboza made no reference to this episode,

In his memories,

and asked years later about Brazilian

involvement in Chile, he denied the file's existence.
Nixon and Medici discussed several topics and basically agreed on all of them,
topics ranging from the policy towards Cuba to the difficulty, expressed by Medici, in
"dealing with and understanding the Spanish-American mentality."

Subsequently,

when Nixon asked Medici about the situation in Chile, the Brazilian president replied
categorically that "Allende would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that
599
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Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil." But the most relevant passage for the purposes
of the argument made in this chapter came after Nixon asked Medici about his
assessment of the capability of the Chilean armed forces to overthrow Allende. Medici
replied to Nixon that not only did he think the Chilean forces were capable, but also that
"Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans." More significantly, Medici
acknowledged that "Brazil was working towards this end." 605 This passage is of great
importance because it is perhaps the first document to show an official confirmation that
the Brazilian government was actively working to help Allende's fall. Nixon's response
is also germane, since he remarked that "it was very important that Brazil and the United
States work closely in this field" but added that the United States "could not take
direction." Nixon continued, saying that "if the Brazilians felt that there was something
we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Medici to let him know. If
money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available." The
Brazilian president expressed satisfaction in seeing "that the Brazilian and American
positions and views were so close."

This exchange is a perfect illustration of another

major argument of this chapter - that the coincidence in US and Brazilian views coupled
with Brazilian willingness to prevent the spread of governments associated with
communism in South America altered the structure of costs and benefits of US
involvement in that region and made it possible for the United States to "not take
direction" and exercise a "soft imperialism" of, in the words of Nixon, "discreet aid" in
South America. Had Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile fallen into the hands of
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communist governments, it is very unlikely, given the international environment of the
Cold War, that the United States would remain so discreet.
Further passages of the meeting report and other associated documentation
reinforces the notion of Brazil's "regional imperialism" as a South American surrogate
for US "imperialism" during the Cold War. The conclusion of the report on the White
House meeting suggested that Medici "hoped that we could cooperate closely, as there
were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could
not."607 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Walters noticed that "Medici wanted to do
everything he could to lighten the President's burden"

A CIA memorandum on the

four-day visit of the Brazilian president to the United States mentioned that Medici
"personally believes the Brazilian government must assume a greater role in defending
neighboring, friendly governments" and that he had "proposed that the United States and
Brazil cooperate in helping other democratic countries in Latin America counter the trend
of Marxist/leftist expansion." The memorandum adds that Nixon "took great interest in
this proposal and promised to assist Brazil when and wherever possible."

A few

months after Medici's visit to the United States, a National Intelligence Estimate entitled
"The New Course in Brazil" concluded that
Brazil will be playing a bigger role in hemispheric affairs and seeking to fill
whatever vacuum the US leaves behind. It is unlikely that Brazil will intervene
openly in its neighbors' internal affairs, but the regime will not be above using the
threat of intervention or tools of diplomacy and covert action to oppose leftist
regimes, to keep friendly governments in office, or to help place them there in
countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay. While some countries may seek Brazil's
607
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protection, others may work together to withstand pressures from the emerging
giant.610
Given the tone of these documents, it is somewhat astonishing that much of the
repercussion in the media at the time of their declassification interpreted them as an
attempt by the part of Nixon to "enlist Brazil in a coup" 6 n in view of the fact that
"cultivation of Medici fits Nixon and Kissinger's pattern of recruiting conservative heads
of state to the U.S. Cold War cause."

However, these views should not be especially

surprising since they merely reflect the traditional approach to the study of US-Latin
America relationship during and beyond the Cold War. Without an alternative framework
to interpret the relationship between the United States and South America, these analysts
tend to shape the facts according to their preconceived notions in which the United States
has virtually complete and homogenous control over the weaker countries south of the
Rio Grande. Therefore, even though the aforementioned documents indicate that it was
actually the Brazilian President who was "enlisting" or "recruiting" a very hospitable
Nixon to the cause of fighting "the trend of Marxist/leftist expansion" in South America,
the conventional international-system approach centered on the great powers hinders a
more accurate analysis of those primary documents, thus reinforcing a cycle that affects
the perception of researches who only had access to secondary sources.
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SURINAME: A FORGOTTEN EPISODE

On October 25, 1983, the United States conducted its first major military
operation since the Vietnam War when eight thousand US troops invaded the Caribbean
island of Grenada under the traditional Cold War rationale of preventing the spread of
communism. Due to the nature of this operation - an open and armed intervention - the
case of Grenada is thoroughly studied and mentioned in the literature as an example of
US interventionist disposition in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, a very similar
case at about the same point in time and in a country only a few hundred miles from
Grenada had a very different outcome, and because of that outcome it is virtually ignored
by the literature. Like Grenada, Suriname was also a country governed by a dictator with
affinities with the Castro government in Cuba. Like Grenada, Suriname was also
regarded as in a strategic position due to its geographic location near the Caribbean Sea.
Consequently, like Grenada, Suriname was also an important concern for the Reagan
administration in the hemisphere. Unlike Grenada, Suriname shared a border with Brazil,
and by the eighties it could be considered part of the South American regional subsystem.
Examining how the case of Suriname unfolded in contrast to the case of Grenada
provides a good illustration of how subsystemic factors contributed to avoiding a US
military intervention in the South America subsystem, thus keeping the US absent.
After 1980, when a military coup under the leadership of Desi Bouterse
overthrew the government of Suriname and declared the country to be a Socialist
Republic, the CIA started closely monitoring the situation in that country. In December
1982, fifteen people who identified with the opposition were arrested and executed,
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which drew world attention to Suriname and led the CIA to develop plans to invade the
country. These plans and the events that followed were kept in secrecy by all the
participants until recently. Perhaps the best source to date on this issue is Paul Kengor
and Pat Clark Doerner's book The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top
Hand.

Kengor and Doerner describe the events in Suriname as "the best kept secret in

Washington" at the time.614 They add that the participants "took almost no notes and kept
few written records of their involvement."615 Therefore, in order to write the chapter on
Suriname, Kengor and Doerner interviewed several of the participants in that event, but
most importantly William P. Clark, who was one of the central figures in the first Reagan
administration, serving as Deputy Secretary of State from 1981 to 1982, National
Security Advisor from 1982 to 1983, and Secretary of the Interior from 1983 to 1985.
Clark was a key participant in the Suriname case; he indicates that he was sent on a secret
trip to Brazil and Venezuela inl983 to develop, as Ronald Reagan recorded in his diaries,
a plan to "oust the dictator" of Suriname which "required their [Brazil and Venezuela]
cooperation."616
The case of Suriname illustrates the notion developed throughout this chapter that
the role of Brazil in the South American subsystem affected the structure of costs and
benefits of US action. The option to count on Brazil to deal with the situation allowed the
United States to limit its participation in that subsystem, which is made even clearer
when contrasted with the outcome in Grenada. As Kengor and Doerner point out, the
main hope of Clark's secret trip to South America "was that the Venezuelans and
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Brazilians could be encouraged to clean up their own neighborhood rather than face some
form of U.S. military intervention."617 The first stop of Clark's trip was in Caracas, where
the US plan to count on their cooperation was turned down. On the other hand, Clark's
meeting with Brazilian President Figueiredo yielded very different results. While the
Venezuelans were unwilling to help, in Brasilia Clark found "an extremely helpful and
unheralded Brazil."618 With Venezuela out of the equation, Clark's main goal in Brasilia
"was to persuade the Brazilians to take care of the Bouterse problem on their own, to
make it unnecessary for the United States to organize and orchestrate a major
deployment,"

and he presented the Brazilians with detailed scenarios for the invasion

of Suriname. As Kengor and Doerner comment, the presentation of the plan had an
important effect on the Brazilian Generals as "Brazil's brass was taken aback at the
specter of U.S. forces crashing into South America."

Following Clark's presentation of

the issue, the Brazilians came up with a plan that did not include an invasion force, since
Figueiredo "did not want a military operation, either Brazilian or American. Yet, he and
his colleagues also dreaded a Soviet presence next door." 621 The Brazilian strategy
included a package of assistance and cooperation, including military aid, in order to
substitute Cuban and Soviet presence by Brazilian influence. The Reagan administration
called this operation "Operation Giminich," in reference to the name of a horse that
Figueiredo had given to Reagan after a meeting between them. As it turned out, the
Brazilian proposal was "enough to keep Suriname from going Marxist and becoming a
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Soviet-Cuban base of operation in the Atlantic." 622 As Bandeira argues, while Brazil
developed its northern region during the seventies and the eighties, it sought to avoid the
penetration of foreign powers in the Amazon region.

Therefore, concludes Bandeira,

"once it could not simply negate collaborating with the United States, the Figueiredo
administration, in order to avoid the invasion of Suriname, which was already decided by
Washington, took the responsibility to solve peacefully the issue."

The whole deal was

kept secret and both sides promised to maintain its confidentiality, which explains why
this event is largely unaccounted for.
One of the main participants in the Brazilian mission sent to Suriname to offer the
package was diplomat Luiz Felipe Lampreia, who later became ambassador to that
country under Figueiredo and eventually Foreign Minister between 1995 and 2001
throughout the Cardoso administration. In 2010, Lampreia published his memoirs, which
helped to bring additional information to the events in Suriname. Lampreia recalls that
during the meeting between Clark and Figueiredo, the Brazilian President "refused the
invitation" to participate in the invasion of Suriname, "but said that, since it was a
neighboring country, Brazil considered that the situation in Suriname required an
adequate and exclusively Brazilian reaction," because the Brazilian government
"considered the issue to be their own responsibility."

Thus, the plan to offer technical,

economic, and material support in exchange for removing the Cubans - which, according
to Lampreia, totaled fifty million dollars - was born. For Lampreia, Bouterse and the
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Surinamese military were more opportunistic than ideological, and therefore the plan had
a high chance of succeeding without the need for a military intervention. Indeed, even
though Reagan was skeptical about the Brazilian proposal and offered US help "if you
wish, and whenever you ask for it," he acquiesced to the Brazilian proposal and wished
Figueredo luck.

Fearing the possibility of a Brazilian invasion, Bouterse gladly

accepted the plan, the Cuban presence in Suriname was greatly reduced, and the
operation was deemed a success. "Not a shot was fired!" celebrated Clark in a
memorandum to Reagan.627 As the Brazilian package was implemented in Suriname, the
United States was ready to send troops to Grenada.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The period of the Cold War provides perhaps the better opportunity to test the
hypothesis of this research that the specific dynamics of the South American subsystem
contributed to keeping the United States an absent empire in that part of the hemisphere.
Because of the particular characteristics of the bipolar period, the incentives for the
United States to intervene in countries in faraway places like Korea or Vietnam were
much higher. Within this context, it is unlikely to expect that any US administration
would tolerate countries in Latin America to fall in the hands of communist governments,
especially given the symbolism that it would represent. Therefore, usual justifications for
US relative lack of involvement or interest in South America, such as geographic distance
or strategic irrelevance, have perhaps their weakest explanatory power during this period,
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which was strongly characterized by an ideological confrontation that did not necessarily
followed pure strategic calculations. Indeed, successive US administrations demonstrated
great concern with the progress of events in South America, and at least two presidents
came close to intervening and toppling South American governments that were perceived
as being associated with communism. Such actions would come as no surprise, since they
would replicate a pattern of behavior that had been pretty clear in Central America and
the Caribbean. Nevertheless, in spite of the interest in South America and the disposition
to intervene and resort to imperial solutions, the best the United States could do was to
exert a kind of "soft imperialism." This difference between intentions and outcomes must
be explained, and this chapter intended to offer an explanation by employing the regional
subsystemic perspective
Hence, following the theoretical framework laid out in chapters three and four,
this chapter explains the United States' relative absence from South America during the
Cold War by looking at how Brazil affected the structure of costs and benefits of
subsystemic change for the United States in that period. In other words, Brazil's foreign
policy objectives in the South American subsystem basically coincided with US
objectives, thus raising the benefits for the United States for the maintenance of the status
quo and likewise decreasing the incentives for resorting to imperial solutions, such as an
invasion to topple particular governments. Brazil's economic growth at the time,
combined with the authoritarian character of the military regime, created the conditions
for a Brazilian "regional imperialism" that worked actively to contain the spread of
governments associated with communism in South America. As this chapter intended to
demonstrate, this policy was a result of Brazil's view of its national interests and was not

directed from Washington. An important part of the argument made here was the
deconstruction of the myth that anti-communism was a US prerogative that should
somehow be incorporated by South American countries through the diligent work of
indoctrination designed from offices in Washington. Obviously, the United States was
willing to take action, but the actions taken did not go beyond supplying an existing
demand for things like money, equipment and armaments. Because of Brazil's
willingness to play a regional imperial role during the period under study in this chapter,
as clearly demonstrated by the cases of Bolivia, Uruguay, and Suriname, there was no
need for an imperial policy from the part of the United States in South America. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Brazil has considered South America to be its area
of influence, and this perception continued to be very much present during the period
under study here.
It is within this context that the case of the 1973 military coup in Chile should be
understood. The Chilean coup is an especially hard case to test the hypothesis presented
here because it is widely mentioned in the literature as following the same pattern of US
interventions elsewhere in Latin America. To make a counterpoint to this view, this
chapter examined the extension of US involvement in Chile. Because the United States
worked to avoid Salvador Allende's ascension to power, and because he was eventually
toppled by a military coup, the temptation to connected the dots and establish a causal
relationship is high. This kind of temptation is helped by the usual framework of US
hegemony in Latin America and, although it can explain with reasonable adequacy
similar cases in Central America and the Caribbean during the Cold War, it does not
provide a satisfactory explanation for the case of Chile. The puzzle presented by Chile is

why the United States stopped short of an imperial solution, in contrast to what it had
done in other places in the world. As this chapter proposed to show, every step taken by
the United States - during both Democratic and Republican administrations - to prevent
Allende from being elected and later to prevent him from taking office failed miserably.
Given the outcome in 1970, if one wishes to offer an interpretation attributing it to the
works of foreign intelligence agencies, the merit should probably go to the KGB and not
to the CIA. The remaining explanation to link Allende's fall to actions taken by the
United States, since there is no clear evidence of US direct involvement in the coup that
eventually overthrew him, is the fact that the United States attempted to destabilize
Allende's government through economic measures. This explanation has at least two
main weaknesses: one is that it tends to attribute to the United States all misfortunes of
the Chilean economy, which is debatable, and the other that it makes a direct connection
between US economic actions and the political outcome in Chile, which is unclear.
The overemphasis of US actions, which is greatly helped by the abundance of
documentation available from US sources, blurs the focus on other countries that also
may have played a role in Chile. Because of Brazilian foreign policy at the time, which
was illustrated by its actions in Bolivia and Uruguay, one would suspect that Chile would
also be a concern for the Brazilian military regime. Indeed, there are a number of
circumstantial evidences - confirmed by two US ambassadors to Santiago - that states
Brazil was actively working with coup plotters in Chile. The lack of documentation from
Brazilian sources of Brazil's involvement in Chile, though, complicates the life of the
researcher interested in demonstrating its extension. Nevertheless, recently declassified
documents in the United States seem to provide the clearest evidence that Brazil was in
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fact taking actions in order to help the overthrown of Allende. These documents refer to a
meeting between Brazilian President Medici and US President Nixon which shows
Medici acknowledging that Brazil was working to overthrow Allende, and Nixon
demonstrating satisfaction that he could count on Brazil to limit US involvement in Chile.
To put in terms of the theoretical framework developed here, the Nixon-Medici
interchange is a clear demonstration of how Brazil successfully affected US cost-benefit
calculations, which made the US less likely to resort to an imperial strategy in the South
American subsystem.

CHAPTER 7
NEGOTIATING THE FTAA: THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM AFTER THE
COLD WAR

The disintegration of the USSR and the end of the bipolar system that
characterized the Cold War combined with the proliferation of democratically elected
regimes in South America would once again create new opportunities for the
development of new patterns of relationships in the Western Hemisphere, which could
eventually lead to subsystemic change. With the United States as the sole remaining
superpower in a reconfigured international system, and with the fears of a Sovietinfluenced communist takeover in Latin America out of policy makers' calculations,
economic issues tended to eclipse the earlier predominance of security issues. Hence, the
main prospects for the development of comparatively new patterns of relationships in the
Americas in the immediate post-Cold War was through the establishment of an allencompassing trading regional bloc which would be relevant enough to create new
patterns of trade and interdependence among the countries in the hemisphere and possibly
698

spill over to other arenas including political and security ones.
Indeed, the nineties began with such promise, after the completion of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the beginning of the negotiations for a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 1994. But after many years of debate, the
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FTAA never came into existence and, instead of the creation of radically new patterns of
relationships, what actually happened was the reinforcement and deepening of previous
patterns along regional subsystemic lines. In fact, the analysis of the process leading to
the rise and fall of the negotiations over the FTAA presents yet another opportunity to
observe the functioning of regional subsystemic pressures contributing to affect the
outcome of US foreign policies toward South America.
This chapter's choice in focusing on the FTAA negotiations as a case study does
not mean that the political perspective that characterized the previous chapters will be
abandoned in favor of a more economic approach based on trade analysis. Instead, in
order to preserve a certain level of homogeneity across the chapters, this section will
focus on the political dimension of processes of regional integration based on trade
fS9Q

liberalization.

Therefore, the analysis will move away from the specific effects that the

FTAA would have on patterns of trade in order to explore the political aspect of an
increased economic interdependence that such agreement would likely generate, or, at
least the policymakers' perception of such increased interdependence. The underlying
assumption is that the conclusion of a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere would
conceivably strengthen US political leverage, particularly in South America, since
Mexico, the Caribbean states and Central America are by and large already dependent on
the US market to a much higher degree than is the case in the rest of Latin America. In
other words, the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas could represent an
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important step in merging the North and South American subsystems through the creation
of new patterns of interaction.
The main argument of this section is that the outcome of the negotiations
concerning the establishment of a Free Trade of the Americas replicates the historical
pattern exposed in the previous chapters in which the role of Brazil was key to
understanding the relative absence of the United States in the South American regional
subsystem. Although keeping with the overall theme of the United States as an "absent
empire" in South America, there is no suggestion in this chapter that the institution of a
free trade area in the Western Hemisphere should necessarily correspond to an "imperial
offensive" by the part of the United States.

As a matter of fact, both NAFTA and the

FTAA could be understood more as push from Latin American states than as an exclusive
US idea, since the first began as a Mexican initiative (and was approved by the US House
of Representatives by a relatively narrow margin of 234-200) and the proposal for the
latter was met with enthusiasm in most of the Latin American capitals. This caveat is
important because it marks a difference in tone from the previous chapters, and the notion
of absence becomes now more salient than the notion of empire as defined in the
introduction of this dissertation. What matters for the purposes of the present chapter is
the fact that the developments of the negotiations for a Free Trade Area in the Americas
offer a good opportunity to investigate yet another instance when US policy makers
demonstrated a clear interest in expanding its presence in South America - now in a
completely different international environment from both of the periods analyzed earlier but again the outcome ended up being the same relative absence.
6j0
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This chapter examines the origins of the FTAA proposal, showing that the idea of
a hemispheric free trade area was launched at the same time that each of the regional
subsystems in the hemisphere were consolidating their own regional institutions around
core regional states: NAFTA in North America, and Mercosur in South America. It
shows that the United States saw a hemispheric free trade agreement as an extension of
NAFTA and consequently Mercosur was soon perceived as a nuisance by US
policymakers. Likewise, Brazil demonstrated clear reservations regarding the
establishment of a free trade area in the Americas since the beginning, a feeling that was
not initially shared by its neighbors. Therefore, contrary to earlier periods examined by
this research, the interests of Brazil and the United States now clashed, and given the
disparities in power between the two countries, it would be reasonable to expect that the
final outcome would favor the latter's view. Brazil's strategy was to lead the formation of
a South American bloc, thus raising the costs for the United States to push for an
agreement that could have the potential to affect the status quo in South America. This
chapter argues that Brazil's strategy of leadership was facilitated by the United States'
lack thereof. The chapter also shows that one economic crisis in each of regional
subsystems in the Americas - Mexico in North America, and Argentina in South America
- acted as catalysts that reinforced subsystemic dynamics and made it even more evident
the separation between these two regional subsystems. The combination of these factors
led to the eventual demise of the FTAA, with Brazil increasingly seeking to
institutionalize the South American subsystem and the United States resorting to bilateral
agreements with like-minded countries in that regional subsystem.
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NAFTA AND MERCOSUR

A few months after the United States signed a free trade agreement with Canada
in the late eighties, Mexican President Carlos Salinas approached his US counterpart
George Bush in the beginning of 1990 with the idea of a free trade agreement between
the two countries. Initially, this proposal "came as a surprise" to the Bush
administration,

since its top trade policy priority was the conclusion of the so called

Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which would
eventually lead to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In spite of the
initial hesitation, the Bush administration soon embraced the idea, as an agreement with
Mexico was seen from Washington's point of view as "part of an overall strategy of
building" a "continental base" centered on the United States.

Therefore, in August of

1990, President Salinas "formally requested a free trade agreement with the United
States." 33 The Canadians, who had just fought a fierce domestic battle over the
conclusion of their own free trade agreement with the United States, did not initially want
to get involved, but realizing that it had little to gain by staying on the sidelines, the
Canadian government later decided that it would be better to participate and consequently
they joined the negotiation in early 1991. Hence, what was initially a bilateral negotiation
became a trilateral one, and thus was created the basis for the treaty known as North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More than just a free trade agreement, at the
political level NAFTA allowed the US government to reaffirm the principles of
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international free trade "as a symbol and a reality of a new economic order ushered by the
United States as part of its victory in the Cold War."634 Indeed, in the midst of the
negotiations with Mexico, the Bush administration unveiled its Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI), a hemispheric program of which one of the central aims was
the extension of free trade to the whole of the Americas. Within the framework of a "new
world order," NAFTA would thus be just a strategic "continental base" from which the
United States would lead the post-Cold War world, beginning by reaffirming its
leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, US interest in hemispheric integration
could be interpreted as going beyond the notion of economic benefits given the
"possibilities it offers for the reinforcement of the structural and ideological foundations
of US hegemony, consistent with its parallel global strategies."
The vision of a hemispheric free trade area put forth by President Bush was
embraced by subsequent US administrations until its demise in the mid-2000s during the
second President Bush administration. While the first President Bush launched the overall
idea and initiated NAFTA, the Clinton administration wrapped up NAFTA and made the
FTAA one of its top foreign policy priorities in Latin America, an approach that was
followed by his successor. According to one of the participants in the initial stages of
FTAA, there was a growing feeling in the Clinton administration in 1992 that a
hemispheric summit "would be a logical follow-up to NAFTA."

President Clinton had

the expectation that the conclusion of NAFTA would enable the United States to "use the
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Mexican precedent to go into the whole rest of Latin America."

Accordingly, in 1993,

the Clinton administration announced that a summit would take place in Miami in
December 1994 to discuss a number of hemispheric issues. During the Miami Summit,
which was attended by all countries in the hemisphere except Cuba, the participating
countries announced the goal of a hemispheric free trade area to be established by the
year 2005, thus marking the beginning of the negotiations of the FTAA.
The year the Miami Summit convened was particularly relevant for matters of
hemispheric integration. In January of 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement,
which had been approved by the US Congress in late 1993, came into force. In December
of that year, a few days after the Miami Summit, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay signed in Brazil the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which complemented the 1991
Treaty of Asuncion and established the institutional basis of the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) thus giving Mercosur legal personality of international law and
providing it with effective actor capabilities in the international arena.

On the first day

of 1995, the four countries of Mercosur introduced a common external tariff covering
about eight-five percent of the goods traded within the bloc, thus transforming Mercosur
into a customs union, although an imperfect one given the fact that some of the goods
were outside the scope of the tariff. From an economic standpoint, Mercosur has been the
second largest trading bloc in the hemisphere after NAFTA in terms of combined GDP,
and the fourth in the world behind the European Union, NAFTA, and the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Therefore, any meaningful regional integration in
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the Western Hemisphere would have to accommodate the reality of Mercosur - to deal
with it or to do away with it. From the point of view of the United States, hemispheric
integration meant the absorption of Mercosur into an enlarged NAFTA with the United
States at the center. In fact, members of the Clinton administration expressed a number of
times that Mercosur was seen as "harmful" to the FTAA and "a threat to hemispheric
regionalism."

As pointed out above, the ideal design for the Clinton administration

would be basically to extend the NAFTA model southward. Given US economic weight,
such an arrangement could have the potential to eventually absorb the South American
regional subsystem if it ended up creating new patterns of relationship in the hemisphere
relevant enough to bring about a relative homogenization of a Latin American periphery
arranged around a US center.
Because of the prospects of altering the status quo in the South American
subsystem, this scenario was feared by Brazil, which held suspicions regarding the
establishment of free trade in the Americas since the beginning and saw it as an "obstacle
to the designs of Brazilian leadership within the regional order" in South America.640 In
fact, the Brazilian Foreign Minister during the Cardoso administration described the
FTAA as a tool to consolidate US "economic preponderance in the continent" and as a
"potential threat" to Brazil, therefore mirroring verbatim the Clinton administration's
view of Mercosur.
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1991, Brazil was clearly "the least enthusiastic among the participating countries to move
forward on hemispheric integration."642 In fact, Brazilian official position towards
hemispheric free trade has been, like the US official position, considerably consistent
through time, permeating four different administrations from different political outlooks.
Basically, Brazil's strategy has been one of securing and reinforcing its position within
the South American subsystem in order to avoid its absorption by an all-encompassing
hemispheric subsystem. Within this context, the establishment of Mercosur with the
Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 was a key strategic component. As soon as George Bush
announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the administration of Collor de
Mello in Brazil responded that it would only negotiate a hemispheric agreement within
the 4+1 framework, that is, the four countries of the recently created Mercosur would
take a joint position when negotiating with the United States. 4 In 1993, the same year
that NAFTA was approved by the US Congress, the administration of Itamar Franco
made a proposal for a SAFTA - South American Free Trade Area.644 These early efforts
demonstrate the Brazilian concern in securing a "continental base" for itself in order to
counter the prospects of a US commercial offensive in South America. In fact, when
Cardoso was the Brazilian Foreign Minister, he spoke about the notion of a "South
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American platform,"

and later, as president, Cardoso referred to Mercosur as "a pole

from which we will organize the South American space."646 Mercosur was thus seen as a
hub from which Brazil would build an alternative pole of attraction in the hemisphere,
and as a result would attempt to create obstacles for greater US penetration in the South
American subsystem. As will be shown below, these efforts were continued and then
deepened in subsequent Brazilian administrations.
Brazilian official strategy towards hemispheric free trade was, not surprisingly,
far from enjoying unanimity in South America. As a matter of fact, two of the biggest
powers in the region, Argentina and Chile, were very enthusiastic about the possibility of
coming to an agreement with the United States as early as possible, ideally before the
2005 deadline. In a complete reversal of its historically contentious stance towards the
United States, the Argentine government became one of its most fervent supporters
during the greater part of the nineties. Distant and often confrontational towards US
foreign policy initiatives during most of its history, Argentina undertook a complete shift
in that historical position under the administration of Carlos Menen and sought to
establish, in the now legendary words of Menen's Foreign Minister, "carnal relations"
with the United States.

Perhaps the best indication of this renewed relationship is the

fact that Argentina dispatched naval vessels to the 1991 Gulf War, the only Latin
American country to do so. In 1998, the United States reciprocated Argentinean
cooperation by designating Argentina as a "major non-NATO ally," also the only Latin
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American country to have this distinction.

Within this context, a trade agreement with

the United States was a logical extension of Argentinean foreign policy, which even
entertained the possibility of an accession to NAFTA.649 However, Argentina could not
freely sign a bilateral agreement with the United States without leading to the demise of
Mercosur as a customs union and creating problems with Brazil, which was a more
important market for Argentina than the United States: in 1994, the year before the Ouro
Preto Protocol took effect, Argentina exported twice as much in value to Brazil than to
the United States.

Therefore, by locking in Argentina through Mercosur, Brazil could

with reasonable success contain Argentinean initial enthusiasm during the early stages of
the FTAA negotiations. On the other hand, Argentinean and other South American
countries' eagerness for such an agreement was an important reason why Brazil could not
simply negate to negotiate the US-proposed FTAA, as it would leave Brazil isolated in
the region it aspired to influence.
Conversely, the constraints that applied to Argentina were not valid for Chile.
Chile was not part of Mercosur and the United States was a much more important market
for Chilean exports than Brazil. Moreover, Chile has had a relatively open economy and
international trade has been a key component of its development strategy. In fact, Chile
had been seeking a free trade agreement with the United States since the early nineties,
and after Mexico it was next in line to negotiate such an agreement. During the Miami
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Summit in 1994, Chile was officially invited to join NAFTA and was hailed by the
Canadian Prime Minister as the fourth "amigo" in the North American agreement.652
Following the official invitation, negotiations for Chilean accession to NAFTA were
formally initiated in 1995. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration had one important
domestic obstacle after 1994 - the lack of the so called "fast track" authority to negotiate
free trade agreements. This bureaucratic detail that, up until then, was little known
outside the circle of trade experts, turned out to be the centerpiece of the problems facing
the United States during the negotiations of the FTAA, and made it considerably easier
for Brazil to enforce its agenda in South America.
According to the US Constitution, it is the responsibility of the Congress to
regulate matters of foreign trade. Because of the possibility that Congress may change an
agreement previously signed by the executive to the point that it becomes entirely distinct
from what was originally agreed upon by the parts, Congress may grant the President a
special authority that became known as "fast track," which gives greater autonomy to the
executive to sign free trade agreements, leaving Congress the possibility to either accept
or reject it without amendments. Additionally, fast track rules require the Congress to
vote within ninety days after the bill is submitted by the president. NAFTA was approved
by the US Congress under fast track provisions, but that expired in 1994. For the
remainder of his administration, President Clinton unsuccessfully tried to reinstate fast
track authority after 1994 in order to promote the FTAA agenda. As it became clear the
difficulty that the Clinton administration had in obtaining fast track, the agreement with
Chile lost momentum and by 1996 Chile had all but abandoned any hopes of joining
652
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NAFTA. The Chilean President Eduardo Frei was reported to have "considered the
United States an unreliable ally."

As the difficulties in joining NAFTA became clear,

"Chilean advocates of expanding ties with the Southern Cone gained ground."654 Indeed,
in October of 1996, Chile joined Mercosur as an associated member, as it became, in the
words of Henry Kissinger, "tired of waiting for the long-promised access to NAFTA."655
By 1997, after Chile had already signed free trade agreements with both Mexico and
Canada, as well as with Mercosur and other South American countries, the Chilean
Foreign Minister declared that NAFTA ascension no longer had "either the urgency or
the importance it had in 1994."656
Therefore, whereas Brazilian leadership was an important factor to explain the
lack of an early agreement in the case of Argentina, in the case of Chile the main
explanation should lie with US lack of leadership; not so much because of an
unwillingness to lead, but more because of incapacity to do so due to domestic dynamics.
It is this combination of Brazilian obstructionism and US inability to provide the
necessary leadership that provides the better explanation for the failure of the FTAA. In
other words, Brazilian strategy of leading a South American bloc was greatly facilitated
by US lack of leadership in the process. The cases of Argentina and Chile during the first
couple of years of FTAA negotiations provide a clear illustration of this claim.
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LAUNCHING THE FTAA

As indicated above, since the very beginning of the negotiations for the
establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas two major views regarding the
character of hemispheric integration clashed. These two views were represented by the
two biggest economies in the hemisphere and the two major powers within their
respective regional subsystems: the United States and Brazil. These different perspectives
were rooted in the fact that the US view of the international system after the Cold War
clashed with the Brazilian view of preserving its role in the South American regional
subsystem. As noted above, while for the United States an expansion of NAFTA to the
whole hemisphere formed the basis of its approach to hemispheric integration and was
seen as part of the broader US view of a new world order, the Brazilian priority was to
consolidate its position in the South American subsystem which, from the point of view
of Brazilian policy-makers, would be jeopardized by a hemispheric free trade area.
Brazil's concern about regional leadership was unsurprisingly not shared by the
other South American countries, which, as exemplified by the cases of Argentina and
Chile mentioned above, generally greeted the 1994 Miami Summit with great
enthusiasm. In contrast, the Brazilian Foreign Minister signalized Brazilian skepticism
regarding the Miami meeting and "warned that the region had overly high expectations of
the summit." 57 These dynamics were already patently clear when US Vice-President Al
Gore made a trip to Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil in 1994 to promote the Miami
Summit, scheduled for the end of that year. Like Argentina, Bolivia also demonstrated
great interest in the proposal for a hemispheric free trade area and even suggested that it
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should be reached by the year 2000 instead of by the original 2005 goal. On the other
hand, Gore's meeting with Brazilian representatives revolved around recognizing Brazil's
"stature in hemispheric affairs" and "little discussion of the summit agenda as such." 5
The themes that Gore discussed in Brazil evidently reflected what the true Brazilian
concerns were at the time.
As the preparations for the Miami Summit went forward, it became increasingly
clear that accommodating the different views of the United States and Brazil would be a
central issue in the negotiations for a free trade area in the hemisphere. Because it could
not simply block the negotiations as it was in a relatively isolated position, Brazilian
strategy was to "render the plan of action more modest in its ambitions, less exact in its
objectives, less specific in its timetables, and less accountable in its implementation."659
In fact, not only did Brazil actively participate in the negotiations, its delegation in Miami
was second in number only to the United States, which is an indication of the interest that
the Brazilian government had in the issue.660 According to one US negotiator, "the heart
of the drama of Miami was Brazil's struggle to establish itself as the interlocutor for
South America,"

and a major concern of Brazil was to introduce changes in the final

text "aimed at lessening future US influence and leaving the integration process less
carefully scripted."662 Contrary to most of the other countries, Brazil wanted to gain time
in order to consolidate and enlarge Mercosur, in order to strengthen its own position visa-vis the United States, and only then attempt to strike a "grand bargain between NAFTA

'"Ibid., 108-109.
9
Ibid., 146.
,0
Ibid., 142.
1
Ibid., 195.
2
Ibid., 134.

and Mercosur (that is, between the United States and Brazil)."

In spite of Brazilian

efforts to bypass the mention of a date certain, the Miami Declaration stuck with the 2005
goal of hemispheric free trade, reflecting the view of the majority of the countries in
Latin America.
Therefore, by the end of the Miami Summit, even though the differences between
Brazil and the United States were clear, it was the latter that got the upper hand and
dictated the pace of the negotiations at the onset. This could obviously be understood as a
logical corollary of the overwhelming disparities in all dimensions of power between the
two countries, which seemed to offer support for the conventional analysis of US
hegemony in Latin America predicting that "[bjecause of US power, NAFTA is probably
a closer approximation to the evolving FTAA than is Mercosur."

In fact, many studies

that attempted to forecast the "economic and business outcomes of the FTAA" commonly
accepted the apparently obvious premise that the FTAA "is going to build on the basic
principles of NAFTA." 665 As soon as it was established, NAFTA was quickly presented
even as a theoretical model of "hemispheric regionalism" as opposed to a "Latin
American regionalism."666 However, the actual facts do not corroborate the assumption
that US power would inevitably bring into being the US view of hemispheric integration.
This gap between a proposed US policy and the actual outcome begs for an explanation.
Evidently, one could once again concentrate only on domestic factors and conclude that
this gap can be adequately explained by the troubles that the Clinton administration had
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in obtaining fast track authority from Congress. Although one can be satisfied with this
explanation - and domestic factors were certainly critical - it can also be argued that it is
an incomplete one. Indeed, even when the Bush administration finally got the fast track then renamed "Trade Promotion Authority" (TPA) - between 2002 and 2007, thus
including the 2005 deadline for the completion of the FTAA, still no hemispheric
NAFTA came into being. Instead, the Bush administration used the TPA to negotiate a
series of bilateral trade agreements with countries in the region, hence outside the scope
of a comprehensive hemispheric framework. This dissertation argues that taking into
consideration the regional subsystemic level can help explain this outcome. In order to do
that, it is necessary to understand how interactions at the regional subsystemic level
contributed to the developments of the FTAA negotiations after the Miami Summit.

MEXICO AND ARGENTINA: THE TALE OF TWO CRISES

A few days after the Miami Summit, on December 20, 1994, and following a
series of political shocks during that year that "bruised public confidence in Mexico's
political and economic stability," a sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso caused a
profound economic crisis in that country, with impacts all over Latin America.
Having just signed a free trade agreement with Mexico and with high stakes in its
financial stability, the United States acted swiftly in leading the elaboration of an
international rescue plan for its southern neighbor. The final package totaled about fifty
billion dollars, with the United States and the International Monetary Fund (where the
United States has the largest share of votes) contributing with more than two-thirds of
667

Joseph A. Whitt Jr, "The Mexican Peso Crisis," Economic Review 81, no. 1 (1996): 4.

this value.

Although the rescue package ended up being successful and the Mexican

economy recovered from the crisis by 1996, the costs of rescuing Mexico reduced much
of the enthusiasm in Washington for further agreements with other Latin American
countries, which greatly contributed to the difficulties of the Clinton administration in
obtaining fast track authority after 1994. Indeed, according to some analyses, the
Mexican crisis represented a "lethal blow" for the FTAA.669 This US paralysis offered an
opportunity for Brazil to push its agenda in South America, and while "U.S.
congressional approval of any post-NAFTA trade agreements had been put in jeopardy
by the Mexican crisis, Mercosur initiated negotiations with Bolivia, Venezuela, and
Chile."

By 1997, both Chile and Bolivia - which were two of the most enthusiast

countries regarding the FTAA - had been added to Mercosur as associate members, thus
starting a process of regional institutionalization that, as will be shown below, would
eventually lead to something resembling the original Brazilian scheme of a South
American Free Trade Area.
Therefore, by the time of the Second Summit of the Americas in 1998, in
Santiago, Chile, which officially launched the negotiations of the FTAA, there was a
clear change in the mood from four years earlier. While in North America the United
States had been intimately involved in rescuing Mexico from financial collapse, in South
America, Brazil, as President Cardoso had remarked, was actively seeking to "organize
the South American space" by using Mercosur as "the pole of attraction for a future
South American Free Trade Area." As the United States, for better or for worse, became
668
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more involved in Mexican affairs and faced the domestic consequences of such
involvement, a "leadership vacuum" was created in South America which "was quickly
filled by Brazil reaching out to other South American countries so as to establish SAFTA
to accumulate negotiating power" in order to deal with the United States. A clear
illustration of this change in mood that facilitated Brazilian strategy is the fact that Chile
was aligned with Mercosur at the negotiating table in Santiago.
Consequently, at the Santiago Summit in 1998, the scenario was much more
favorable to Brazil in comparison to Miami in 1994, as Brazil had achieved its key
objective of negotiating the FTAA not in a country-by-country basis but "between a
South American bloc, led by Brazil, and a North American bloc, led by the United
States." 672 This notion of the FTAA as following the principle of "building blocs," that
is, integration within the existent regional blocs, had been a key component of the
Brazilian strategy, which was clearly much more focused on first securing its position in
South America before reaching any agreement that included the United States. Hence, as
the negotiations were formally launched in Santiago, what initially seemed as a process
of hemispheric integration centered on NAFTA increasingly became a process of
hemispheric integration with two poles of attraction, one in North America and the other
in South America. In a matter of just four years, "the roles of US and Brazil in the FTAA
negotiations had been reversed."

7

According to one US analyst at the time, "[fjhe

balance of hemispheric power shifted at the Santiago summit" as "the United States had
lost the initiative in the FTAA negotiations" and had "become a mere bystander in a
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231
hemispheric process of trade liberalization in which Brazil now is setting the pace and
direction of negotiations."
Another financial crisis would soon have an impact on the negotiations of
hemispheric integration in the Americas. Similarly to what had happened to Mexico after
the Miami Summit, a few months after the Santiago Summit, Brazil would also be forced
to abruptly devalue its currency at the beginning of 1999. Argentina, which at the time
had a currency regime fixed by law to the value of the US dollar, soon suffered the
consequences of the Brazilian devaluation and, after a brutal economic, political, and
social crisis, was also eventually forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate in January
2002. Therefore, between 1999 and 200,1 while Brazil had a flexible exchange rate,
Argentina stuck to a fixed exchange rate, which created significant macroeconomic
imbalances between the two major Mercosur members. These events had dreadful
economic effects on Mercosur and created "a series of noisy trade disputes" between
Brazil and Argentina, with Argentina resorting to a number of protectionists measures
incompatible with Mercosur rules in order to compensate for the disparities in the
exchange rates between the two countries, which had made Argentinean exports to Brazil
less competitive.

Intra-Mercosur exports, which had quadrupled between 1994 and

1998, from around six to twenty billion dollars, dropped to ten billion dollars in 2002.676
Thus, while Mercosur was seen as a great success by the time of the Santiago Summit in
1998, at the next gathering of the heads of state and government of the Americas, which
was held in Quebec, Canada, in 2001, the South American bloc had effectively lost much
674
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of its economic rationale and faced its darkest period, with many analysts proclaiming its
imminent demise.

However, while the 1999-2001 crises underlined the economic

limitations of Mercosur, the eventual survival of the bloc and the subsequent events
underscored the importance of its political dimension, particularly to Brazil.
But before examining the factors behind the survival of Mercosur even after it
seemed to have collapsed, it is crucial to investigate how the Argentinean crisis made
evident pressures at the regional subsystemic level. Similarly to the Mexican crisis, which
brought Mexico and the United States closer together and at the same time decreased US
eagerness for hemispheric integration, the Argentinean crisis ended up having
comparable political effects in respect to the South American subsystem - as Argentina
recovered from its economic crisis, it became closer to Brazil and far less enthusiastic
about the FTAA. In other words, both the Mexican and the Argentine crises worked as
catalysts for reinforcing patterns of relationships within their respective regional
subsystems, thus demonstrating the difficulties of overcoming such patterns based on
regular interactions and geography and, consequently, in bringing about subsystemic
change. This assessment becomes even more apparent when one considers that both
Mexico and Argentina had similar foreign policy trajectories in their relations with the
United States - from a generally cool and sometimes confrontational policy during most
of their history, to an abrupt shift in the late eighties and early nineties as both sought to
develop a closest-as-possible policy. While this shift may be explained both by domestic
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factors as well as a response to the changes in the international system, the regional
subsystemic approach can help explain the differences in outcome of these two similar
policies. Examining the distinct interactions that followed the Argentinean economic
crisis in contrast to the Mexican economic crisis a few years earlier uncovers how
subsystemic dynamics were at play.
At least two factors can be pointed out to explain why the Argentinean crisis had
the effect of bringing Brazil and Argentina closer together instead of further apart, as
seemed to be the trend during the several trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil
after 1999. One factor was that the economic crisis led Argentinean policy makers to the
realization that the policy of "carnal relations" with the United States announced in the
early nineties seemed to have produced few tangible results. In contrast to its behavior
during the Mexican crisis a few years earlier, when the United States quickly acted to bail
out its southern neighbor, Argentina was treated with "indifference and lack of
assistance" by Washington.

This evident dissimilarity in US attitudes accelerated a

process of reorientation in Argentina's foreign policy towards a gradual distancing from
Washington, which had in fact been taking place since 1997, by the end of the Menem
•

*

administration.

67Q

With the short-lived era of automatic alignment with the United States

over, Brazil emerged as the "principal beneficiary" of US unresponsiveness to
Argentina's economic debacle, as Argentina openly refocused its foreign policy in
improving relations with its most important neighbor.680 Realizing an opportunity to
reinforce its position in South America, Brazil, "in stark contrast to the perceived callous
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indifference of the United States to Argentina's plight," took a series of unilateral
measures beginning in 2002 in order to facilitate Argentinean exports.

In addition, all

the Mercosur countries, including the associated members Chile and Bolivia, convened
an extraordinary meeting in Buenos Aires to offer their support and request financial
assistance to Argentina from international institutions. Therefore, as Mario Carranza
asserts, in spite of the negative effects of the Argentinean crisis on Mercosur, it "had a
positive political impact" since the "absence of US leadership to deal with the crisis
strengthened political solidarity among the Mercosur partners."
The second factor accounting for why the Argentinean crisis ultimately had the
effect of bringing Argentina closer to Brazil while it simultaneously became far less
enthusiastic about the need for a FTAA is, in a sense, intimately related to the first: the
fact that the extension and depth of the crisis that hit Argentina led to a "significant
reassessment of the country's power position in the regional, hemispheric and multilateral
systems." The immediate effect of this "downward revision of Argentina's power
potential" was that it increased the "incentives for bandwagonning with its stronger
neighbour in order to increase its leverage in external negotiations."

In other words,

the Argentinean crisis had such a psychological impact on policy makers and civil society
alike as to remove Argentinean pretensions of joining the developed North - as
symbolized by its inconsequential granting as a "major non-NATO ally" during the early
nineties - and to "South-Americanize" Argentinean foreign policy. This reorientation
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meant that Argentina's foreign policy had become closer to Brazil's, which had been
constantly seeking to establish a united South American front to negotiate the FTAA.
The above discussion helps to understand Mercosur's endurance in spite of its
near collapse. The basic reason seems to be the fact that Mercosur "has always been
about more than free trade," with important political and also military dimensions.684
While Argentina, as well as Paraguay and Uruguay, initially saw the commercial aspects
of Mercosur as the major factor for joining the regional trading bloc, for Brazil, whose
economic benefits from Mercosur are less significant, the main motivation "would appear
/joe

to be its ambition to be a regional power."

Successive Brazilian administrations have

consistently valued Mercosur not merely for its potential economic benefits, but as a
"potent symbol of Brazil's ambition to be a leader of South American unity."686 Before
the Quebec meeting in 2001, at the height of the crisis between Brazil and Argentina,
President Cardoso set the tone of Brazil's position declaring that '"Mercosur is a destiny
for us, while the FTAA is an option."

Without accounting for the strategic

considerations behind Brazilian support for Mercosur, in terms of the consolidation of a
sphere of influence in South America, it becomes definitely problematic to explain its
resilience. In fact, the survival of Mercosur after bitter trade disputes between Brazil and
Argentina following their financial crises can only be understood in the context of the
political approximation that they contributed to bring about, even as it accelerated the
shift in Argentinean foreign policy away from Washington and closer to Brasilia. In other
684
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words, Mercosur's survival "reflected a convergence of foreign policy or 'strategic'
incentives between the governments of Argentina and Brazil" that had been initiated in
the late nineties.688 Also important is the fact that after both countries were forced to
adopt a fluctuating exchange rate, this "strategic convergence" was followed by a gradual
macroeconomic convergence, which removed much of the rationale behind their trade
disputes. Indeed, intra-Mercosur exports grew every single year after hitting the bottom
in 2002, from ten billion dollars to a record forty-one billion dollars in 2008.
In regional subsystemic terms, the resilience of Mercosur is explained because it
is not an artificial arrangement with no basis on actual interactions but an institutional
translation of a regional subsystemic reality - the same way that NAFTA is.690 A putative
FTAA, on the other hand, would have to either reflect or create new patterns of
relationships in order to overcome subsystemic pressures and be an effective and
enduring institution. Because the FTAA did not reflect actual patterns of interactions
between the North and South American regional subsystems, it would have probably
required a combination of specific political circumstances in order to bear the necessary
costs to make it happen. Another possibility was that an unexpected disturbance in the
regional subsystems in the hemisphere - such as a financial crisis in a key regional state could set in motion potentially self-reinforcing subsystemic dynamics, making it even
more difficult or costly to create new patterns of relationship necessary for the
establishment of an enduring hemispheric arrangement.
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BRAZIL AS THE LEADER OF A SOUTH AMERICAN BLOC

Therefore, during the course of their interactions following the goals enunciated at
the Miami Summit in 1994, it became clear that neither US power nor the enthusiasm
with which the FTAA proposal was initially received in Latin America would necessarily
translate into a comprehensive hemispheric integration scheme centered on the United
States. The difficulties in obtaining fast track authority and the discrepancies in behavior
between the Mexican and Argentinean crises seemed to signal that the United States was
either unwilling or unable to bear the costs of subsystemic change through the
establishment of fundamentally new patterns of interactions. On the other hand, contrary
to its past strategies aimed at preventing the United States to undertake such change and
preserving the stability of the South American subsystem - when Brazil raised the
benefits of subsystemic stability for the Unite States - now the Brazilian strategy was
basically one of increasing the costs of subsystemic change through the consolidation of a
South American bloc centered on Mercosur.
By the time of the Third Summit of the Americas in April of 2001 in Quebec, in
spite of the apparent collapse of Mercosur at the time, the Brazilian strategy, in great part
because of the context explained above, was reasonably secured. As a new administration
was inaugurated in the United States that openly proclaimed its commitment to free trade
and to the establishment of the FTAA, the process of consolidation of a South American
space had already been set in motion.

As the preparations for the Quebec meeting

began in 2000, Brazil launched a historic initiative: it brought all of South America's
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leaders together for the first time to a conference in Brasilia in order to discuss a variety
of issues pertaining to that regional subsystem. The significance of this event was that it
was the first exclusive meeting of all South American presidents. The Mexican President,
like every other Latin American leader outside South America, was not invited for the
summit and declared that he "would like to have been invited," adding that "our
geographical situation in North America in any way impedes us from having an intense
relationship with Latin America." 692 This was not to be another "Latin American"
meeting, but explicitly a South American one. It was a concrete symbol of the realization
that South America was in fact a distinct regional subsystem, one in which Brazil played
a central role. As Sean Burges commented, the 2000 meeting was "the first exclusive
gathering of South American presidents, giving symbolic gravitas to South America as a
viable geopolitical entity" and its outcome suggested "an implicit acceptance of the
consensual leadership role that Brazil had been accruing over the previous six years."
For Burges, who places particular emphasis on the abovementioned concept of
"consensual leadership," this kind of leadership is based not on "coercion or imposition"
but on "coordination, consultation, and discussion."

Since it requires fewer resources

than relying on coercion, it is particularly fitted for a country that occupies a key position
in its region but at the same time has limited power resources, as is the case of Brazil.
The concept alluded to by Burges is based on the notion of "co-operative hegemony"
developed by Thomas Pedersen. In contrast to the hegemonic stability theory, which
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focuses only on powerful states,

the co-operative hegemony approach "centres around

the proposition that major states which are militarily weak or weakened may seek to
maximise or stabilise their influence through non coercive means by pursuing a strategy
of co-operative hegemony within a multilateral structure." 696 Thus, Padersen's theory of
co-operative hegemony seeks to explain the formative processes of regional
institutionalization based on the long term strategies of major regional powers, while at
the same time it highlights the importance of geopolitical and security elements, rather
than economic factors, leading to regional institutionalization. A key element of the grand
strategy of co-operative hegemony is what Pedersen denominates "power aggregation
capacity," which "refers to the capacity of a regional big power to make a number of
neighbouring states rally around its political project." The author adds that even though
"this capacity is constrained by external structural factors at the regional and global level,
it also depends upon psychological factors and leadership skills."

Padersen's co-

operative hegemony approach provides a particularly appropriate framework to
understand the role of Brazil during the FTAA negotiations, which became especially
evident after the year 2000.
By bringing together all twelve presidents of South America to Brasilia, the
Brazilian government officially signaled its attempt to rally the South American states
around Brazil's political project of organizing a South American space as a means of
inserting the region in the post-Cold War international system. President Cardoso
described the 2000 summit as a "moment of reaffirmation of South America's identity as
695
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a region" adding that a "free trade agreement between Mercosur and the Andean
Community will be the dorsal spine of South America as an extended economic space."
Therefore, he concluded, "it should be seen as a political objective of immediate
/AO

concern."

These statements make plainly clear the goal as well as the means to

accomplish it. The immediate goal was the construction of South America as a distinct
economic and political space. In order to achieve it, it was necessary to act in two
dimensions - at the ideational level, it was essential to affirm a South American identity,
while at the practical level it was necessary to merge Mercosur and the Andean
Community, which was the second major trading bloc in South America and at the time
included Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. This Brazilian proposal which was clearly an upshot of the original scheme of a South American Free Trade Area
unveiled almost a decade before - is especially significant if considered within the
context of the acute crisis that Mercosur was going through at the time, as pointed out
above.
The principle behind this policy was consistently supported by the administrations
that preceded Cardoso as well as by the administrations that have succeeded him. In fact,
the administration of Lula da Silva, which was inaugurated in 2003, saw the integration
of South America as a top foreign policy priority699 and in 2004, during the third meeting
of South American presidents in Peru, Mercosur and the Andean Community formalized
a cooperation agreement thus creating the "South America Community of Nations,"
which later became the "Union of South American Nations," or Unasur. In May 2008, the
Unasur countries met in Brasilia to sign its constitutive treaty, establishing its juridical
698
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and political components and including the Brazilian proposal of a South American
Defense Council. The Brazilian Defense Minister, when asked on a visit to Washington
how the United States could help, said that the best way the United States could
collaborate would be to "watch from the outside and keep its distance."700 Colombia,
which has had strong military ties with the United States and was then in the middle of an
acute diplomatic crisis with Venezuela and Ecuador, was the only country not to sign the
pact that created the Defense Council. However, after intense negotiations led by Brazil
and a growing fear of political isolation in the region, Colombia decided to join the
701

Council a couple of months later.

*

In 2009, the South American Defense Council held

its first meeting in Santiago, Chile, and was attended by all Defense Ministers of the
region. The main significance of this body is that it excludes the United States and
overlaps with functions that were previously performed by hemispheric bodies such as
the Organization of American States (OAS). In particular, it represents a challenge to the
security counterpart of the FTAA launched at the 1994 Miami Summit: the Defense
Ministerial of the Americas, which assembled for the first time in 1995, in Williamsburg,
Virginia and have met roughly every two years since then in different countries.
By explicitly articulating the concept of a South America as a distinct regional
subsystem, successive Brazilian administrations after the end of the Cold War were
basically recuperating a recurrent theme of Brazil's foreign policy that, as indicated in
chapter 5, was present since the early days of independence: the notion that in contrast to
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rest of Latin America, where Brazil would seek not to get involved and would sometimes tacitly, sometimes explicitly - recognize US preeminence, South America was
understood by Brazilian policy makers as being a Brazilian sphere of influence where US
interference should be kept at arm's length since it could easily overtake Brazil as the
predominant player in the region. The meeting of South American Presidents in 2000
made explicit the concept of South America once again as a key component of Brazilian
diplomacy, a reality that turned out to be even more salient during the Lula da Silva
administration.

One noteworthy change that was marked by the 2000 meeting was that,

while initially the Brazilian view of South America had been mostly restricted to the
Southern Cone, now it unequivocally incorporated the northern tier countries of South
America, including Guiana and Suriname.704 This reflected a process that had began since
at least the late seventies, and had become apparent by the Brazilian behavior during the
case of Suriname in the eighties recounted in the previous chapter. The agreements
between Mercosur and the Andean Community and the successive meetings of South
American presidents that led to the creation of a Union of South America Nations are
thus the institutional translation of these earlier interactions.
Consequently, by the time the Bush administration finally got fast track authority
from Congress in 2002, the Brazilian strategy was already clearly underway. Between
1994 and 2002, the years that US administrations had no fast track and therefore could
not provide clear leadership to the FTAA process, Brazil had achieved its goal of forging
a South American bloc by using Mercosur as an alternative hub to NAFTA with
reasonable success, and was also in the process of bringing Argentina closer to the
7(b
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Brazilian camp. With this basic framework in place, Brazil could shift the focus away
from the US lack of fast track and concentrate on more substantive issues such as
agriculture liberalization, particularly regarding non-tariff barriers, which had been a
focal point of disagreement between the United States and Brazil throughout the
negotiations. Again, the United States helped the Brazilian case by providing the
necessary ammunition when the US Congress passed a one-hundred-billion-dollar farm
bill that significantly increased agricultural subsidies in the same year that President Bush
got fast track authority, in 2002.705 The passing of the 2002 farm bill signaled the US
unwillingness to liberalize a sector that was central to Brazilian interests in the FTAA and
allowed President Cardoso to frame the United States, and not Brazil, as the real problem
for the establishment of hemispheric free trade.

In addition, the Bush administration

after September 2001 was primarily focused on the Middle East, which dominated the US
domestic political debate at the time.
Within this context, the results of a ministerial meeting in Miami in 2003, at the
final phase of the FTAA negotiations, was considered a Brazilian victory - the final
outcome of Miami was termed as a "FTAA a la carte" or a "FTAA-light," that is, a noncomprehensive FTAA with different levels of commitment.7 7 The Ministerial
Declaration of Miami stated that the "Ministers recognize that countries may assume
different levels of commitments" and that the "negotiations should allow for countries
that so choose, within the FTAA, to agree to additional obligations and benefits."708
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These statements meant that the notion that the FTAA should be negotiated as a
comprehensive "single undertaking," which was a basic principle until then, had come to
an end. Each country was free to negotiate which areas to put in a FTAA agreement and
with the interests of the United States and Brazil "very much at opposite ends of the
spectrum," (since the first was interested mainly on liberalization on services and
investments and the latter on the agricultural sector) they did not have any incentives to
compromise.709 It was the beginning of the end of the FTAA.
As the American heads of state convened for the Fourth Summit of the Americas
in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 2005, the long process of FTAA agony that had become
evident by the Miami Ministerial Declaration two years earlier came to an end. Since
2005 marked the original deadline for a final agreement on the FTAA and no agreement
was eventually reached, the ailing FTAA was virtually buried in Mar del Plata. The 2005
summit was a perfect illustration of how Mercosur was efficiently used by Brazil as the
core of its strategy to fend off the establishment of a hemispheric free trade area. Among
the thirty-four participants of the summit, twenty-nine were in favor of moving forward
on the FTAA negotiations.

The five dissenting nations were composed by the four full

members of Mercosur plus Venezuela, which a month later was officially invited to join
Mercosur as a full member. It is noteworthy that these five nations together represent
about seventy-five percent of the total GDP of South America. With the possibility of a
comprehensive hemispheric agreement out of the table, and with the Trade Promotion
Authority in hand, the Bush administration sought to establish bilateral free trade
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agreements with individual countries, including Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, at
the same time that Brazil sought to establish South America as an "extended economic
space," as President Cardoso had declared at the beginning of the decade. The biggest
difference between the two strategies seems to be that while the United States relies on
specific and detailed agreements with individual countries, Brazil seeks a higher degree
of multilateral institutionalization though a regional framework coupled with the attempt
to construct of a South American identity. These two approaches seem to be "on a
collision course"711 and point toward a situation of what Henry Kissinger had termed at
the beginning of the last decade as a "tacit competition" between Brazil and the United
States in South America since the end of the Cold War.712

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The process involving the rise and fall of the FTAA negotiations is a clear
illustration of Brazil's main regional strategy of keeping the United States at arm's length
in the South American subsystem. However, while earlier periods were characterized by
a general coinciding of core goals between the two biggest countries in the hemisphere which made Brazilian strategy less apparent and often confounded with subordination to
US policies - the reorganization of hemispheric relations brought about by the end of the
Cold War created the conditions for a clash in views and objectives between the United
States and Brazil. This made evident that the generally cooperative attitudes of earlier
times were contingent on US support to Brazilian broader regional goals. As Brazil
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perceived the United States as competing with its goal of keeping the status quo in the
South American regional subsystem, Brazilian strategy adapted to this perception.
Therefore, if earlier strategies were aimed at increasing the benefits of regional
subsystemic stability for the United States, now Brazil sought to increase the costs of
subsystemic change. This was done through intense participation in the FTAA process,
even though Brazil had clearly no enthusiasm for it, while in parallel leading the
formation of a South American bloc by creating political and economic incentives that in
many ways competed with the FTAA goals. Whereas the United States sought to use an
extended NAFTA as a continental base from which it would lead the post Cold War
world, Brazil sought to build a South American platform organized around Mercosur.
Because these two objectives tended to collide, both the United States and Brazil saw
each other's project as a threat to their own policies from the beginning.
As it turned out, in spite of the disparities in power between the United States and
Brazil, time was on the latter's side. Domestic and regional subsystemic pressures tended
to favor the maintenance of the status quo, and all Brazil had to do was work to delay the
conclusion of the FTAA in order to give time for these pressures to make themselves felt.
Whereas the launching of the FTAA negotiations reflected the weight of US power in the
hemisphere, the actual interactions among the American states following the Miami
Summit in 1994 reinforced subsystemic dynamics and made power discrepancies less
relevant to the outcome of the negotiations. In fact, in a matter of four years, between the
Miami Summit in 1994 and the Santiago Summit in 1998, it became clear that two poles
of attraction were being constituted in the hemisphere - one centered on the United
States-NAFTA core and the other centered on Brazil-Mercosur. Focusing on the

international system and on power imbalances would be of little help to explain this
configuration. In order to provide an effective explanation for this outcome, it is
necessary to take into account the interplay between domestic and regional subsystemic
dynamics.
Domestically, the difficulties of the Clinton administration in obtaining fast track
authority to negotiate the FTAA made it clear that the United States was not willing to
pay the costs of regional subsystemic change. This lack of effective leadership was a key
element in enabling Brazil to push its agenda in South America more successfully. The
case of Chile, which had gone from considering NAFTA membership to embracing
Mercosur, provides a clear illustration of this claim. In regional subsystemic terms, the
outbreak of the economic crises first in Mexico and later in Argentina acted as catalysts
that helped to set in motion regional subsystemic dynamics by bringing closer together
the two major actors of each regional subsystem - the United States and Mexico in North
America, and Brazil and Argentina in South America. While the outcome of the Mexican
crisis made it clear that NAFTA had definitively North-Americanized Mexico, the
Argentinean crisis contributed to the South-Americanization of Argentina's foreign
policy. Both of these processes reinforced interactions at the regional level making even
more difficult the establishment of new patterns of interactions necessary for the
reconfiguration of the regional subsystems in the hemisphere.
These interactions favored the Brazilian strategy of consolidating a South
American bloc around the Mercosur core, and when the United States eventually
overcame some of its domestic obstacles as the US Congress granted fast track authority
(then renamed Trade Promotion Authority) to the Bush administration in 2002, the

original FTAA goals of a genuine hemispheric integration had lost much of its impulse.
As a result, even with fast track authority in hands, the Bush administration was not able
to conclude the FTAA by the original 2005 target date. The immediate consequence of
the FTAA debacle was that the United States resorted to the establishment of bilateral
trade agreements with individual countries in South America, while Brazil hoped to
accelerate the process of institutionalization of the South American space, thus
incorporating issues going beyond trade, such as security.
In contrast to the US strategy, which relies mostly on specific trade agreements
and therefore is much more restricted, Brazil seems to pursue a strategy of co-operative
hegemony in which it attempts, within a multilateral structure and by stressing a common
identity, to make all South American states rally around the political project of
establishing South America as a distinct region within the hemisphere, thus increasing the
costs of a more significant US involvement in that subsystem. The Brazilian strategy of
leading a South American bloc seems to have been working so far, as indicated by a
recent public opinion poll taken on eighteen Latin American countries which shows
Brazil as being perceived as the country with greatest leadership in the region by 19% of
•

the population in Latin America followed by the United States with 9%.
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It is

interesting to notice that the same report shows that 67% of the Latin American
population sees the United States as a positive influence, contrasted to Brazil's 61%,
which seems to indicate that US numbers are not related to an anti-US feeling. Since
Brazilian leadership perception decreases as one moves from Argentina to Mexico, when
considering only the nine South American countries in the sample (excluding Brazil),
Brazil's average goes up to around 27%, with half of the Argentinean population
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indicating Brazil as the regional leader.

These numbers seem to indicate that Brazilian

strategy of co-operative hegemony has achieved a considerable degree of success, which
at the same time seems to depend to a great extent on keeping the United States as a
relative absent empire in the South American regional subsystem.

In decreasing order of Brazil's leadership perception: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Colombia,
Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation aimed to fundamentally address two broad sets of questions.
First, it sought to challenge the notion that the concept of Latin America should take
preeminence over other possible regional subdivisions within the field of international
relations. For that reason, the first set of questions asks if there is such a thing as South
America and, if so, what makes it distinctive from the rest of Latin America. The second
set of questions builds upon the first and asks if, from the perspective of international
relations, the fact that there is indeed a South American regional subsystem matters. In a
nutshell, it was argued that geography and patterns of interactions justify the existence of
a North and a South American regional subsystem in the Western Hemisphere, and that
this is important so that one may understand the distinct interactions that characterize US
relations with each of these subsystems.
In order to answer these two sets of question, this research developed a
methodology that was based on the literature on regional subsystems. Hence, chapter 2
offered a review of this literature, in order to organize and locate it within the broader
literature dealing with the issue of regions. A major concern of this chapter was to present
the literature on regional subsystems as a distinct theoretical body, particularly in relation
to the literature on regionalism. In examining the work produced on the subject, chapter 2
laid out a conceptualization of regional subsystems that was both regional and systemic.
Thus, a regional subsystem was defined as a subset of the international system reflecting
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the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum between
conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic proximity. By
focusing on geography and patterns of interaction as necessary and sufficient conditions
for the establishment of a regional subsystem, other variables, such as culture or level of
development, were deemed as irrelevant. Subsequently, chapter 3 sought to use the
insights of the previous chapter to understand the specific theoretical contributions of the
regional subsystemic approach to the study of international relations. It was argued that
the regional subsystem should be understood as a third level of analysis between the
domestic and the international system, therefore adding an extra level to the international
relations game. Because of the emphasis on patterns of interaction, it was demonstrated
that a constructivist perspective provides the most adequate fit for the study of regional
subsystems, which should take into consideration not only the spatial dimension (to
reflect geography) but also the time dimension (to reflect patterns of interaction). While
geography is hardly changeable, patterns of interaction are not and therefore this is where
the roots of subsystemic change should be found.
The theoretical framework developed in these two chapters, prepared the ground
for chapter 4 to finally answer the central questions asked by this research. This chapter
demonstrated that, if geography and patterns of interactions are considered as necessary
and sufficient conditions for the determination of a regional subsystem, it logically
follows that dividing the Western Hemisphere between a North American (including
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) and a South American regional subsystem
makes more sense from the point of view of the study of international relations than
dividing it between Latin America (including the Caribbean) and United States/Canada.
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While the first subdivision follows the regional subsystemic criteria laid out by this
dissertation, the second is based on variables that have little utility for the purposes of this
research. Nevertheless, it is the latter categorization that has been most widely used by
scholars of international relations.
As this research argued, the concept of Latin America is clearly not a geographic
one, even though it has been used as such. Indeed, making the case for a Latin American
regional subsystem based only on geography is far more complicated than making the
case for a South and a North American regional subsystem. On the other hand, chapter 4
sought to offer the rudiments of a possible way to operationalize patterns of interactions
based on the variables war/armed conflicts, trade, and international organizations. It was
suggested that North and South American countries fight more within their own
respective subsystems, trade more within their own subsystems, and create more
enduring and relevant international organizations within their own subsystems. Hence, a
central preoccupation of the present dissertation was to demonstrate that subdividing the
Western Hemisphere between a North and a South American regional subsystem can
provide relevant insights and uncover a number of important interactions that are
neglected both by using the international-domestic dichotomy as well as by employing
the concept of Latin America to explain the international relations of the Americas. In
summary, that is why it does matter that there is a South American regional subsystem.
Chapter 4 suggests that a key interaction that a regional subsystemic perspective
for the study of South America helps to uncover is the relationship between that regional
subsystem and the United States. While a number of students of Latin America have
acknowledged that "the United States has treated South America somewhat differently
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than it has Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean," this differentiation has not been
sufficiently theorized and explained.715 Basically, those who dedicated some time to
explain this differentiation have been content to point to two main variables: distance and
stability, which combined would make South America strategically irrelevant for the
United States. Although these variables can provide compelling explanations for the
relative absence of the United States in South America vis-a-vis the rest of Latin
America, the best they can do is perhaps explain a supposed lack of interest, or neglect,
toward South America vis-a-vis Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. However,
they have several shortcomings. First, they do little to satisfactorily explain why South
American states would be more "stable" than other Latin American states. Moreover,
these variables become less relevant in instances when the United States demonstrated a
clear interest in South American affairs, and yet the outcome was the same relative
absence. Finally, they tend to be a pretext to transform this US relative absence from
South America in the studies of US foreign policy.
The alternative explanation offered by this dissertation to account for the distinct
interactions that have characterized the relations between the United States and South
America in contrast to the rest of Latin America is based on the role of Brazil within the
South American regional subsystem. Hence, in making the case for a subsystemic
approach to the study of South America, this dissertation also makes the case for
emphasizing the role of Brazil in that subsystem. It follows that a central argument of this
research is that Brazil is a status quo power that has affected the calculations of costs and
benefits of subsystemic change in South America for the United States. In other words,
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this dissertation maintains that without understanding the role of Brazil in the South
American subsystem, any explanation for US relative absence from South America is
incomplete at best. Under this perspective, South America's allegedly strategic
irrelevance would not provide a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon; instead, it
may have worked in favor of Brazil in the sense that it gave more room for the South
American country to pursue its regional objectives by spending fewer resources than
would have been the case had South America been considered a region of high strategic
value.
In order to assess the validity of the hypotheses that Brazil has affected the
calculations of US statesmen when interacting with the South American regional
subsystem, chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore case studies demonstrating instances when a clear
interest in South America was demonstrated - thus the argument of neglect could be
discarded - and yet the outcome was consistently the same: an absence of imperial
policies of the kind that often characterized US policies towards the rest of Latin
America. Chapter 5 deals with the early interactions between the United States and the
newly independent Latin American countries in order to demonstrate that there has been
a clear differentiation, both in actions and discourse, between South America and the rest
of the region since the beginning of their interactions. This differentiation is hardly
acknowledged by the literature, which interprets the Monroe Doctrine as an all
encompassing policy that was applied homogeneously to the whole of Latin America.
Nevertheless, an examination that goes beyond the 1823 declaration and investigates how
the Monroe Doctrine was actually applied throughout history as well as the interpretation
given to it by subsequent administrations makes clear the scope and extent of that policy.
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This examination is what chapter 5 attempted to accomplish. It sought to demonstrate that
successive US administrations made progressively clear the Caribbean character of the
doctrine. Distance from the United States and relative stability of core South American
countries are just part of the explanation in the sense that these factors made possible the
early development of a system of power politics in South America around the ABC
countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It is noteworthy that the two administrations that
were the most interventionist in Latin America - Theodore Roosevelt's and Woodrow
Wilson's - were also the two administrations that most clearly made a distinction
between the North and South American regional subsystems. This view was utterly
reciprocated by Brazil, which pursued an "unwritten alliance" with the United States,
meaning "a tacit accord whereby Brazil acknowledged the hegemony of the United States
in North America and the United States respected Brazilian pretensions to the hegemony
~IA

of South America."

s:

This arrangement became even more relevant by the beginning of

the twentieth century, when Chile declined in power and Argentina developed a foreign
policy with a clear anti-United States component. Brazil's willingness to be the defender
of the status quo in South America allowed the United States to concentrate its actions in
the circum-Caribbean area, and there was no compelling reason for the United States to
change this state of affairs. In other words, Brazil played a role in South America that
increased the benefits of subsystemic stability for the United States.
The examination of these early developments of the South American subsystem
and its interaction with the United States helped to put in context the case studied in
chapter 6. The overthrow of the Salvador Allende government in Chile is an especially
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relevant case for at least two reasons. First, it is a clear instance when both a Democrat
and a Republican administration in the United States demonstrated a strong interest in
employing imperial policies in South America, such as the ones previously implemented
elsewhere in Latin America during the Cold War, like in Guatemala or in the Dominican
Republic. This was because the Cold War environment increased the incentives for the
United States, now a true global power, to intervene in several regions of the world in
order to contain the spread of communism. This was particularly true, even if for
symbolic reasons, in Latin America, which was considered the US most immediate
sphere of influence, where its power should be uncontested. The second reason that
makes the case of Chile particularly important is the fact that this has been widely
mentioned as an example of a homogeneous imperial Latin American policy on the part
of the United States. Because there is an abundance of evidence of US involvement in
Chile, the usual interpretation is that this equals an evidence of abundance. On the other
hand, there is much less evidence of involvement from third countries in the Chilean
case, such as the Soviet Union and Brazil, and this lack of evidence seems to be
interpreted as an evidence of lack. The result is that when it comes to the assessment of
foreign influences leading to the military coup that eventually overthrew Allende, there is
a virtual monologue when in fact there may have been more voices present.
Therefore, congruent with this research's central argument, chapter 6 intended to
emphasize the role played by Brazil during this process. By using both primary and
secondary sources, the chapter sought to put the specific case of Chile into context by
demonstrating Brazil military government's willingness to take action in order to prevent
South American countries from tilting towards communism. In other words, chapter 6

suggests that Brazil played a role in Chile that allowed the United States to limit its
involvement to that of a great power, instead of having to resort to truly imperial
solutions which would have involved taking decisive actions to topple Allende. Brazil's
role in the Chilean case was far from being an isolated one during the Cold War, as
demonstrated by the cases of Bolivia and Uruguay before that, and by the case of
Suriname afterwards.
Although covering different periods of time with different configurations of the
international system, the cases studied on chapters five and six had one characteristic in
common - they displayed a relative congruence in terms of foreign policy objectives
between the United States and Brazil in regards to the South American subsystem as both
sought the maintenance of the status quo there. This was not the case after the end of the
Cold War, when the United States proposed a free trade area in the hemisphere that could
potentially lead to the development of new patterns of interactions and, therefore, to
subsystemic change by incorporating the South American subsystem into a truly
hemispheric subsystem centered on the United States. Because this was perceived as a
challenge to the status quo in South America, Brazil sought to increase the costs of
subsystemic change for the United States. It did so by actively participating in the FTAA
process while at the same time working to create a web of South American institutions in
order to consolidate its position in that regional subsystem. Brazilian strategy was greatly
facilitated by domestic issues in the United States that were translated into a lack of
effective leadership to move forward with the FTAA. Additionally, economic crises in
Mexico and Argentina acted as catalysts that reinforced regional subsystemic dynamics
and brought closer together the pairs of countries that are the most relevant for each of

the regional subsystems in the hemisphere. By the end the first decade of the twenty-first
century, it was more evident than ever the distinction between a North and a South
American regional subsystem in the Western Hemisphere.

FINAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This research attempted to offer an alternative framework for the study of interAmerican relations in particular, and of international relations in general, based on the
regional subsystemic approach. This approach was presented as a third level of analysis
between - and distinct from - the customary two employed in the field of international
relations. The cases studied in this dissertation sought to apply this regional subsystemic
framework to the specific case of South America by emphasizing the interactions
between the two most important members of each regional subsystem in the Western
Hemisphere: the United States in North America and Brazil in South America. The focus
was on how US foreign policies initiatives interacted with the South American subsystem
to bring about outcomes that differed from the ones often produced elsewhere in Latin
America. It has been argued that, within this regional subsystemic framework, the role of
Brazil in the South American subsystem is the key to understanding the outcome of these
interactions, which has kept the United States a relatively absent empire in South
America.

One criticism that could be raised regarding the explanation offered here is that
each of the particular case studies could be satisfactorily explained by reference to
domestic politics, without consideration to regional subsystemic dynamics. For example,
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the failure to reach an agreement for a comprehensive free trade in the Americas could be
attributed to the rise of leftist governments in South America by the early 2000s that were
opposed to the FTAA project. Similarly, Brazilian policies during the military regime
could be attributed to the particular characteristics of that type of government. In fact, if it
could be demonstrated that the historical events studied by this dissertation were related
mostly to particular domestic configurations of individual countries, with regional
dynamics playing no distinctively relevant role, then this would obvious infirm the
hypothesis set forth here. Nevertheless, one preoccupation that was present throughout
this research was to make clear that there has been a regional pattern of interactions that
remained relatively stable regardless of particular domestic circumstances both in the
United States and in Brazil. Likewise, this was also true concerning the configuration of
the international system and the role of the United States in it. Even as the United States
went from a regional power in a multipolar world, to a global power in a bipolar world,
and finally to the remaining superpower in a unipolar world, there were certain patterns
of interaction that remained relatively unchanged. On the other hand, although Brazil
went from a monarchy to a republic, from a military regime to a democracy with
presidents from distinct political outlooks, the basic concern with the maintenance of the
status quo in the South American regional subsystem remained. In other words, changes
both in the domestic environments and in the international system did not lead to change
in the regional subsystem, which seems to indicate that the latter operates with a distinct
logic.
Evidently, as this research also sought to make clear, the fact that the South
American subsystem has shown a great deal of resilience does not mean that it is

unchangeable. Here, the agent-structure debate mentioned in chapter 2 is germane as it
indicated that agents and structures, or states and regional subsystems, both determine
and are determined by the other, which means that they are not independent variables but
the relationship is one of co-determination. This is central to explain the possibility of
subsystemic change, and in fact, this was an overall theme present throughout this
dissertation. One possibility for subsystemic change would be if the most powerful
outside actor concluded that the benefits of change outweighed the costs, that is, if the
United States decided, for example, to become a present empire in South America. This
could happen through the emergence of particular international conditions and domestic
circumstances in the United States combined with Brazilian inaptness to effectively affect
US calculations. The result would probably be the establishment of new patterns of
relationship in the Western Hemisphere, thus leading to a possible amalgamation of the
North and South American subsystems which would make any differentiation between
them largely irrelevant. Likewise, the hypothesis proposed by this research only remains
valid as long as Brazilian interests remain linked to the maintenance of the status quo in
the South American regional subsystem. It follows that if Brazil becomes unable or
unwilling to uphold the status quo, the possibility for subsystemic change increases
significantly. This dissertation sought to demonstrate that this basic interest has not
changed throughout history, and that it has been present regardless of variations in
domestic or international conditions. This is evidently not surprising, since it is
reasonable to expect the dominant power in any given regional subsystem to favor the
maintenance of the system's status quo, which perhaps explains the relative consistency
in Brazilian regional goals as opposed to the wide variations in the foreign policies of a
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number of other Latin American countries. As this dissertation intended to evidence,
because US power has been perceived as a potential threat to the Brazilian position in the
South American regional subsystem, keeping the United States an absent empire in that
subsystem has been a central Brazilian concern.
The discussion above is also important to address another important issue
regarding the assumptions of this dissertation. The attentive reader will notice the
constant references to "Brazilian" or "US" interests, which would indicate that, in spite of
the constructivist methodology, this research has a realist bias since it both considers
states as the main actors in international relations as well as it treats them as unitary
actors primarily concerned with what they perceive as their own national interest. While
the first is indeed a central assumption of this research, the second is only partially so.
Because this research had a systemic/structural focus of which the aim was to explain
continuity rather than change, as well as the outcome of foreign policies initiatives rather
than decision-making processes leading to particular policies, treating states as unitary
actors was nothing but a convenient expedient for the sake of parsimony. As pointed out
above, a central concern of this dissertation was to show that there has been a broad
pattern of interactions between the United States and the South American regional
subsystem that has existed regardless of particular domestic circumstances. It would be
difficult to make this kind of generalization and at the same time to take into
consideration the complexities of domestic processes. Additionally, since this research
covers a lengthy period of time, examining the peculiarities of each individual foreign
policy decision would be a herculean task clearly beyond the scope of the dissertation.
Nonetheless, a convenient expedient is not necessarily an assumption. Neorealists can
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comfortably assume states as unitary actors in great part because they treat the
international system as the independent variable, creating such dominating pressures that
domestic dynamics are of little or no importance. The theoretical perspective employed
by this research assumes that states and regional subsystems are mutually constitutive and
therefore domestic changes may eventually lead to subsystemic change. In fact, this
dissertation makes an important unit-level assumption when it claims that successive
Brazilian governments have been concerned with the maintenance of the status quo in
South America, which can also be understood as a response to a subsystemic incentive.
As mentioned above, was this central concern to change, the subsystem might also
change. Because this has not been the case, and the aim of this research was to explain
the persistence rather than transformation of the South American regional subsystem, it
was not necessary to resort to the examination of domestic dynamics.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

As pointed out above, in order to answer the questions posed by this research, it
was necessary to develop a methodology based on the concept of regional subsystem.
This methodological choice was based on the grounds that neither the domestic nor the
international system approaches were equipped to explain the main puzzle examined by
this dissertation. Although the main concern of this dissertation was to analyze
specifically the interaction between the United States and the South American subsystem,
the methodology employed here could contribute to refining broader theoretical questions

in the field of international relations. At least three major theoretical contributions can be
pointed out.
The first contribution that the regional subsystemic perspective developed here
could offer to the study of international relations is when one moves from the strict focus
on great powers to the study of lesser powers in the international system. The
international system approach, with its explicit focus on the great powers, tends to ignore
the importance of middle powers. Because middle powers are likely to have mostly
regional - rather than global - interests, the regional subsystem approach seems uniquely
equipped to understand the role of these states both in relation to their own regional
subsystem as well as in relation to outside powers. This has become increasingly more
important, as it becomes clear that traditional international system approaches to
international relations have limited applicability in the current world. Conventional
systemic approaches based on the number of poles in the system and the formation of
global balances of power tend to become less relevant in a world that is neither
multipolar, bipolar, and increasingly less unipolar. In the mid sixties, George Liska
described the international system as bipolar, but "unifocal," meaning that even though
there were two major poles in that system, it constituted in essence an "imperial system"
centered around the United States - the relationship of individual countries with the
United States was more important than the relationship those states had among
717

themselves.

Drawing from Liska, one could describe the current international system

as unipolar, but multifocal. That is, even though there is one clear major pole in the
system, the system is not necessarily organized around this pole. It is not that the United
States has lost its preeminence, or even that it will lose it in the near future, but that this
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preeminence is becoming increasingly irrelevant. In other words, the international system
may still be characterized as unipolar but that does not seem to matter much. If during the
Cold War, global pressures emanating from the bipolar configuration of the international
system could explain a number of phenomena, in the current world states are increasingly
subjected to pressures emanating more from their own respective regional subsystems
than from the international system as a whole.
A second contribution of the regional subsystem approach to the study of
international relations is the fact that it draws attention to the other fundamental feature of
the international system, besides anarchy: non-mobility, that is, the fact that states are
fixed in space. Applying systemic theories that were created and taking into consideration
units that are mobile to a system where the major units are non-mobile may generate
unsatisfactory explanations. If a system is composed by structure and interacting units,
the regional subsystem approach highlights the fact that both anarchy and geography
affect the interaction among states. Ignoring the role of non-mobility would mean to
assume that if Brazil where located where Mexico is, little would change in Brazilian
foreign policy. This seems counterintuitive for the simple fact that Brazil's foreign
policy, as the foreign policy of any other state, is intimately related to its geographical
situation. Therefore, the regional subsystems differ from the international system in
which the first varies not only in time, but also in space. Applying the framework laid out
by this dissertation to the study of other regional subsystems would require first
delineating the borders of the regional subsystem based on geography and patterns of
interactions, followed by the identification the specific characteristics of the regional
subsystem under study, which is what chapter 4 attempted to do for the South American
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subsystem. This characterization could start by deciphering the main regional actors and
the main outside powers, followed by an examination of how the main regional actors
interact within their own subsystem as well as how they interact with the outside powers.
If a general theory of regional subsystems is to be developed, it should probably begin by
establishing the main criteria to classify different types of regional subsystems in order to
compare and evaluate whether similar regional subsystems display similar characteristics.
Finally, the regional subsystem approach deals with two fundamental theoretical
issues in international relations: the level-of-analysis question and the agent-structure
debate. Regarding the first, the subsystemic perspective opens up new possibilities for
research since it reveals a third level of analysis located between the domestic and the
international system. Thus, it seeks to avoid both the artificial homogenization associated
with the latter as well as the over-differentiation associated with the first by
acknowledging different degrees of interaction among states but without necessarily
looking into each individual country, since the main concern is with the role of the most
powerful regional players. Nevertheless, because the overwhelming majority of the
literature in international relations has focused either on the total international system or
the national state, the regional level has remained considerably undertheorized. In
relation to the agent-structure debate, the regional subsystem approach, with its
acknowledgement of different levels of interaction among states, calls for the utilization
of an approach equipped to deal with the relationship between social interaction and
structural effects. Hence, this dissertation argued that a constructivist perspective, the
basic premise of which is the notion that agents and structure are mutually constitutive, is
appropriate. But while the constructivist literature tends to stress ideational structures in

detriment of material structures, the regional subsystem approach, by stressing
territoriality, highlights the latter. Consequently, it assumes that interactions among states
are affected not only by the role of ideas, but also by the physical reality of geographic
location, which also affects how ideas are produced and reproduced.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Demonstrating the existence of a distinctive South American subsystem and
examining how it has interacted with the United States has not only implications for the
study of inter-American relations but also has important policy implications for US
policy makers. First and foremost, it makes evident that the United States must take into
account that its initiatives toward Latin America will generally tend to have different
outcomes in the different regional subsystems in the hemisphere. Almost forty years ago,
Thompson commented that "the foreign policy of great powers have on occasion given
the impression that subsystems either do not exist or at least need not to be taken
seriously."718 Although it could be argued that overall the United States has improved in
terms of designing specific foreign policies for different regional subsystems, in its own
hemisphere there has been little advance, as there remains the premise that there is a
Latin American regional subsystem. Therefore, it would be advisable for the United
States to do away with its "Latin American" policy and design policies specifically
directed to South America. In fact, the United States does not have an "African" policy
that includes both Egypt and South Africa for the simple reason that this would be of
little use in practical terms. The State Department has a "Bureau of African Affairs" that
718
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covers sub-Saharan Africa, while having a separate "Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs" for
North Africa and the Middle East. Conversely, the "Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs" covers all of Latin America.
But bureaucratic subdivisions are less important than actual policy formulations,
and the fact is that the United States has developed a specific set of policies for key
countries in the world. Hence, successive US administrations have had to deal with the
development of a China policy or a Russia policy. Likewise, within the context of a
larger South American policy, a Brazil policy should be developed. This has become
even more relevant given the increasing importance of Brazil in the international arena.71
As Fareed Zakaria argues, in spite of political turmoil, the first years of the 2000s
witnessed the largest period of global economy expansion, which benefited particularly
the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, and opened the way for a "tectonic
power shift" in the distribution of power. For Zakaria, this redistribution of power has led
to a "post-American world" characterized not necessarily by the decline of the United
States, but by "the rise of the rest."720 Within this context, even though much attention
has been paid to India, and especially to China, Brazil may become a relevant player. For
Leslie Gelb, the current international system is characterized by a "pyramidal" structure
in which the United States occupies the top and right below it there is a second tier
composed by China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Brazil. Gelb terms these countries as "the Eight Principals," and claims that they possess
"enough power to provide essential support to joint efforts with the United States and to
719
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block or seriously impede action by Washington."

According to Gelb, these are the key

countries that the United States should take into consideration when seeking support for
its actions in the different parts of the globe.
Therefore, the development of a foreign policy distinctively designed for Brazil
makes sense from the point of view of the United States both because of Brazil's
increasing clout in the emerging international system as well as within the specific
context of South America. As long as South America in general, and Brazil in particular,
remains buried in the midst of a "Latin American" or a "Western Hemispheric" foreign
policy, US initiatives toward the region will be destined to have few satisfactory results.
If the United States could easily afford not having a South American policy in the past,
the current global trends seem to indicate that this neglect will increasingly have more
important consequences for US ability to shape the post-American world.
But what kind of South American policy should the United States design?
Although it is not the aim of this dissertation to offer an answer to this question, a few
lessons from what has been demonstrated here could be helpful. Chiefly among them is
the fact that any US policy that can be interpreted by Brazilian policy-makers as affecting
the status quo in the South American subsystem will almost certainly face resistance in
Brazil. The question is how an increasingly more powerful Brazil is going to manipulate
this resistance within the context of the South American subsystem. If, on one hand,
Brazil's growth may give it more resources to defend the status quo in South America
and consolidate its position, on the other hand this same growth may generate suspicions
among its neighbors and resurface fears of a Brazilian hegemony in the subsystem.
21
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Therefore, Brazil's ability to handle its own rise regionally will be a key component of
how regional subsystemic dynamics will evolve. In any case, if the United States intends
to have any significant future leverage in Brazil and consequently in South America, one
feasible alternative is to increase the level of interdependence, particularly in the
economic field, between them. This would require taking measures, even if unilaterally,
directed at increasing the level of trade between the two countries, particularly in areas
sensitive to Brazil, such as agriculture. For example, Brazil has a successful sugarcanebased ethanol program, and it could export much of it to the United States if it was not
for the existence of an almost prohibitive tariff imposed in order to protect an inefficient
corn-based domestic ethanol industry.

Measures as simple as removing the tariff on

Brazilian ethanol would significantly increase the level of interdependence between
Brazil and the United States, thus approximating the two countries. Obviously, there are
domestic obstacles in the United States that must be overcome in order to undertake such
initiatives. The question then is whether US policy-makers will be willing to bear the
costs of global and hemispheric leadership in the new emerging international
environment or if domestic concerns will make the United States increasingly more
absent from South America.

I have discussed this topic earlier in more detail in: Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, "Brazil and United
States: Fading Interdependence," Orbis 55, no. 1 (2011).
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